Reconciliation in New Zealand involves recognition, reparations and an apology for past injustices relating to breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1840, Māori and the British Crown signed a treaty that promised a beneficial relationship to both signatories. Almost immediately after the Treaty was signed and continuing through to today, promises inherent in the principles of the Treaty have been breached. However, in 1975, a government-appointed permanent commission of inquiry was established to investigate actions or omissions of the Crown that breach the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi. The Waitangi Tribunal and the Ministry of Justice provide the institutional mechanisms used in New Zealand to foster reconciliation. This article will discuss how the state has moved iwi from being in Treaty ‘grievance mode’ to one of tino rangatiratanga/Māori self-determination and demonstrates how reconciliation has integrated Treaty settlement iwi into the mainstream New Zealand economy.
Drawing on the work of Matike Mai Aotearoa: The Independent Iwi Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (the Working Group), this article argues that there is an evolving New Zealand constitutionalism, one that offers a constitutional understanding grounded in the Māori constitutional system. The article opens with a descriptive analysis of the Māori constitutional system, explains the key features of New Zealand’s existing constitution and concludes with an argument that the existing constitution can evolve – and, through the political process, ought to evolve – according to the constitutional models that the Working Group recommends. This article deploys legal research methods, primarily doctrinal research and applied doctrinal research.1
In this article, I outline the existing legislative options available and rationale for Māori representation in local government. I suggest that the arguments and rationale against Māori representation have been exacerbated by a lack of clarity around local government’s duties and obligations stemming from the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the second part of this article, I explore more recent arguments by Māori for representation and involvement in local government decision-making on the basis of being mana whenua, which means to have territorial authority and power associated with the possession and occupation of tribal land. This argument foregrounds specific iwi (tribes) as holding territorial authority and therefore rights to representation and involvement in decision-making sourced in tikanga Māori (Māori law), over and above other Māori who live in that area. I examine in detail the Rotorua District Council’s establishment of the Te Arawa Partnership Board in 2015 and argue that this Board and its first election results provide unique insights into the relationship between Te Arawa people living in and outside the district and has implications for broader conversations about the rights of Māori living away from their tribal areas.
We introduce a method for assessing the overall level of bias and relative tracking accuracy in time-series analysis of polling data on voter intentions by comparing two data sets: the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (N = 13,936) and the One News Colmar Brunton election polls (N = 10,210). The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study is a national probability longitudinal postal panel survey started in 2009. It was set up to track stability and change in values, without any intention to predict election results. The One News Colmar Brunton poll is a nationally representative random-digit dial telephone survey conducted by Colmar Brunton specifically to measure voter sentiment. Our comparison focuses on responses to both surveys from February 2014 to September 2014, in the run-up to the New Zealand general election. The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study and One News Colmar Brunton poll detected nearly identical changes in party vote over time, and both effectively predicted the outcome of the 2014 general election. This shows the unexpected power of national-scale probability postal studies to track change in democratic decisions that affect all members of a society. These results further support the validity of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study as an independent and impartial source that might be ‘repurposed’ to create a continuous monitor tracking political attitudes and detecting citizens’ reaction to, and relative change in opinions towards, different social policies, values and attitudes over time.
This article aims to contribute to the growing literature on the substantive representation of women in conservative parties by evaluating MPs’ claims to ‘act for women’ during parliamentary debates on reproductive health and same-sex marriage in the UK and Australia. It argues that the actions of centre-right MPs who made claims about the situation of women in their speeches can be understood as the substantive representation of women, but the nature of this representation is problematised. While some legislators’ actions can be understood as a ‘feminist’ substantive representation of women, the action of MPs who supported liberalising reforms can be broadly understood as a different kind of ‘conservative’ substantive representation of women, which aims to address women’s status in a more traditional way. This can be differentiated from the actions of a group of conservative MPs who claimed to ‘act for women’ but did not seek to address women’s position (even in a traditional way), which is considered conversely as the representation of conservative interests. This article argues that to fully understand MPs’ legislative behaviour in Westminster democracies, consideration of an MP’s ideological view must be central to any explanation of the substantive representation of women on ‘morality politics’ issues.
As part of recent efforts to advance participatory policymaking, there is increased collaboration between government and women’s groups creating, in principle, ‘deliberative mini-publics’. While there is substantial literature debating the merits of mini-publics, their longer-term influence on ‘macro-political’ environments is still unfolding. This article examines the particular case of a successful collaboration between the New Zealand government and the sexual abuse sector (represented by Te Ohaakii a Hine – National Network Ending Sexual Violence Together or TOAH-NNEST) in the specially commissioned Taskforce for Action on Sexual Violence, which ran from 2007 to 2009 to evaluate the processes and politics of engagement. Drawing on interviews and documentary evidence, the article maps the oscillating nature of engagement for TOAH-NNEST, and the gains and losses in partnering with successive governments since its inception in 2006. The analysis in this article identifies the factors that led to the success of the ‘mini-public’/Taskforce, and those that disabled the impacts of the successful collaboration at the macro-political level. The article concludes with a discussion about the challenges of engagement for community groups in dynamic political and policy contexts.
Our study investigates how political candidates’ occupational background and gender influence voters’ perceptions of candidates’ competence to handle a variety of policy issues and voters’ support for candidates. Using experimental data collected among American and New Zealand students (N = 794), our multivariate analyses indicate that students perceive candidates with political experience as most competent in handling security-related issues, candidates with a business background as most competent in handling economic issues, and candidates with a background in education as most competent in handling human services issues. This pattern is similar for male and female candidates and holds in both countries. The effect of candidates’ occupational background on the likelihood to vote for the candidate, however, differs between both countries. Whereas occupational background does not seem to matter for American students, New Zealand students are substantially less likely to vote for a candidate with a business background than for a candidate with political experience.
The article analyzes Taiwan’s legitimacy debate over trade negotiations with China. The theoretical concept of legitimacy is used to assess Taiwan’s cross-straits negotiation mechanism and trade agreements. This article argues that Taiwan’s current legal framework governing congressional supervision of cross-straits agreements falls short of procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy. By explaining the constitutional design for Taiwan’s "white glove" mechanism, the article explores the initial procedural legitimacy deficit. As cross-straits negotiations involve increasingly substantive obligations, the legitimacy of bilateral agreements has changed fundamentally. The massive protest of the Sunflower Movement due to the Services Trade Agreement reinforced legitimacy concerns. Taiwan’s ambiguous congressional review procedures and negative public perception undermine the performance legitimacy of cross-straits agreements. Notwithstanding the conclusion of free trade agreements with Singapore and New Zealand, Taiwan’s domestic political impasse will jeopardize its efforts to integrate into regional free trade agreements. Hence, the legitimacy of Taiwan’s law and politics regarding cross-straits negotiations will have a profound impact on its cross-straits and foreign trade policies.