Can the theory and practice of the yogic tradition serve as a challenge to dominant cultural and political norms in the Western world? In this essay I demonstrate that modern yoga is a creature of fabrication, while arguing that yogic norms can simultaneously reinforce and challenge the norms of contemporary Western neoliberal societies. In its current and most common iteration in the West, yoga practice does stand in danger of reinforcing neoliberal constructions of selfhood. However, yoga does contain ample resources for challenging neoliberal subjectivity, but this requires reading the yogic tradition in a particular way, to emphasize certain philosophical elements over others, while directing its practice toward an inward-oriented detachment from material outcomes and desires. Contemporary claims about yoga’s counterhegemonic status often rely on exaggerated notions of its former "purity" and "authenticity," which belie its invented and retrospectively reconstructed nature. Rather than engaging in these debates about authenticity, scholars and practitioners may productively turn their energies toward enacting a resistant, anti-neoliberal practice of yoga, while remaining self-conscious about the particularity and partiality of the interpretive position on which such a practice is founded.
Marcel Duchamp describes the infrathin as "the most minute of intervals, or the slightest of differences." Working through Duchamp’s proposition, and taking him at his work that the infrathin cannot be defined as such—"One can only give examples of it"—this article explores how the infrathin comes to expression and asks what a politics of the infrathin might look like. Key to the exploration is the question of how else value can be defined and how this rethinking of the concept of value might compose with the concept of a pragmatics of the useless.
This essay analyzes what Alexis de Tocqueville calls an "application of linguistics to history." Beginning with Tocqueville’s position that language is the ground of meaningful bonds between people, I argue that the internal logic of a language—the grammar—is correlated with the internal logic governing the social order that both begets and is begotten by that language. Social orders therefore have both linguistic and political grammars and, as the internal logic of language changes, so too can the political grammar. This essay thus traces what Tocqueville envisions as the historical importance of language: from the language of aristocracy and the grammar of difference, to revolutionary language and the grammar of concurrence, to democratic language and the grammar of indifference. It concludes with Tocqueville’s suggestion of how good grammar might be taught in democratic ages.
In recent work, Martha Nussbaum has exposed an important ambiguity in the standard conception of political liberalism. The ambiguity centers on the notion of "reasonableness" as it applies to comprehensive doctrines and to persons. As Nussbaum observes, the notion of reasonableness in political liberalism can be construed in a purely ethical sense or in a sense that combines ethical and epistemic elements. The ambiguity bears crucially on the respect for persons norm—a key norm that helps to distinguish political from perfectionist versions of liberalism. Nussbaum contends that when political liberals affirm a construal of reasonableness that includes epistemic elements they run into trouble in formulating an account of their view that sharply distinguishes it from perfectionist liberalism. She contends further that perfectionist versions of liberalism should be rejected since they fail to offer an account of respect for persons. This paper responds to Nussbaum’s challenge. It argues that an adequate account of respect for persons must make reference to epistemic elements. This being the case not only explains why political liberals were correct to incorporate epistemic elements into their accounts of reasonableness but also why it is a mistake to think that perfectionist liberals themselves cannot present an appealing account of respect for persons. Nussbaum’s challenge merits careful study since it both sheds light on the nature of political liberalism and highlights an important faultline in its structure.
In a recent article in Political Theory (40, 5: 573–601), entitled "Human Rights, Freedom, and Political Authority," Laura Valentini proposes a "freedom-centered" account of human rights. On this account, "human rights are derived from the universal right to freedom, namely each person’s innate right to a sphere of agency within which to pursue her ends and goals without being subject to the will of others" (574). In spite of its prima facie appeal, I argue that Valentini’s theory does not do a good job at explaining some of our settled convictions about the content of human rights and that she offers an implausibly restrictive view of our reasons for respecting human rights. I conclude by very briefly presenting the main elements of a broader perfectionist and dignitarian account of human rights, which seems more consistent with our settled convictions on these matters.
Printers and presses were central to the physical and social reproduction of the classical anarchist movement from the Paris Commune to the Second World War. Anarchists produced an environment rich in printed words by creating and circulating hundreds of journals, books, and pamphlets in dozens of languages. While some scholars and activists have examined the content of these publications, little attention has been paid to the printing process, the physical infrastructure and bodily practices producing and circulating this remarkable outpouring of radical public speech. This paper brings the resources of the new materialism into conversation with the networks of anarchist printers and presses. Printers and presses operated as nodal points, horizontal linkages among the objects, persons, desires, and ideas constituting anarchist assemblages. In their publishing practices, anarchists may have implicitly identified a constitutive condition of possibility for the flourishing of radical political communities in our time as well as theirs.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is no doubt an autocratic regime, where the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamanie, has taken it upon himself to micromanage the suppression of the opposition for many years. In this respect and in the eyes of most Iranians, the resignation and submission of the Iranian reformists, including the former president Mohammad Khatami, is puzzling if not downright treacherous. By appropriating the insight of an Italian Renaissance writer, Baldassare Castiglione, in his book, Il Libro del Cortegiano or The Book of the Courtier, I hope to offer an alternative interpretation of the confounding position of the Iranian reformists. Contrary to its prevalent reading in its scholarship, which takes Il Libro del Cortegiano as an apolitical book, its more recent scholarship has discovered a political program, which in the absence of freedom aims to ameliorate the conduct of the tyrant through the actions of the courtier, who provides an example of honourable conduct and public service. I propose to adopt the ideal of cortegiano as a heuristic device that, when applied to the Iranian situation, can explain Mr. Khatami and his fellow reformists’ acquiescence as a stratagem of resistance that, in the absence of a better alternative, works as the politics of the second best to make their "master" a better leader by offering an example of a more virtuous leader.
Lucretia Mott is widely recognized as a moral and spiritual leader in the abolitionist and early women’s rights movements. She has been characterized as a disciple of William Lloyd Garrison, a proliferator of Mary Wollstonecraft’s ideas, and a religious promoter of human rights whose efforts were surpassed by the theoretically sophisticated and politically astute Elizabeth Cady Stanton. These portrayals paradoxically elevate Mott’s status while understating the originality of her views. This analysis examines Mott’s speeches and writings in detail and finds that her unique theoretical contributions are shaped by a combination of elements: a radically anti-dogmatic worldview rooted in her progressive religious faith, an unwavering commitment to autonomy for all people, and an egalitarian conception of power. Careful study of Mott’s work reveals a compelling alternative viewpoint in the early women’s rights and abolitionist movements and provides important insight into the philosophical roots of contemporary feminism and pacifism.
David Walker’s famous 1829 Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World expresses a puzzle at the very outset. What are we to make of the use of "Citizens" in the title given the denial of political rights to African Americans? This essay argues that the pamphlet relies on the cultural and linguistic norms associated with the term appeal in order to call into existence the political standing of black folks. Walker’s use of citizen does not need to rely on a recognitive legal relationship precisely because it is the practice of judging that illuminates one’s political, indeed, citizenly standing. Properly understood, the Appeal aspires to transform blacks and whites, and when it informs the prophetic dimension of the text, it tilts the entire pamphlet in a democratic direction. This is the political power of the pamphlet; it exemplifies the call-and-response logic of democratic self-governance.
Nineteenth-century American political thinkers like Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman advocated for and sought to exemplify a life of self-direction and critical self-reflection, or personal autonomy, as a means of contesting entrenched routines of democratic-capitalist normalization and as a way of resisting a host of institutional disciplinary pressures. Today, the ideal of personal autonomy within a diverse liberal society is branded by many as a form of "comprehensive" disciplinary normalization in its own right. In this essay I offer a reconsideration of this reversal in the appraisal of the value of autonomy within pluralistic democratic societies and argue that the abandonment of autonomy is a symptom of a mistaken understanding of the personal-ethical qualities upon which a democratic culture depends and a maladaptive concession to neoliberal norms. To confront these challenges, I draw upon a range of Emerson’s writings to offer some ideas about how a reconstructed ideal of aspirational autonomy might inform contemporary politics without unduly constraining moral pluralism or undermining toleration.
In this essay, I propose an interpretation of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples that puts the stability of liberal societies as the central organizing idea of its principles. I start by critically examining other interpretations currently found in the literature. I observe two characteristics of Rawls’s conception of stability from his political turn: stability for the right reasons and in the right way. In the main body of the essay, I argue that the absence of a global egalitarian principle is compatible with the stability of liberal peoples, that the toleration of decent peoples is conducive to the stability of liberal peoples, and that the universal enforcement of human rights and assistance to burdened societies are rationally required for the stability of liberal peoples. I clarify the meaning of the centrality of peace and stability, and explain why it is not conspicuous but still unsurprising given Rawls’s personal history and the development of his theory of international justice. I conclude by suggesting how the stability interpretation paves the way for further extensions of Rawls’s theory of justice and assessing the practical value of The Law of Peoples.
This essay explores the political significance of two largely unexplored texts on American radio that Adorno originally composed in English after emigrating to the United States: Current of Music: Elements of a Radio Theory and The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas’ Radio Addresses. Here, productively complicating the traditional image of him, Adorno translates his theory to a broader public in ways that reflect a desire to understand and inform democratic citizenship as enacted at the level of the everyday customs, conventions, and habits of the people. Ultimately, Adorno’s writings on radio in the United States show how he tries to strengthen the substantive practice of democracy through a unique form of democratic leadership as democratic pedagogy that represents the practical enactment of an early version of negative dialectics. With this justification for Adorno’s complicated commitments to democracy in mind, we might begin to read him as a twentieth-century democratic theorist and productively turn to an unlikely thinker, not just to read a message in a bottle but to help us chart our current position and navigate our future course.
William Connolly has made important interventions in political theory over a period of four decades, and the past few years have seen a surge in recognition of his contribution. Those who are familiar with Connolly’s ideas will know the role that continental theorists—especially Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze—have played in the development of his thought, and more recently the uses he has made of advances in the natural sciences, for example in complexity theory, in the work of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, and the Nobel Prize–winning chemist Ilya Prigogine. With reference to these innovations, a consensus has emerged in recent discussions, that there is a basic discontinuity between Connolly’s "postmodern" theory of pluralism and the "old" pluralism of the generation of post-war political scientists. By way of contrast, in this essay I outline the congruity between Connolly’s ideas and earlier iterations of pluralism. I trace the essential continuities between Connolly and the leading post-war writers, especially Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, David Truman, and David Easton, and also his proximity to a tradition of pluralism that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century and was exemplified in the work of Arthur Bentley. Indeed, I make the case that Connolly’s work is best understood as the resumption and enhancement of a distinct canon of pluralism in American political thought.
Since the rediscovery of the ancient Indian political thinker Kautilya and his Arthaśāstra in the early twentieth century, scholars have argued for similarities between his political thinking and Machiavelli’s, especially on the topic of realism. Employing a new analytic approach to reexamine their political thought, I locate unidentified tensions and overlaps between Machiavelli’s secular ethic, which pulls towards autonomous standards, and Kautilya’s political-theological ethic, which follows traditional brahmanical beliefs. In the first part of the essay, I challenge existing interpretations of Kautilya’s thought and clarify a coherent political theology in the Arthaśāstra. The second part critically assesses their realist positions using the concepts of flexibility and legitimacy. While I explain how the Machiavellian position poses justifiable objections to the apparent repression and self-defeating nature of brahmanical realism, I also argue that the Kautilyan position raises important questions concerning both the flexibility and inflexibility of a secular realist position.
The Perestroika movement recently reopened longstanding debates about the scholarly and political implications of orienting political science research around a scientific ideal derived from the natural sciences. Many Perestroikans, like earlier critics of "naturalized" political science, turned to ontology, opposing the political world to the natural world to espouse what I call a two-sciences settlement: a separate-but-equal arrangement in which political science and natural science would each operate according to distinct methodological imperatives dictated by their distinctive objects. In this article, I critically appraise this divided settlement and the two-worlds ontology that underwrites it. I recover an alternative, less dualistic vision of politics and nature from Giambattisa Vico, challenging received views of him as an early architect of the two-sciences settlement. Vico’s vision of ontological hybridity, I argue, offers more robust support to the Perestroikan goals of methodological pluralism and political engagement than the two-worlds ontology Perestroikans often invoked.
This essay interprets Hannah Arendt’s concept of the "social question" through a reading of her controversial essay "Reflections on Little Rock." I argue that Arendt’s social question refers to social climbing and not simply poverty, as she initially suggests. The social-climbing framework illuminates "Little Rock" in two ways. First, it explains why Arendt opposed mandatory school desegregation, which she saw as black social climbing, that is, African American citizens and the NAACP using the US courts and federal government to raise the status of African Americans to the level of whites. Second, and more significant, it provides a framework for criticizing "Little Rock" with Arendt’s own standards and criteria in mind. Reminded by Arendt of the suspect politics of social climbing, we can see something she did not: segregation was not "natural" association but an institution established after the Civil War to protect white social climbing and social advancement.
This paper considers the politics of tolerance through the lens of Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence. The contention is that Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence provides us with a better conceptualization of the relationship between tolerance and power, and that it in so doing reinvigorates a theory of active tolerance that, for the most part, has been lost in contemporary democratic theory. Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence does so because it animates a sensorial orientation to politics, one that heightens our attention to the affective components of political life, enabling us to better theorize how all modes of existence, including the so-called passive ones, harbor a degree of power that can be mobilized for purposes that go beyond the "non-practice" highlighted by advocates and critics of tolerance in contemporary democratic theory. The paper develops this argument with ongoing reference to Marcuse’s critique of tolerance.
In the nineteenth century a group of "labor republicans" argued that the system of wage-labor should be replaced by a system of cooperative production. This system of cooperative production would realize republican liberty in economic, not just political, life. Today, neo-republicans argue that the republican theory of liberty only requires a universal basic income. A non-dominated ability to exit is sufficient to guarantee free labor. This essay reconstructs the more radical, labor republican view and defends it against the prevailing the neo-republican one. It argues that neorepublicanism lacks an adequate conception of structural domination, which leaves it without theoretical resources to address certain forms of economic domination. The concept of structural domination allows us to comprehend the coherence of the nineteenth century, labor republican view and identify its relevance to modern labor markets. Labor republicanism takes us beyond a universal basic income to a concern with control over productive assets and workplace organization. As such, it shows us how the republican theory of liberty can support an argument for the transformation of work, not just the escape from it.
Interpretations of Nietzsche, particularly about politics, cover an exceptionally wide range. Additionally, Nietzsche is often said to commit "rhetorical excesses." I argue and show that Nietzsche consciously crafted his published works to allow this range of interpretations, that he did this for critical purposes, and that his so-called rhetoric is there to serve this purpose.
The concept of dependence is central both to the study of modern republicanism and to the study of systemic corruption. Recently, Lawrence Lessig has described American politics as suffering from "dependency corruption," a type of institutional corruption about which eighteenth-century republican writers were extremely worried. This article examines the use of the concept "dependence" in the current "neo-roman" republican theory stemming from Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, and particularly Philip Pettit. The article argues that the term dependence has two essentially distinct inflections, one relating to outright domination (subjection to arbitrary power) and the other relating to a condition of material subordinacy (dependency corruption). If liberty is the "the absence of dependence on the will of others," it is extremely important to determine just what independence entails. This article suggests that dependency corruption was a dominant concern of the modern republican tradition, but it is a concern that is largely ignored in today’s new republicanism. By way of a foray into the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources employed by the new republicans, the article attempts to revive a manner of thinking about corruption that risks being lost to view.
The debate over Locke’s theory of slavery has focused on his involvement with the Royal African Company and other institutions of African slavery, as well as his rhetorical use of slavery in opposing absolutism. This overlooks Locke’s deep involvement with the Carolina colony, and in particular that colony’s Indian slave trade, which was largely justified in just-war terms. Evidence of Locke’s participation in the 1682 revisions to the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which removed the infamous "absolute power and authority" clause, and his knowledge of colonial affairs, when examined alongside textual evidence of the timing of the composition of Locke’s theory of slavery, indicates a significant connection between the colony and Locke’s work. In light of this evidence, this article suggests an interpretation of Locke’s theory that stresses its character as a response to the conditions he encountered in Carolina.
Neorepublican treatments of Hobbes argue that his conception of liberty was deliberately developed to counter a revived and Roman-rooted republican theory of liberty. In doing so, Hobbes rejects republican liberty, and, with it, Roman republicanism. We dispute this narrative and argue that rather than rejecting Roman liberty, per se, Hobbes identifies and attacks a language of liberty, Roman in character, often abused by ambitious persons. This is possible because Roman liberty—and, by extension, Hobbes’s relationship to it—is more complex than neorepublican authors have allowed. Drawing on Roman sources, along with Hobbes’s major works, we argue that Hobbes’s theory of liberty owes much to his engagement with Roman sources, and that this theory speaks to the egalitarian elements in his political thought.