Syria’s descent into conflict is receiving growing scholarly attention. On their own, the sectarian and geopolitical interpretations of the Syrian conflict provide us with little understanding of the roots of the conflict. Recent studies have started to unpack the political economic and socioeconomics aspects of the conflict, highlighting issues such as the economic reforms in the 2000s, rising inequality, and climate change. This article aims to contribute to this growing literature by placing these issues in a broader analysis of Syria’s political and economic institutions. It argues that the movement of 2011 should be seen as an unorganized protest movement driven by the consolidation and institutionalization of multisectarian elite rule through the economic reform process that started in the 2000s, following the expiration of the "developmental rentier fix" that had ensured authoritarian stability in Syria in earlier decades.
For many citizens, public services are the most direct and tangible output of the democratic process, and yet in the past thirty years policymakers have privatized a broad swath of these services. This article asks whether privatization of state services changes citizens’ willingness to use the ballot box to hold governments to account for service performance. It argues that citizens can hold governments to account for privatization, but only if they have genuine political alternatives. Where quality falls with privatization and citizens can vote for an anti-privatization party, what we call a clear signal, privatization can mobilize citizens to sanction incumbents. By contrast, where quality falls but there are few anti-privatization alternatives, a mixed signal, privatization reduces sanctioning behavior. To test this theory, the article draws on a panel difference-in-differences analysis of disability reform from the United Kingdom, leveraging a geographically varied introduction of private provision across two political contexts.
Right-wing social movements in the United States have been underexplored in the sociological literature. This article examines how right-wing social movements have been able to capture a foothold in the Texas state Republican Party, and maintain political support even as their policies and politics have grown increasingly partisan and increasingly extreme. Through in-depth analysis of the state Republican Party’s internal battles over the past twenty years, coupled with a fixed-effects regression analysis of statewide election results 1994–2012, the article uses the context of statewide battles over equalization of education finance to explain how right-wing movements in Texas have maintained durable support for radical, right-wing candidates and policies. The article demonstrates the role played by material and symbolic "threats" in maintaining and increasing support for the Republican Party, even among previously moderate populations.
Liberal market states promote the responsible consumption of potentially dangerous commodities. But the work of enforcing sumptuary law is in fact delegated to service employees in the private sector. In this article such work is termed sumptuary labor. Although the ability of states to privatize sumptuary enforcement is a remarkable accomplishment, it is by no means a seamless one. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among bartenders and casino dealers, the article elaborates patterned conflicts of interest that arise during the performance of sumptuary labor. Both firms and workers may fail to ensure eligibility for consumption, prevent overindulgence, or guarantee the purity of the problematic commodity. The article concludes by theorizing how liberal market states manage the potential decoupling of sumptuary policy and practice.
How did the state protect and then subvert men’s household authority when the state was exclusively staffed by men? I answer the above question by critically fusing neo-Weberian scholarship on modern state development with feminist political sociology on gender and the state, and by examining establishment of the French conscription system. When first creating a mass army in the nineteenth century, the French state offered family-based exemptions, balancing between expanding state power and maintenance of men’s household authority. However, intensification of twentieth-century total war led to a decrease in family-based exemptions, and the state’s diminished support of men’s household authority. I thereby identify how the fiscal-military state first supported then diminished men’s household authority through one of the state’s most masculine arms.
We argue that, to effectively understand media effects in authoritarian societies, researchers must assess different types of media strategies adopted by authoritarian leaders. Using survey data from two Chinese cities, we examine the effects of two types of media strategies adopted by the Chinese government, targeting political attitudes and nonpolitical values and norms, respectively. Following a new line of research, we contrast China’s domestic-controlled media to foreign free media. After accounting for the selection bias in Chinese urbanites’ media access, we do not find sufficient evidence for the effect of the media strategies directly targeting their democratic conceptions. However, sufficient and robust evidence shows that more intensive consumption of diverse media sources, including foreign media, does significantly but indirectly counteract the Chinese government’s political campaigns targeting its citizens’ democratic conceptions, via thwarting the government’s media strategies to cultivate a collectivistic norm in the society.
In the half decade following the 2007 financial crisis, the reform of global financial governance was driven by two separate policy debates: one on the substantive content of regulations, the other on the organizational architecture of their governance. The separation of the two debates among policymakers has been mirrored in academia, where postcrisis analyses of financial governance have remained detached from reinvigorated discussions about the nature of financial markets. We argue that this separation is deeply flawed. Presenting an analysis of interactions between standards for banking, credit rating, accounting, and derivatives trading, this article demonstrates why the appropriateness of the organizational architecture of global financial governance is necessarily contingent upon one’s understanding of how financial markets work. In particular, if financial markets are not anchored to external "economic fundamentals" but instead exhibit reflexivity, then the reciprocal interactions between different regulatory arenas demand considerably more organizational coordination than presently exists.
For many years women tended to vote more conservative than men, but since the 1980s this gap has shifted direction: women in many countries are more likely than men to support left parties. The literature largely agrees on a set of political-economic factors explaining the change in women’s political orientation. In this article we demonstrate that these conventional factors fall short in explaining the gender vote gap. We highlight the importance of a religious cleavage in the party system across Western European countries, restricting the free flow of religious voters between left and right parties. Given that surveys show us a constantly higher degree of religiosity among women and a persistent impact of religion on vote choice, religion explains a substantial part of the temporal as well as cross-country variation in the transition from the more conservative to the more progressive voting behavior of women.
Over the past two decades, China has launched a nationwide endeavor to push domestic firms up the value chain. This article explores why, in some localities, Chinese firms had significant success in upgrading, while in other localities, firms were paradoxically trapped in a race-to-the-bottom competition. Drawing on national economic census data, a firm-level survey, and in-depth interviews, the article conducts a controlled comparison of China’s largest electronics manufacturing bases in the Yangtze and the Pearl River Deltas. It argues that the local government’s choice of global business allies shaped the upgrading behavior of domestic firms. When local governments allied with large multinational corporations (MNCs) at the top of the value chain, they reinforced the hierarchical structure of production, shrank the upgrading space for domestic firms, and squeezed them to the bottom of the value chain. In contrast, alliances with small foreign invested firms at the bottom helped break the hierarchical segregation and held more potential for local learning and innovation. The article sheds new light on the question of when industrial policies succeed or fail to facilitate domestic upgrading in a globalized era.