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Journal of Industrial Economics

Impact factor: 1.194 5-Year impact factor: 1.539 Print ISSN: 0022-1821 Online ISSN: 1467-6451 Publisher: Wiley Blackwell (Blackwell Publishing)

Subjects: Business, Finance, Economics

Most recent papers:

  • Prices, Locations and Welfare When an Online Retailer Competes with Heterogeneous Brick‐and‐Mortar Retailers.
    Wen‐Chung Guo, Fu‐Chuan Lai.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    This study proposes a novel spatial model in which an online retailer competes with heterogeneous brick‐and‐mortar retailers. Consumers are assumed to be non‐uniformly distributed along an urban‐rural line, and online transactions provide savings in transportation costs at the expense of distaste costs. Among other results, we show that the surviving brick‐and‐mortar retailers eventually move toward densely populated (urban) areas after the entry of the online retailer. Consumer welfare, the policy of not taxing online business, and the socially optimal number of retailers are also analyzed.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12141   open full text
  • Productivity Dynamics and the Role of ‘Big‐Box’ Entrants in Retailing.
    Florin Maican, Matilda Orth.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    We use a dynamic model to measure the impact of the entry of large stores on incumbents’ productivity separate from demand while accounting for local markets and the endogeneity of entry. Using data on all retail food stores in Sweden, we find that incumbents’ productivity increases after the entry of large stores and that the magnitude of the increase declines toward the upper part of the productivity distribution. Our findings highlight that large entrants drive productivity.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12121   open full text
  • Common Values and Low Reserve Prices.
    Daniel Quint.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    I show that the benefit of a high reserve price in a common‐values ascending auction is lower than in the observationally equivalent private values setting. Put another way, when bidders have common values, empirical estimation based on a private‐values model will overstate the value of a high reserve price. Via numerical examples, I show this same ranking typically applies to the level of the optimal reserve price as well, and often to the benefit of any reserve price, not just high ones. With common values, the optimal reserve can even be below the seller's valuation, which is impossible with private values.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12142   open full text
  • The Impact of Mergers on Quality Provision: Evidence from the Airline Industry.
    Jeffrey T. Prince, Daniel H. Simon.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    We examine how mergers affect quality provision by analyzing five U.S. airline mergers, focusing on on‐time performance (OTP). We find that airline mergers have minimal negative impacts on OTP, and likely result in long‐run improvements due to efficiencies. Importantly, we show that this finding is not driven by post‐merger changes in price that could affect OTP. Consequently, at least in the case of airlines, policymakers should not, as a rule, fear the negative quality effects of mergers.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12136   open full text
  • The Value of Delegated Quality Control.
    Alexander E. Saak.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    This paper studies the case in which a firm delegates quality control to an independent monitor. In a repeated game, consumers’ trust provides incentives to acquire information about whether the good is defective, and withhold defective goods from sale. If third‐party reports are observable to consumers, delegation lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs. Internal quality control is optimal only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information is sufficiently precise. This result holds in the presence of the possibility of collusion, fully non‐verifiable presale information, and economies of scale in external quality control.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12138   open full text
  • Do Multi‐Plant Firms Reduce Misallocation? Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing.
    Pavel Ševčík.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    Using Canadian plant‐level data, this paper shows that, depending on the industry, the differences in the average plant‐level productivity and cross‐plant allocation of resources between multi‐plant and single‐plant firms account for 1 to 15 per cent of the industry‐level TFP. A large part of this contribution stems from more efficient cross‐plant allocation of resources, measured by the covariance between plant size and productivity, in the pool of plants in multi‐plant firms compared to the pool of plants in single‐plant firms. There is less dispersion in the marginal products of the inputs, and thus less misallocation, in industries in which multi‐plant firms account for a larger share of output. The patterns found in the cross‐plant distribution of productivity and size are also consistent with better allocative efficiency among plants in multi‐plant firms than among plants in single‐plant firms.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12132   open full text
  • Who Loses when Prices are Negotiated? An Analysis of the New Car Market.
    Ambarish Chandra, Sumeet Gulati, James M. Sallee.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 09, 2017
    We establish that there are large and persistent differences in final transaction prices for identical new cars, and that demographic characteristics explain at least 20% of the observed variation. Older consumers perform progressively worse in negotiations, and the age premium is greater for women than for men. Our results suggest that the complex nature of vehicle transactions leads to price dispersion in this market, and that the worst performing groups—older women—have the lowest rates of market participation. We conjecture that the results are driven by the sharp increases in women's education and labor force participation in recent decades.
    July 09, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12125   open full text
  • Welfare Changes in the Cournot Setting with an Empirical Application to the Telecommunications Industry.
    Pedro Ferreira.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    I characterize the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium and provide bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. I only assume that demand is decreasing in price and costs increasing in the quantity produced as long as equilibrium exists. I show how price, demand and average cost, before and after the number of firms in the market changes, can be used to compute these bounds. I apply these bounds to the Portuguese wireline market and conclude that welfare increased significantly when the monopolist was split in 2007.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12134   open full text
  • Consumer Search in Retail Gasoline Markets.
    David P. Byrne, Nicolas de Roos.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    This paper develops direct tests for search behavior in retail gasoline markets. We exploit a unique market‐level dataset that allows us to directly measure search intensity with daily web traffic data from a gasoline price reporting website and perfectly measure daily changes in price levels and dispersion. Our simple yet powerful tests provide strong evidence of both cross‐sectional and intertemporal price search.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12119   open full text
  • Switching Costs in Two‐Sided Markets.
    Wing Man Wynne Lam.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    In many markets, there are switching costs and network effects. Yet the literature generally deals with them separately. This paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction (or ‘indirect bargain’) in a dynamic two‐sided market. It shows that in the symmetric equilibrium, the classic result that the first‐period price is U‐shaped in switching costs does not emerge, but instead switching costs always intensify the first‐period price competition. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first‐period price on the other side. Policies that ignore these effects may overestimate the extent to which switching costs can reduce welfare.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12133   open full text
  • The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia.
    Doh‐Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    We study the case in which a library consortium increases the aggregate payoff of the member libraries. We find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium and that those with diverse preferences are likely to gain by doing so. Combining libraries with diverse preferences implies that their valuation for different publishers' journals is more symmetric, which intensifies competition among publishers for scarce combined budgets. A tension between short term and long term considerations might generate a ‘library consortium trap.’ Our insight can be applied to other buyer groups as long as competition is generated by buyers' budget constraints.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12123   open full text
  • Market Structure and Broadband Internet Quality.
    Gabor Molnar, Scott J. Savage.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    This paper investigates the effects of the number of firms and their product‐type on broadband Internet quality. We estimate a model that relates the actual speeds delivered, in census block groups to the number of wireline and wireless internet service providers (ISP's), cost and demand conditions, and correction terms for the endogeneity of market structure. Model estimates show four main findings. Wireline speeds are often higher in markets with two or more wireline ISP's than with a single wireline ISP. Excluding the correction terms from the analysis understates this effect. Increases in wireline speeds are larger in the upstream direction, and there is no relationship between wireline speeds and the number of wireless ISP's.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12106   open full text
  • Payment Card Interchange Fees and Price Discrimination.
    Rong Ding, Julian Wright.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    We consider the implications of platform price discrimination in the context of card platforms. Despite the platform's ability to price discriminate, we show that it will set fees for card usage that are too low, resulting in excessive usage of cards. We show this bias remains even if card fees (or rewards) can be conditioned on each type of retailer that the cardholder transacts with. We use our model to consider the European Commission's objection to the rules card platforms have used to sustain differential interchange fees across European countries.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12120   open full text
  • Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts.
    Philippe Gagnepain, Marc Ivaldi.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 27, 2017
    We consider contracts for public transport services between a public authority and a transport operator. We build a structural endogenous switching model where the contract choice results from the combined effects of the incentivization scheme aimed at monitoring the operator's efficiency and the political agenda followed by the regulator to account for the voice of private interests. Our results support theoretical predictions as they suggest that cost‐plus contracts entail a higher cost for society than fixed‐price contracts but allow the public authority to leave a rent to a subset of individuals. Accounting for transfers to interest groups in welfare computations reduces the welfare gap between cost‐plus and fixed‐price regimes.
    April 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12118   open full text
  • Production Theory: Accounting for Firm Heterogeneity and Technical Change.
    Giovanni Dosi, Marco Grazzi, Luigi Marengo, Simona Settepanella.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short‐run production functions by Hildenbrand (), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors‐firms as indicator of inter‐firm heterogeneity. Moreover, the angles that the zonotope's main diagonal form with the axes provide a measure of the rates and directions of productivity change. The proposed framework also accounts for n‐inputs and m‐outputs and, crucially, the measures of heterogeneity and technical change do not require many of the standard assumptions from production theory.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12128   open full text
  • Heterogeneous Firms and Asymmetric Product Differentiation.
    Carlo Altomonte, Italo Colantone, Enrico Pennings.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    We introduce asymmetric product differentiation in a model characterized by a linear demand system, endogenous markups and heterogeneous firms (as in Melitz‐Ottaviano [2008]). In particular, a single industry is divided into a number of market segments, each characterized by a different degree of horizontal product differentiation. Such a setup allows us to explain, within a single theoretical framework, the non‐linear relations between firm productivity, size and exporting behavior that have been documented by the empirical literature. The theoretical results are tested empirically by examining the performance of French wine producers operating in market segments characterized by different levels of horizontal product differentiation. Such segments are identified using the official classification of French wines based upon the controlled denomination of origin, i.e., the Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) system.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12105   open full text
  • Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs.
    Dan Bernhardt, Mahdi Rastad.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk‐averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits. With sufficient risk aversion and non‐trivial fixed operating costs, it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued, and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high: output relative to monopoly levels becomes a U‐shaped function of demand. Greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions, but easier to support in booms.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12111   open full text
  • Price Discrimination with Demarketing.
    Jaesoo Kim, Dongsoo Shin.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12129   open full text
  • Cinematic Explosion: New Products, Unpredictabilty and Realized Quality in the Digital Era.
    Joel Waldfogel.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    While file sharing has undermined firms’ ability to generate revenue for their products, other technological change has reduced entry barriers in cultural industries, with substantial positive impacts on the availability of new books and recorded music. Unpredictability of product quality is a generic feature of cultural goods, including music, books and movies, so an infusion of new products holds the possibility of bringing not just low‐appeal products but also new products that consumers find highly appealing. This paper explores the effects of reduced costs of production, promotion and distribution in the motion picture industry, asking four questions. First, we document substantial growth in the number of movies brought to market, particularly since the early 2000's. Second, we document growth in institutions by which consumers can discover new movies, many of which are produced outside of the major studios and not released in theaters. Third, we show that the new independent movies account for a growing share of commercially successful movies. Finally, we present evidence, based on both critical assessments and usage, that recent vintages are more appealing to consumers than earlier offerings. These findings on movies echo developments documented elsewhere for recorded music and books.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12117   open full text
  • Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi‐Store Retailers.
    Victor Aguirregabiria, Gustavo Vicentini.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    We propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition between multi‐store retailers. Firms compete in prices and decide where to open or close stores depending on demand and cost conditions, the number of competitors at different locations, and on location‐specific private‐information shocks. The model distinguishes multiple forces in the spatial configuration of store networks, such as cannibalization of revenue between stores of the same retail chain, economies of density, competition, consumer transportation costs, or positive demand spillovers from other stores. We develop an algorithm to approximate a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in our model, and propose a procedure for the estimation of the parameters of the model using panel data on number of stores, prices, and quantities at multiple geographic locations within a city. We also present a numerical example to illustrate the model and algorithm.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12112   open full text
  • Pass‐Through and the Prediction of Merger Price Effects.
    Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan, Gloria Sheu.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    We use Monte Carlo experiments to study how pass‐through can improve merger price predictions, focusing on the first order approximation (FOA) proposed in Jaffe and Weyl []. FOA addresses the functional form misspecification that can exist in standard merger simulations. We find that the predictions of FOA are tightly distributed around the true price effects if pass‐through is precise, but that measurement error in pass‐through diminishes accuracy. As a comparison to FOA, we also study a methodology that uses pass‐through to select among functional forms for use in simulation. This alternative also increases accuracy relative to standard merger simulation and proves more robust to measurement error.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12131   open full text
  • Regulation and Contract Design: The Impact of Relationship Specific Investment.
    Kanishka Kacker.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    A primary explanation for variation in contract structure is the extent to which contracting parties make investments specific to their transaction. Investment decisions are typically endogenous in contract choice, however, frustrating attempts at causal verification. I analyze the impact of a major environmental regulation, the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, on coal procurement strategies of U.S. utilities. I exploit a key feature of the Amendment's design to define a difference‐in‐difference model that is arguably less susceptible to endogeneity concerns. I find wide support for the theoretical prediction: reduced specificity leads to shorter length, fixed price contracts.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12122   open full text
  • Competition in a Dynamic Auction Market: Identification, Structural Estimation, and Market Efficiency.
    Anna Adachi.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    The model incorporates an infinite series of auctions for identical items (or close substitutes) ordered over time and bidders with unit demand. The participants of each auction are drawn from a dynamic pool, with losing bidders remaining in the pool of potential bidders. The number of bidders in each auction is unobservable. Risk‐neutral, forward‐looking bidders submit bids below valuation. A novel identification and estimation strategy is used to estimate the valuation distribution from an order statistic of the bids. The model is used to evaluate the efficiency of online auctions for a 60GB Apple iPod Video, compared to a perfect‐competition benchmark.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12130   open full text
  • Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition.
    Maarten C.W. Janssen, Mariya Teteryatnikova.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. February 21, 2017
    This paper studies firms' incentives to disclose horizontal product attributes in a competitive environment. With competition, two elements play an important role: whether (i) firms can disclose only their own product characteristics or also those of their competitors, and whether (ii) competitors can react with their pricing decisions to the type of information disclosed. In all possible cases, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, it is generically the unique equilibrium outcome when (i) advertising is comparative and (ii) prices are also advertised, that is, announced simultaneously with the product information. When advertising is noncomparative or prices are not advertised, many nondisclosure equilibria exist.
    February 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/joie.12104   open full text
  • Entry Models Applied to Churches: Could Protestants use a Catholic Bishop to Solve Excess Entry?
    Michael W. Walrath.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    This paper studies the entry behavior of churches of different religious denominations. In a given town, there tend to be fewer Catholic churches (with more members) than there are Protestant churches. Entry of Catholic churches can be considered centralized, since entry is controlled by a bishop; whereas, the entry of Protestant churches is rather decentralized. I estimate an entry game for Protestants, then conduct counterfactuals looking at how entry would change if it were centralized. I find that a large portion of the differences in entry between Catholic and Protestant churches is explained by this difference in entry regulation.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12116   open full text
  • Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains.
    Marco Pagnozzi, Salvatore Piccolo, Matteo Bassi.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    We study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with exclusive retailers who are privately informed about their costs. The number of brands in the market (determined by the manufacturers’ zero profit condition) depends on the presence of asymmetric information and on the types of contracts between manufacturers and retailers. With two‐part tariffs, wholesale prices fully reflect retailers’ costs; with linear contracts, wholesale prices are constant and independent of retailers’ costs. The number of brands is lower (resp. higher) with asymmetric information than with complete information when contracts are linear (resp. with two‐part tariffs). Moreover, although the number of brands is always higher with linear contracts than with two‐part tariffs, joint profits of manufacturers and retailers are higher with linear prices. We also discuss manufacturers’ incentives to choose different contract forms and analyze the effects of endogenous entry on welfare.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12107   open full text
  • Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality.
    Anthony Creane, Thomas D. Jeitschko.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12113   open full text
  • Fixed Costs and the Product Market Treatment of Preference Minorities.
    Steven Berry, Alon Eizenberg, Joel Waldfogel.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    We clarify the sense in which the market outcome may be biased against preference minorities, and estimate the degree of bias using an empirical model of entry into American radio broadcasting markets. Listening model estimates are used to infer fixed costs, and these estimates are then used to compute optimal station configurations as well as the welfare weights on different groups that rationalize the observed configuration. Welfare weights are 2 to 3 times higher for whites than for blacks, and 1.5 to 2 times higher for non‐Hispanic than for Hispanic, listeners. We explore the role of ‘importing’ and ‘exporting’ patterns in generating these findings.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12124   open full text
  • Foreclosing Competition Through High Access Charges and Price Discrimination.
    Ángel L. López, Patrick Rey.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non‐linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on‐net and off‐net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large. In the absence of termination‐based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies are not profitable.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12115   open full text
  • Does Exclusive Dealing Matter? Evidence from Distribution Contract Changes in The U.S. Beer Industry.
    Chia‐Wen Chen, Shiou Shieh.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    We examine whether restricting a beer distributor's external trading opportunities increases the market shares of brands carried by the distributor. We use distribution status changes from the Anheuser‐Busch‐InBev distribution agreement, along with a panel scanner data set from a grocery chain in California, to implement a ‘difference‐in‐differences’ empirical strategy. We find that InBev's market share increased by 6% once InBev was carried by Anheuser‐Busch's exclusive distributors, while InBev's retail price had no significant change. The effect on InBev's market share is stronger for smaller stores that carry more brands. These results are consistent with the efficiency‐based theory of exclusive dealing.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12108   open full text
  • Diagnosing Foreclosure due to Exclusive Dealing.
    John Asker.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements lead to foreclosure. To implement this test a model of consumer demand and firm behavior is estimated that incorporates industry details and allows for distribution through exclusive and shared channels. The test indicates that foreclosure effects are not present in this market.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12114   open full text
  • Introduction to the Symposium on Market Structure, Competition and Economic Outputs.
    Heski Bar‐Isaac.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12126   open full text
  • An Appreciation: Pierre Régibeau Retires from the Journal.

    Journal of Industrial Economics. September 22, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    September 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12127   open full text
  • Incorporating Prior Information into A GMM Objective For Mixed Logit Demand Systems.
    Charles J. Romeo.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    Random parameters demand system estimates can generate upward sloping demands and imply margins outside of the theoretical bounds for profit maximization. If such violations are numerous enough, they can confound merger simulation exercises. Using Lerner indices for multiproduct firms playing static Bertrand games, we find that up to 35 per cent of implied margins for beer are outside the bounds. We characterize downward sloping demand and the theoretical bounds for profit maximization as prior information and extend the GMM objective function, incorporating inequality moments for product‐level own‐elasticities and brand level or product level Lerner indices. Very few violations remain when an inequality constrained estimator is used.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12100   open full text
  • Spillovers in Space: Does Geography Matter?
    Sergey Lychagin, Joris Pinkse, Margaret E. Slade, John Van Reenen.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    Using U.S. firm level panel data we simultaneously assess the contributions to productivity of three potential sources of research and development spillovers: geographic, technological, and product market (“horizontal”). To do so, we construct new measures of geographic proximity based on the distribution of a firm's inventor locations as well as its headquarters. We find that geographic location is important for productivity, as are technology (but not product) spillovers, and that both intra and inter–regional (counties) spillovers matter. The geographic location of a firm's researchers is more important than its headquarters. These benefits may be the reason why local policy makers compete so hard for the location of local R&D labs and high tech workers.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12103   open full text
  • Box‐Office Demand: The Importance of Being #1.
    Luís Cabral, Gabriel Natividad.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    We propose a theoretical framework to understand the effect on a movie's eventual theatrical success of leading the box office during the opening weekend. We consider two possible channels: a positive shock to the utility from watching the movie and a greater awareness of the movie's existence. We derive a series of testable predictions, which we test on U.S. box office data. The results suggest that being #1 in sales during the opening weekend has an economically and statistically significant effect on the movie's total demand; and that the primary channel for this effect is through the greater awareness induced by being #1.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12095   open full text
  • Interfirm Bundled Discounts as a Collusive Device.
    Jong‐Hee Hahn, Sang‐Hyun Kim.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand‐specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12097   open full text
  • How Do Switching Costs Affect Market Concentration and Prices in Network Industries?
    Jiawei Chen†.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    I investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option. I find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option. Without a viable outside option, high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects, but with a viable outside option, switching costs increase market concentration. Furthermore, switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option, but generally raise prices otherwise.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12102   open full text
  • Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle.
    Wataru Tamura.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. June 05, 2016
    This paper examines an auction platform in which the monopoly platform maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus between the seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller's type is affiliated with the buyers' signals, the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by choosing a first‐price or descending auction than a second‐price or ascending auction.
    June 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12101   open full text
  • Ex post Merger Evaluation in the U.K. Retail Market for Books.
    Luca Aguzzoni, Elena Argentesi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Massimo Tognoni.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    This paper evaluates the price effects of the merger of two major U.K. book retailers. We use a dataset containing monthly scanner data on a sample of 200 books in 50 local markets for four years around the merger. We compare the price changes after the merger in shops located in areas where both chains were present before the merger and in areas where only one chain was present. We also investigate the country‐wide effect of the merger. We find that the merger did not result in any price increase either at the local or at the national level.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12099   open full text
  • Competition, Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations.
    Hugh Gravelle, Anthony Scott, Peter Sivey, Jongsay Yong.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    Prices for consultations with General Practitioners (GP's) in Australia are unregulated, and patients pay the difference between the price set by the GP and a fixed reimbursement from the national tax‐funded Medicare insurance scheme. We construct a Vickrey‐Salop model of GP price and quality competition and test its predictions using individual GP‐level data on prices, the proportion of patients who are charged no out‐of‐pocket fee, average consultation length, and characteristics of the GP's, their practices and their local areas. We measure the competition to which the GP is exposed by the distance to other GP practices and allow for the endogeneity of GP location decisions with measures of area characteristics and area fixed‐effects. Within areas, GP's with more distant competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out‐of‐pocket payment. GP's with more distant competitors also have shorter consultations, though the effect is small and statistically insignificant.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12098   open full text
  • The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining.
    Bjørn Olav Johansen, Tore Nilssen.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12096   open full text
  • Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety.
    Jian Shen, Huanxing Yang, Lixin Ye.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    We analyze markets with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products under both monopoly and duopoly. In the base model with two consumer types, we identify conditions under which entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its low end of the product line. Our analysis offers a novel explanation for the widespread use of ‘fighting brands’ and ‘product line pruning.’ We also extend our analysis to asymmetric firms and three types of consumers and show that depending on the specific environment, entry may lead the incumbent to expand or contract the middle range of its product line (middle contracts). Our results are mainly driven by interactions between horizontal differentiation (competition) and vertical screening of consumers.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12094   open full text
  • Early Settlement in European Merger Control.
    Luke Garrod, Bruce Lyons.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    We analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties and the European Commission over remedies that remove concerns of anticompetitive effects. This extends the previously narrow range of econometric literature on early settlement. Consistent with the theory of early settlement, our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty, measured by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger. We also find a non‐monotonic effect of agency resourcing, which raises questions about the Commission's efficiency in times of high case load. Econometrically, we select a sample of merger decisions in which the European Commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects, and our selection model provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the Commission. Conclusions are drawn for public policy.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12093   open full text
  • Dynamic Product Diversity.
    Ramon Caminal.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. April 26, 2016
    This paper examines the frequency of new product introductions in monopoly markets where demand is subject to temporary satiation. Consumers' taste for diversity is satisfied over time as new varieties are introduced to the market. If two varieties are introduced in consecutive periods then they become imperfect substitutes and the firm has an incentive to raise prices and sell each one to consumers with higher valuations (better preference matching). Higher frequency can also generate market expansion. However, under strong temporary satiation, better preference matching may dominate and the frequency of new product introductions may become socially excessive.
    April 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/joie.12091   open full text
  • On Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition.
    Robert A. Ritz.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place significant emphasis on measures of firm size, such as sales revenue or market share. Such objectives have an important—yet thus far unquantified—impact on market performance. With n symmetric firms, equilibrium welfare losses are of order 1/n4, and thus vanish extremely quickly. Welfare losses are less than 5% for many empirically relevant market structures, despite significant firm asymmetry and industry concentration. They can be estimated using only basic information on market shares. These results also apply to oligopsonistic competition (e.g., for retail bank deposits) and strategic forward trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12038   open full text
  • Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting.
    Jan Boone, Wieland Müller, Sigrid Suetens.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2009b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive contract the higher the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12045   open full text
  • Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes.
    Levent Celik.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    This paper analyzes in a spatial framework how much information a seller discloses about the variety he sells when he faces a buyer with a privately known taste for variety. I identify an equilibrium in which, for each possible variety, the seller's optimal strategy consists of either fully disclosing the variety or disclosing how far it is from the buyer's expected taste. The set of varieties the seller fully discloses monotonically expands as the buyer's taste for variety becomes stronger. I show that this is the unique undefeated equilibrium. From a policy perspective, mandating full disclosure is socially harmful.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12043   open full text
  • Price Adjustment Policies in Procurement Contracting: An Analysis of Bidding Behavior.
    Georgia Kosmopoulou, Xueqi Zhou.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    The fluctuations in fuel prices over the past decade led a number of government agencies to introduce price adjustment clauses in procurement contracting. Those clauses were primarily designed to reduce contractors’ uncertainty without considering the impact of such initiatives on bidding and the budget. We analyze a newly constructed, detailed panel of observations on bids for construction contracts and compare bidding behavior across periods and projects, and across items within projects. Estimates from a difference‐in‐differences approach, indicate that bidding becomes more aggressive and less dispersed after the implementation of this policy. The difference is more pronounced when we consider itemized bids than overall project bids. Alternative techniques of regression discontinuity and nonparametric estimation are applied and yield consistent results.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12036   open full text
  • Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector.
    Hang Gao, Johannes Van Biesebroeck.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    The restructuring of the Chinese electricity sector in 2002 reshaped the market structure by vertically unbundling the dominant integrated firm and started the process of wholesale price liberalization. We estimate factor demands to study whether these reforms boosted productivity in the generation segment of the industry. Controlling explicitly for price‐heterogeneity across firms and unobservable productivity shocks, we find that the reforms are associated with reductions in labor and material use of 7 and 5 per cent, respectively. These effects only appear two years after the reforms and are robust to many specification checks. The absolute magnitudes of the estimated restructuring effects vary in intuitive ways by location, firm size or age, and for different definitions of restructured firms.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12034   open full text
  • Collusion or Competition? Interfirm Relationships in the Chinese Auto Industry.
    Wei‐Min Hu, Junji Xiao, Xiaolan Zhou.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. March 03, 2014
    The Chinese passenger‐vehicle industry contains a large number of manufacturers. Some of them are members of big corporate groups centered around state owned enterprises. These corporate relationships may facilitate collusion. This paper applies the non‐nested hypothesis test methodology to data on passenger vehicles to identify whether price collusion exists within corporate groups or across groups. Our empirical results support the assumption of Bertrand Nash competition in the Chinese passenger‐vehicle industry: We find no evidence for within or cross‐group price collusion. Our policy experiments show that indigenous brands will gain market shares and profits if within‐group companies merge.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/joie.12035   open full text
  • Are Losers Picked? An Empirical Analysis of Capacity Divestment and Production Reallocation in the Japanese Cement Industry.
    Masato Nishiwaki, Hyoeg Ug Kwon.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 11, 2013
    As demand in an industry shrinks, pressure for the reduction of capacity arises. A key issue is whether plants which, from an efficiency perspective, should reduce output in fact do so. Focusing on the Japanese cement industry, we examine whether less efficient plants reduce capacity. We find that less efficient firms are not more likely to reduce capacity than more efficient firms; however, less efficient plants within a multi‐plant firm are more likely to reduce capacity than more efficient plants. In addition, we find that this divestment pattern has led to a substantial drop in industry‐wide allocative efficiency.
    July 11, 2013   doi: 10.1111/joie.12019   open full text
  • A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy‐It‐Now: Theory and Evidence.
    Jong‐Rong Chen, Kong‐Pin Chen, Chien‐Fu Chou, Ching‐I Huang.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 11, 2013
    In the ascending‐price auctions with Yahoo!‐type buy‐it‐now (BIN), we characterize and derive the closed‐form solution for the optimal bidding strategy of the bidders and the optimal BIN price of the seller when they are both risk‐averse. The seller is shown to be strictly better off with the BIN option, while the bidders are better off only when their valuation is high enough. The theory also implies that the expected transaction price is higher in an auction with an optimal BIN price than one without a BIN option. This prediction is confirmed by our data collected from Taiwan's Yahoo! auctions.
    July 11, 2013   doi: 10.1111/joie.12018   open full text
  • Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me‐too's.
    Farasat A. S. Bokhari, Gary M. Fournier.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 11, 2013
    Recent decades have seen a growth in treatments for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) including many branded and generic drugs. In the early 2000's, new drug entry dramatically altered market shares. We estimate a demand system for ADHD drugs and assess the welfare impact of new drugs. We find that entry induced large welfare gains by reducing prices of substitute drugs, and by providing alternative delivery mechanisms for existing molecules. Our results suggest that the success of follow‐on patented drugs may come from unanticipated innovations like delivery mechanisms, a factor ignored by proposals to retard new follow‐on drug approvals.
    July 11, 2013   doi: 10.1111/joie.12017   open full text
  • The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm's Valuation.
    Luca Aguzzoni, Gregor Langus, Massimo Motta.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 11, 2013
    EU antitrust investigations involve a sequence of events which affect the investigated firm's market value. We model these relationships and estimate their impact on firms' share prices. On average, a surprise inspection reduces a firm's share price by 2.89%, an infringement decision reduces it by 3.57%. The Court judgments do not have a statistically significant effect. Overall, we find that the total effect of the antitrust action ranges from −3.03% to −4.55% of a firm's market value. Fines account for no more than 8.9% of this loss, and we conjecture that most of the loss is due to the cessation of illegal activities.
    July 11, 2013   doi: 10.1111/joie.12016   open full text
  • A Structural Approach to Market Definition With an Application to the Hospital Industry.
    Martin S. Gaynor, Samuel A. Kleiner, William B. Vogt.
    Journal of Industrial Economics. July 11, 2013
    Market definition is common in merger analysis, and often the decisive factor in antitrust cases. This has been particularly relevant in the hospital industry, where many merger challenges have been denied due to disagreements over geographic market definition. We compare geographic markets produced using frequently employed ad hoc methodologies to structural methods that directly apply the ‘SSNIP test’ to California hospitals. Our results suggest that markets produced using previous methods overstate hospital demand elasticities by a factor of 2.4 to 3.4 and were likely a contributing factor to the permissive legal environment for hospital mergers.
    July 11, 2013   doi: 10.1111/joie.12015   open full text