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Foreign Policy Analysis

Impact factor: 0.61 5-Year impact factor: 0.763 Print ISSN: 1743-8586 Online ISSN: 1743-8594 Publisher: Wiley Blackwell (Blackwell Publishing)

Subject: International Relations

Most recent papers:

  • Information, Commitment, and the Russo‐Japanese War of 1904–1905.
    Philip Streich, Jack S. Levy.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 12, 2014
    We apply a modified version of the bargaining model of war to the outbreak of the Russo‐Japanese War of 1904–1905. We conceptualize the informational path to war as a two‐step process, the first identifying the sources of informational asymmetries, and the second specifying the causal linkages between informational asymmetries and war. The sources of informational asymmetries include not only private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, but also individual, societal, and governmental‐level factors. We argue that the primary causes of the Russo‐Japanese War involved a combination of the commitment problem and preventive logic arising from Russia's growing power relative to that of Japan, and informational problems arising from disagreements about relative power and resolve. These disagreements arose almost exclusively from Russian political and military leaders' underestimation of Japanese capabilities and resolve, and they generated highly intransigent Russian bargaining behavior. Russia misperceptions can be traced primarily to racial and cultural stereotypes and psychological biases, and to competition between rival domestic and bureaucratic factions that distorted information flows, created an incoherent decision‐making process, and sent confusing signals to Japan.
    May 12, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12058   open full text
  • Interindustry Goods Market Networks and Industry Lobbying for Trade Policy.
    Hak‐Seon Lee.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 12, 2014
    This study investigates how interindustry goods market networks influence industry lobbying as foreign firms' direct investment and local production increase in the United States. The goods market networks consist of each sector's procurement of inputs from other sectors and the sectoral destinations of its outputs. I found that domestic upstream sectors modify their lobbying in ways dissimilar to those of downstream sectors when foreign firms' local production and sales increase. Upstream sectors lobby more when US affiliates of foreign firms that procure inputs from their own supply chains gain market share at the expense of domestic firms in investment‐receiving sectors. In contrast, downstream sectors lobby less when they save input procurement costs as domestic and foreign firms compete to produce quality goods at a lower price. The empirical results imply that goods market networks provide another theoretical framework, in addition to that provided by factor or sector models, in the analysis of demand side of trade policy.
    May 12, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12059   open full text
  • Linking Foreign Policy and Systemic Transformation in Global Politics: Methodized Inquiry in a Deweyan Tradition.
    Gunther Hellmann.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 12, 2014
    Change at the level of the international system as a whole has always been a challenging subject matter in IR. This is especially true with regard to the link between foreign policy agency and systemic transformation—processes of societal re‐creation at the global level of interacting states, societies, and human beings which are significantly shaped by socialized foreign policy agents. In IR and foreign policy analysis, this link is largely taken for granted. At the same time, the connections between foreign policy agency and systemic transformation are widely considered to be essentially intractable in epistemological and methodological terms. As a result, the link has been surprisingly undertheorized. In this article, I will try to show how a Deweyan (or pragmatist) understanding of social action in general and of causal analysis in particular might help to theorize the link. More specifically, I will mobilize Deweyan notions of situated creativity, historical contingency, and event‐processes as sites of interaction which emphasize the “existential” character of systemic transformation and agential resocialization. The article also reviews available methodological tools of disciplinary inquiry in order to show that many of the necessary tools to examine the links between foreign policy agency and systemic transformation are actually at hand.
    May 12, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12060   open full text
  • Going for the Gold versus Distributing the Green: Foreign Policy Substitutability and Complementarity in Status Enhancement Strategies.
    Paul Bezerra, Jacob Cramer, Megan Hauser, Jennifer L. Miller, Thomas J. Volgy.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12061   open full text
  • Stopping the Killing During the “Peace”: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization.
    Jacob D. Kathman, Reed M. Wood.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    Recent research has investigated the relative effectiveness of peacekeeping in stabilizing postconflict states, preventing the return to armed hostilities between belligerents, and reducing civilian abuse during civil conflict. This research has shed light on important theoretical and policy‐relevant issues. However, scholars have largely neglected to evaluate the role of peacekeeping in protecting civilians during the notoriously unstable postconflict period. Even after active conflict has ended, the factions often persist in abusing civilians to reinforce conflict gains, shape the postconflict environment, exact revenge for wartime grievances, or spoil peace processes. This analysis investigates the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians during the post‐conflict “peace.” Using newly collected data on the number and type of United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments along with civilian victimization data for all African conflicts between 1992 and 2010, we find that greater numbers of peacekeeping troops reduce anticivilian violence. By contrast, larger deployments of UN observers are positively correlated with violence.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12041   open full text
  • Imposing Democracy to Ensure the Peace: The Role of Coercive Socialization.
    Paul Fritz.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    Democratic victors hoping to protect war gains by forcing the vanquished to be free must not only overcome the problems associated with imposed democracy but also ensure continued influence over and interests in the newly democratic state. To secure this dual imperative, I argue victors must coercively socialize the vanquished state. I create a framework of coercive socialization and conduct a plausibility probe of the theory by detailing the imposition strategies the United States utilized to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a reliable democratic partner after World War II. The findings suggest imposing democracy to ensure peace and secure interests is likely to succeed only under even more limited conditions than recent scholarship on imposed democracy allows and also lend insight into why the US effort to impose democracy on Iraq is unlikely to provide the benefits policymakers sought.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12042   open full text
  • What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China.
    Georg Strüver.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    With China's emergence as a global power, it is commonly assumed that the Chinese leadership's influence in international politics has increased considerably. However, systematic studies of China's impact on the foreign policy behavior of other states are rare and generally limited to questions regarding economic capabilities and the use of coercive power. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on China's global political rise by taking a broader perspective. Drawing on voting data from the UN General Assembly for the last two decades, it explores the plausibility of different explanations for foreign policy similarity: economic, diplomatic and military linkages; domestic institutional similarities; and parallel problem‐solving processes. The logistic regression analyses find that high levels of foreign policy similarity correlate with shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of political globalization. The results further indicate that foreign aid seems to help buy support in global politics.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12050   open full text
  • Balancing on the Shoulders of Giants: Moldova's Foreign Policy toward Russia and the European Union.
    Cristian Cantir, Ryan Kennedy.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    “Soft balancing” has emerged as a way to reconcile realist theory with the lack of hard balancing behavior against US hegemony. Scholars continue, however, to disagree on the concept's utility and causes. Consistent with its realist roots, scholars have primarily focused on power imbalance and external threat to security as causes of soft balancing. This article analyzes Moldova's major foreign policy shift in the mid‐2000s. It argues that this was a clear example of soft balancing and that it adds several important insights into the causes of soft balancing. While the power imbalance and external threat from Russia were persistent throughout Moldova's post‐independence history, the country only adopted a soft balancing strategy once Russia posed a threat to the internal stability of the government and changes in EU policy created a permissive international environment for the strategy. Moreover, we argue that the domestic political environment played a key role in enabling the adoption of this strategy. This article therefore diversifies the analysis of the causes of soft balancing and provides a theoretical answer for the puzzle of Moldova's pro‐Western turn in 2003.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12051   open full text
  • The Power of “Sacred Commitments”: Chinese Interests in Taiwan.
    Gregory J. Moore.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    What explains China's fixation on Taiwan? With a focus on the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as case, this study has led to the finding that “sacred commitments” explains far more about China's fixation on Taiwan than balancing or Taiwan's strategic significance, and its interests in Taiwan cannot be understood without taking its socially constructed “sacred commitments” to Taiwan into account. The theoretical implications of this study are that contrary to the conventional understanding of Chinese foreign policy as Realist in orientation, as it regards this case Realism was not particularly helpful, for the sorts of factors Realism “majors in” were not key to understanding China's Taiwan policy. The policy implications are that though the situation across the Taiwan Strait is calm at present, American policymakers must be absolutely clear that China's interests in Taiwan are unwavering and are not based on more pragmatic realpolitik considerations, but on “sacred commitments.”
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12039   open full text
  • Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008.
    Clayton L. Thyne, Jonathan M. Powell.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 16, 2014
    This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a threat to consolidated and fledgling democracies. Policymakers have adapted to this viewpoint by treating coups as unjustifiable maneuvers that must be curtailed, with states frequently terminating aid and IOs suspending membership following a coup. While coups clearly confound democratic consolidation, it is notable that the vast majority of coups do not happen in democracies. Therefore, we focus on authoritarian regimes in seeking to discover how coups might open paths toward democratization. We first argue that successful coups should promote democratization because leaders have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish political legitimacy and economic growth. Second, we view failed coups as credible signals that leaders must enact meaningful reforms to remain in power. Empirical analyses strongly support the argument that coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise.
    April 16, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12046   open full text
  • The Fiscal Autonomy of Deciders: Creditworthiness and Conflict Initiation.
    Matthew DiGiuseppe.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 11, 2014
    Liberal theory claims that the constraint taxpayers impose on military expenditure is an important mechanism through which democracy and international commerce help prevent conflict. However, leaders with affordable access to sovereign credit have often overcome this constraint by raising revenue on credit markets. By minimizing or deferring the economic burden imposed on taxpayers and the macroeconomic stress associated with alternative financing strategies, I argue that these leaders have greater autonomy to pursue an aggressive foreign policy if they so desire. Leaders that lack creditor confidence risk increased political opposition and removal from office if hostilities generate macroeconomic stress or disturb the domestic fiscal balance. They also face a higher likelihood of defeat or retreat, and the subsequent political consequences, if they pursue conflict without sufficient resources. Estimates of a heteroskedastic probit model support this hypothesis and indicate that creditworthy states initiate conflict with a greater mean probability and greater variance than their noncreditworthy counterparts.
    April 11, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12044   open full text
  • Counterfactual Reasoning in Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of German Nonparticipation in the Libya Intervention of 2011.
    Mischa Hansel, Kai Oppermann.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 11, 2014
    The abstention of the conservative‐liberal government under Chancellor Angela Merkel on UN Security Council resolution 1973 marked the first occasion in which the Federal Republic of Germany stood against all three of its main Western partners, the US, France, and the UK, simultaneously, on a major foreign policy issue. Many accounts of this decision invoke the influence of electoral incentives. What is problematic, however, is that the causal weight attached to electoral politics is often left ambiguous and difficult to assess with traditional case study methods. The article, therefore, employs counterfactual reasoning to scrutinize “electoral politics” explanations of Germany's policy on Libya. Specifically, it develops counterfactuals in which decision making did not take place in the shadow of upcoming elections and investigates how other variables on different levels of analysis would have shaped decision making in the counterfactual scenarios. The findings suggest that electoral incentives did not decisively shift German foreign policy on Libya. More generally, the article speaks to the value of counterfactuals in foreign policy analysis.
    April 11, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12054   open full text
  • The War That Wasn't There? Italy's “Peace Mission” in Afghanistan, Strategic Narratives and Public Opinion.
    Fabrizio Coticchia, Carolina Simone.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 11, 2014
    Factors as culture, values, and symbols are crucial to understand the evolution of the Italian foreign and defense policy. However, scholars’ attention to such variables in the study of Italian defense policies still leaves many gaps. Since the end of the Cold War, Italian troops have been constantly engaged in military operations abroad spreading a “peacekeeper image” of Italy in the international arena. The goal of this work is to investigate the features and the evolution of the main strategic narratives adopted by political leaders to interpret the Italian military involvement in Afghanistan. How have politicians crafted strategic narratives on the Afghan mission? How have these story lines influenced public opinion during the conflict? Has the disproportionate gap between the storyline, based on the traditional values of peace and multilateralism, and the war‐torn reality on the ground, affected the level of public approval? Or have the ways in which narratives were built in 2009 played a more significant role? In order to answer these questions, this paper relies on polls, content analysis of parliamentary debates, and public discourse analysis (2001–2011).
    April 11, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12056   open full text
  • Letting Bygones be Bygones: Rapprochement in US Foreign Policy.
    Matthew Fehrs.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 11, 2014
    Research into the conditions that cause former adversaries to seek improved relations has missed the interaction of systemic and domestic factors critical to a rapprochement. The United States was able to achieve a rapprochement with China 25 years after fighting a war against it, but has failed to develop normal diplomatic relations with the other adversary from that conflict, North Korea, after nearly 60 years. This study posits that reconciliation is the product of two factors: changing threat perceptions and economic incentives. At the international level, shifts must occur that change how the rivals perceive each other. While this creates conditions for a rapprochement, there must also be economic incentives to drive the two sides together. When both these conditions are present, reconciliation can occur. This theory is examined in two cases where diplomatic normalization with the United States occurred—China and Vietnam—and two cases where it did not—Iran and North Korea. The likelihood of improved relations between the United States and North Korea or Iran is also discussed in light of this theory.
    April 11, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12055   open full text
  • Public Contestation and Policy Resistance: Canada's Oversized Military Commitment to Afghanistan.
    Justin Massie.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    This paper examines the domestic enablers and constraints to oversized coalition burdensharing. Using the Canadian case study, it explores the conditions under which state leaders are successful in imposing their policy preferences to a critical public, despite little tangible benefits in return. The paper develops a neoclassical realist framework which focuses on domestic determinants of alliance burdensharing, namely elite consensus, strategic culture, strategic narratives, executive autonomy, and social cohesion. This framework helps make sense of Canada's distinct case of public contestation and policy resistance by making two broad arguments. First, ineffective strategic narratives and strategic subcultures explain Canadian public opposition to Canada's combat mission. Second, an unmobilized public opinion, due to elite consensus, best accounts for Ottawa's policy unresponsiveness and hence its decision to maintain the coalition's fourth largest combat presence in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2011.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12047   open full text
  • The International Community's Reaction to Coups.
    Megan Shannon, Clayton Thyne, Sarah Hayden, Amanda Dugan.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    With ten attempts since 2010, coups d'état are surprisingly common events with vital implications for a state's political development. Aside from being disruptive internally, coups influence interstate relationships. Though coups have important consequences, we know little about how the international community responds to these upheavals. This paper explores what drives global actors to react to coups. Our theory differentiates between normative concerns (for example, protection of democracy) and material interests (for example, protection of oil exports) as potential determinants of international responses to coups. We argue that coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction. Using newly collected data, we explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011. The analyses reveal that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention. States react when democracies are challenged by coups, while IOs react to coups in Africa and coups during the post‐Cold War period. We surprisingly find that heavy traders and oil‐rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction, suggesting that international actors are more driven by normative concerns than material interests when reacting to coups.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12043   open full text
  • Understanding the Yalta Axioms and Riga Axioms through the Belief Systems of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
    Su‐Mi Lee.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    This research employs stakeholder analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to examine two coalitions of US foreign policy during the postwar and early Cold War periods. It defines the proponents of the Yalta axioms and the proponents of the Riga axioms as two purposive groups based on ideological positions. By identifying the stakeholders, their strategic bases, their belief systems (with respect to the Soviet Union), and their policies and resources, this research demonstrates how each coalition formed and competed with the other. More importantly, it offers a way to understand the seemingly inconsistent policy positions of Kennan and Bohlen that supported the Riga axioms at one time and opposed them at another time. By so doing, this research demonstrates the utility of the ACF in examining foreign policies.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12040   open full text
  • Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?
    Bryan R. Early, Robert Spice.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    When international institutions obligate their members to impose economic sanctions against a target state, how much do those sanctions obligations actually impact their members' behavior? To date, the consensus view has treated all international institutions as if they are equally capable of making multilateral sanctioning efforts more effective. Building upon the enforcement theory of sanctions cooperation, we instead theorize that the ability of international institutions to constrain their members from engaging in spoiler behaviors degrades the larger they are. We hypothesize that sanctions obligations imposed by smaller‐sized institutions are more effective at preventing their members from becoming extensive trade‐based sanctions busters than those imposed by larger ones. We test our hypothesis via a quantitative analysis of how the involvement of five different international institutions in sanctioning efforts influenced their members' likelihoods of sanctions‐busting. We find that only the smaller‐sized institutions we examine appear capable of constraining their members from undercutting sanctioning efforts. Notably, we find no evidence that the United Nations' sanctions actually prevent its members from sanctions‐busting.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12038   open full text
  • Wedges and Widgets: Liberalism, Libertarianism, and the Trade Attitudes of the American Mass Public and Elites.
    Brian Rathbun.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    What are the ideological sources of free trade attitudes? Free trade plays a crucial role in classical liberal theory as a way of increasing the prospects of peace between states. Are liberal individuals more supportive of free trade? The literature on foreign policy beliefs largely neglects the question of trade, and those exceptions that find support for the liberal hypothesis generally rely on faulty conceptualization. Using surveys of the American mass public and American elites, this article finds that the combination of views that marks classical liberalism does not in fact predict support for free trade at either the mass or the elite level. Support for free trade at the mass level has libertarian, not liberal, foundations, predicted by a combination of social and economic libertarianism. At the mass level, the combination of cosmopolitanism and dovishness that constitutes foreign policy liberalism has no effect on trade attitudes. At the elite level, cosmopolitanism is actually generally negatively associated with support for free trade. Free trade is a wedge issue that creates strange alliances at the elite level between cosmopolitans and isolationists generally hostile to one another on foreign policy and at the mass level between social and economic libertarians typically antagonistic to each other's domestic agenda.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12037   open full text
  • Defining the Ambiguous Situation: Context and Action in the 2006 Lebanon War.
    Ben D. Mor.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    In studies of war and terrorism, an exclusive focus on action misses an important and logically prior stage of constitutive thinking and discursive contestation. Particularly in ambiguous contexts, which states often face when waging conflict against nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations, how the situation is defined is a key to understanding state decision making and action. This paper employs symbolic interactionist theory to analyze the process of defining situations under ambiguity. It argues that how different domestic actors develop preferences for definitions depends on (i) the kind of situational parameters that they monitor as part of their group perspective, (ii) the availability of historical analogies, and (iii) (role)‐identity and self‐esteem needs, namely the legitimation of actors' claimed identity through an effective role performance. These ideas are examined in a case study of Israeli understanding of and response to Hizbollah's attack of July 12, 2006, which developed into the 2006 Lebanon War (known in Israel as the Second Lebanon War).
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12053   open full text
  • Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power.
    Leslie E. Wehner.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    This article sets out how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power, as well as Brazil's strategy of using its regional powerhood to further its own ambitions of becoming a global power on the international stage. The article assesses the expectations of these three countries, specifically in terms of what kind of roles they attribute to Brazil. Following this empirical interest, the article develops a role theoretical framework for understanding the importance of Others' expectations for the role con‐ception and enactment of the Self. The article also elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region,” as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12048   open full text
  • Foreign Policy Ideology and Conflict Preferences: A Look at Afghanistan and Libya.
    Nicholas F. Martini.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. April 03, 2014
    Existing research has shown that individuals have a fairly defined and consistent ideology when it comes to foreign policy. However, exploring how a foreign policy ideology influences more specific policy preferences is largely understudied. I apply this concept of a foreign policy ideology in understanding conflict preferences in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya. Results demonstrate that a foreign policy ideology has a strong influence on preferences in both conflicts, but that this influence is determined by the context of the interventions. This effect of a foreign policy ideology is even greater, at times, than that of the more traditional explanations.
    April 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12049   open full text
  • When Domestic Politics and International Relations Intermesh: Subordinated Publics' Factional Support Within Layered Power Structures.
    Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius, Fouad Bou Zeineddine, Nour Kteily, Shana Levin.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Using social dominance theory and structural balance theory to analyze the political and psychological perspectives of subordinated peoples, we argue that struggles between dominant and subordinated polities are embedded in layered power structures. In such contexts, it is important to examine publics' political desires and interests in relation to their political elites' positions or choices of political tactics and allegiances. To illustrate these arguments, we used random urban samples surveyed in March 2010 to examine Lebanese and Syrian citizens' favorability toward their governments and Hezbollah (a quasi‐government faction with significant relations to the governments of Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the United States). As theorized, citizens' favorability depended on (i) how much they view their government as providing services for them, (ii) opposition to general group dominance, (iii) opposition to US oppression, and (iv) their governments' alignments vis‐à‐vis the US. Implications for political psychology and international relations theory are discussed.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12023   open full text
  • Consequences of Reversing the European Union Integration.
    Jacek Kugler, Birol Yeşilada, Ali Fisunoğlu.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Today, financial crisis once again threatens the unity among member states and future of the European Union. The magnitude of the problem is so grave that observers and analysts have concluded a big decision must be made regarding fiscal union (thus political union) to save EMU. “Is this really the end of the road for Eurozone?” Using Power Transition theory, our analysis shows that trust and relative political capabilities are essential to build a stable Union. While it is clear that the center of global politics is shifting away from Europe and the United States to the Asian giants—the transition from West to East can be effectively planned so that the future units are satisfied with each other rather than distrustful, dissatisfied, and contentious. The slowdown of integration is not simply a regional problem with serious consequences for the economic stability of Europe. Far more importantly, our analysis suggests that the process of integration that has reduced tensions within a region previously characterized by major wars may be declining and that this in and of itself could reset the stage not only for regional confrontations but increase the likelihood that global wars may once more be considered as means to solve disputes. The European Union cannot afford to move from the cooperative contest to a confrontational one where solutions are arrived at by force rather than reason. Therefore, the challenge for European leaders is to resolve the current crisis in the EMU and build upon it a reinvigorated union that once more provides a path for complete regional integration.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12024   open full text
  • Nation Branding, National Self‐Esteem, and the Constitution of Subjectivity in Late Modernity.
    Christopher S. Browning.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Surprisingly, the emergent and increasingly popular phenomenon of nation branding has received only scant attention from International Relations scholars. While most analyses account for the phenomenon by emphasizing the perceived material benefits to be derived from establishing a positive national brand, this article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that nation‐branding processes need to be understood as responding to the need of states and state leaders to enhance both their citizens and the nation's sense of ontological security and (self)‐esteem. Moreover, this quest for self‐esteem and ontological security is unfolding in the context of broader realignments occasioned by the advent of late modernity. While nation branding represents an understandable response to these developments, the article questions the strategy's overall efficacy by highlighting its implications for how national subjectivity is constituted, its notable disciplining elements and its potentially undemocratic implications.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12028   open full text
  • Airpower and Quagmire: Historical Analogies and the Second Lebanon War.
    Asaf Siniver, Jeffrey Collins.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah. Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments in military theory and the air‐based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and the Balkan wars of the mid‐1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel's own traumatic experience of Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost‐benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12029   open full text
  • Coordination in a Crisis: Domestic Constraints and EU Efforts to Address the 2008 Financial Crisis.
    Patrick Howell.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    This article explores possible theories of international economic policy coordination, and then proceeds to test these theories through a qualitative analysis of four EU member states – Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – and their preferences and experiences during the financial market crisis period of Fall/Winter 2008–2009. Both institutional and basic realist theories for coordination preferences are evaluated for explanatory power against the case of the 2008 financial crisis and are found lacking. Instead, this analysis finds that a comparative foreign policy theory of political constraints – institutional design, political polarization, and leader time horizons – emerges as the best fit for explaining the divergence in foreign policies among these EU member states.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12030   open full text
  • Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency.
    Pinar Ipek.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Constructivism in the International Relations literature mainly focuses on the constitutive interaction between international norms and state actions. Few studies explore when ideas at the domestic level matter in foreign policy change. I propose a constructivist account for policy change that emphasizes not only ideas but also material interests as exogenous factors constituted within domestic structures. My empirical analysis in the case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency reveals important evidence demonstrating the influence of (i) shared normative values, mostly constituted by the foreign policy elite's intersubjective understanding of Turkey's historical roots and cultural ties in the region and (ii) material interests, favored through the “trading state” and framed by the convergence of principled and causal beliefs on policy change. Ideas matter in foreign policymaking when a set of contingent conditions is satisfied: (i) A small group of recognized foreign policy elite has shared normative beliefs and (ii) an enabling political environment exists, particularly a majority government facilitating foreign policy appointments to key positions so that a window of opportunity is provided for policy entrepreneurship.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12031   open full text
  • The Stabilizing Effects of International Politics on Bilateral Trade Flows.
    Benjamin E. Bagozzi, Steven T. Landis.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Trade volatility can do serious harm to a country's economic and political stability. Research suggests that international trade agreements can reduce such volatility by reinforcing extant trade commitments, improving transparency, promoting policy convergence, and strengthening investor confidence. Drawing on this logic, we posit that international political ties can also produce notable reductions in export volatility. Specifically, we argue that diplomatic missions and military alliances signal lower discount rates, increase political transparency, and enhance issue linkages among trading partners. These enhancements in turn work to stabilize trade flows. To test this argument, we use a gravity model to evaluate the effects of directed diplomatic relations and alliances on bilateral export volatility. Controlling for confounding variables and exploring a wide array of model specifications, we find that the establishment of diplomatic relations or alliances can significantly reduce trade volatility.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12034   open full text
  • Easier Done Than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, and the Origins of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
    Ellen Gutterman.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) is having an unprecedented moment. In 2010, corporations paid $1.8 billion in FCPA fines, penalties, and disgorgements—the most ever recorded in this controversial Act's history and half of all criminal‐division penalties at the Justice Department. While this recent pattern of enforcement is itself interesting, a deeper puzzle lies in the origins and early trajectory of the FCPA. Throughout the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, major US business groups opposed its unilateral ban on transnational bribery and lobbied the government to repeal this costly constraint on American businesses operating overseas. Yet, despite a decade of pressure from otherwise powerful groups, the government failed to respond to business demands amidst strategic trade concerns about the FCPA. Why? The paper applies a Constructivist lens, together with concepts from the theory of legal reasoning, to analyze the early history of the FCPA and explain its continued significance in US foreign economic policy. Anti‐corruption norm resonance and the pressure publicly to justify norm‐transgressing practices made foreign corrupt practices by American businesses “easier done than said.”
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12027   open full text
  • A Story of Institutional Misfit: Congress and US Economic Sanctions.
    Emre Hatipoglu.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 15, 2013
    Parting from conventional studies on economic sanctions that look at the properties of the targeted state, this study focuses on the institutional origins of economic sanctions. I observe that most US sanctions either originate from the legislative or the executive branch. Building on this observation, I argue and present evidence that the institutional origin of a US sanction has a discernible effect on that sanction's duration. An institutional approach underpins the theory I develop to explain this difference. The veto‐point approach focuses on the institutional inertia bestowed upon foreign policy actions executed through law and suggests that sanctions imposed as law should last longer than those carried out by executive order. Semi‐parametric duration analysis conducted on the recently released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data confirms this expectation.
    August 15, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12032   open full text
  • Democracy, Territory, and Armed Conflict, 1919–1995.
    Johann Park, Patrick James.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. August 14, 2013
    Democracy and territory are two of the most important factors that affect conflict and war. Yet no research design looks directly at a possible interaction between these two variables to influence occurrence of armed conflict. This study seeks to answer the following question: “How do two democracies behave when a contentious issue such as territory arises as the source of conflict between them?” Results based on Militarized Interstate Dispute data from 1920 to 1996 produce the conclusion that the pacifying effect of democracy stands up for both territorial dyads and non‐territorial ones in spite of the imperatives toward militarization created by territorial conflict. However, territory of high salience still appears to increase the likelihood of armed conflict between two democracies.
    August 14, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12033   open full text
  • The Biological Bases for Aggressiveness and Nonaggressiveness in Presidents.
    Rose McDermott.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    Leaders remain subject to the same biological determinants and pressures that affect other humans. Yet, they also differ in their ability to regulate and marshal their emotions just as they diverge in their other skills, talents, limitations, and abilities. In particular, some are better at channeling their emotions to help shape foreign policy more efficiently than others. One of the most potent and powerful emotions with which leaders have to contend, particularly under conditions of provocation, is anger. Anger can influence judgment and decision making in systematic and predictable ways. Individual heritable differences can influence the conditions under which anger leads to aggressive action. Such differences can influence not only the environments into which leaders select, but also the ways they process and interpret information; these determinations can decisively influence the outcome of significant public policies, including decisions on conflict and war. As a result, emotion regulation can play a strategic role in leadership. Examples from several recent presidencies illustrate how such individual differences play out on the world stage.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12009   open full text
  • Broadening the Debate about War: The Inclusion of Foreign Critics in Media Coverage and Its Potential Impact on US Public Opinion.
    Shoon Murray.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    In the US context, scholars have demonstrated that public support for military intervention is influenced by the elite debate as presented in the national news media and that the volume of elite criticism reported is largely determined by opposition in Congress. Because the media “index” the debate among officials in Washington, a lively and comprehensive airing of the pros and cons of a military intervention often depends upon Congressional leaders taking an oppositional stance. But sometimes, American reporters will incorporate a surge of foreign leaders' critical views, even when Congressional leaders support administration policy or when they choose to remain silent due to strategic considerations. The question addressed by this article is whether such departures from traditional indexing behavior—which bring foreign views into media coverage in a significant manner—can be predicted based on the circumstances and journalists' incentives. The article also explores whether high‐visibility opposition by credible foreign leaders, in particular United Nations officials and European allies, can substitute for partisan cues from domestic leaders and invigorate a national debate in a manner that influences public opinion.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12010   open full text
  • The Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in Interstate Disputes.
    Andrew P. Owsiak, Derrick V. Frazier.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third‐parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third‐party states' willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. We find that allies are more likely than non‐allies to manage their partner's disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments – both across and within alliance types – increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12011   open full text
  • Scaling CAMEO: Psychophysical Magnitude Scaling of Conflict and Cooperation.
    G. Dale Thomas.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    Event data is the preferred method of characterizing directed‐dyadic behavior through time and is a very versatile approach able to handle both state and nonstate actors. By scaling and aggregating values on a conflict and cooperation continuum, event data can provide a net measure of conflict between two parties for a set time interval. The CAMEO coding scheme was created to address structural flaws in the WEIS coding scheme and to handle better the post‐Cold War environment. However, no systematic study has been completed for assigning fixed‐weight conflict–cooperation scale values to the newer coding scheme, leaving an ad hoc transliteration of Goldstein scale values for WEIS as the best option. This paper reports the results of a psycho‐physical magnitude scaling survey of 158 students from two universities where the students scaled CAMEO categories for conflict and cooperation. In addition to providing empirically based scale values for CAMEO, the paper also tests whether or not conflict and cooperation exist on a single continuum and whether or not a gender difference exists in perceptions of conflict and cooperation.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12012   open full text
  • The New Barbary Wars: Forecasting Maritime Piracy.
    Ursula E. Daxecker, Brandon C. Prins.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    This paper extends systematic analyses of maritime piracy by verifying the robustness of empirical results and examining the forecasting ability of empirical models. Recent research by Ward, Greenhill and Bakke () finds that statistically significant relationships frequently offer poor guidance when it comes to anticipating the inception of civil war. We assess the predictive ability of purported causal factors of piracy using evaluative statistical tools such as receiver‐operating characteristic plots, out‐of‐sample predictions, and outlier analysis. Statistical results for in‐sample and out‐of‐sample tests show that while factors such as military capacity, population size, coastline length, and trade volumes are statistically related to piracy, state fragility has by far the strongest predictive effect despite only being moderately statistically significant in the models. Outlier analysis demonstrates that while several countries experience higher numbers of piracy incidents than predicted, empirical models are generally robust to the presence of outliers. For policymakers, the findings suggest that counter‐piracy efforts focused on capacity‐building measures have the greatest potential for reducing the piracy threat.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12014   open full text
  • Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq.
    Matthew Eshbaugh‐Soha, Christopher Linebarger.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    Much research disputes the president's ability to lead public opinion and shows media to have influenced public opinion concerning the war in Iraq. We argue that although news tone is likely to have affected public support for the war, presidential rhetoric could be influential for two reasons. First, heightened presidential attention to the war increases the public's accessibility to the president's perspective on the war. Second, a survey question that cues the respondent to consider the president explicitly in their evaluation of the Iraq war is likely to encourage responsiveness to presidential rhetoric. To assess these arguments, we simultaneously examine the impact that presidential tone and media tone have on public support for the war in Iraq by analyzing an original dataset of presidential speeches, news coverage, and public support for the war and the president's handling of it from 2002 to 2008. Our findings reveal that although media tone drives public support for the war in Iraq, presidential tone influences the public's view of President Bush's handling of it.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12015   open full text
  • Third Parties and the Arab‐Israeli Conflict: Poliheuristic Decision Theory and British Mandate Palestine Policy.
    Carly Beckerman‐Boys.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    What role do third parties play in the Arab‐Israeli conflict, and to what extent do domestic political constraints shape this role? Answering these questions has important ramifications for understanding the interplay between domestic and international politics. One useful tool to conduct this research is the two‐stage decision‐making framework, Poliheuristic (Ph) Decision Theory, which eliminates options from the choice set that do not meet domestic political requirements. This paper applies Ph theory to a case study from the conflict's infancy, the British decision in 1922 to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home (based on the Balfour Declaration 1917) despite violent Arab opposition. It argues that the decision was based solely on domestic political needs and did not attempt to address tensions in Palestine. It concludes that Ph theory provides a highly effective theory of decision‐making for assessing motivations and policy decisions of third parties in the Arab‐Israeli conflict.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12017   open full text
  • Capabilities, Cooperation, and Culture: Mapping American Ambivalence Toward China.
    Shelley Wick.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    The Sino‐American relationship is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world. Whether this relationship remains peaceful or becomes conflictual will have far‐reaching economic and political ramifications. For more than two decades, American analysts have been attempting to answer one question: Is China a threat to the United States? The result has been a voluminous collection of data that equally supports contradictory answers. I contend that if we want to understand the probable course of the Sino‐American relationship, we need to ask a different question: When and why are Americans likely to perceive China as a threat? This paper reports the results of a social psychological experiment designed to explore the basis of American attitudes toward other states in general and toward China specifically. Contrary to expectations that economic insecurity drives American attitudes toward economic competitors, this study finds that American attitudes toward China are shaped primarily by cultural and institutional judgments. These results contribute to the field of IR by challenging preconceptions about the extent and potential impact of Americans' economic insecurities, by contributing to a nascent constructivist literature that examines how threat is constructed in the national imagination, and by informing how policymakers approach important bilateral relationships.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12020   open full text
  • Explaining Nonratification of the Genocide Convention: A Nested Analysis.
    Brian Greenhill, Michael Strausz.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    What explains the large variation in the time taken by states to ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention? The costs of ratification would appear to be relatively low, yet many states have waited several decades before ratifying this symbolically important treaty. This study employs a “nested analysis” that combines a large‐n event history analysis with a detailed study of an important outlying case in order to explain the main sources of this variation. Surprisingly, the results of our event history analysis suggest that states do not become more likely to ratify once the treaty has become widely adopted by others. We use the case of Japan to examine this relationship in more detail. We argue that once the norm embodied in a human rights treaty develops a “taken‐for‐granted” character, the rate of ratification can slow down because the marginal costs of additional ratifications begin to outweigh the expected benefits.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12013   open full text
  • Religious Discrimination and International Crises: International Effects of Domestic Inequality.
    Özgür Özdamar, Yasemin Akbaba.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    This paper explores religious discrimination against ethnic groups and foreign policy crisis linkages as part of the broader foreign policy approaches developed by McGowan and Shapiro () and James and Özdamar (, ). Informed by the literature suggesting that domestic policies of repression and inequality may result in similar patterns of behavior internationally, this study tests whether states characterized by high levels of religious discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities are more likely to initiate or become involved in foreign policy crises with other states in general. A broad range of data sources, including an independently collected religious discrimination index, are used to test the hypothesized relationship between religious discrimination and international crisis during the period 1990–2003. The results suggest that religious discrimination is an important predictor of initiating and becoming involved in international crises.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12016   open full text
  • Eisenhower's Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test‐Ban Debate 1954–1958.
    Julia M. Macdonald.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    What accounts for the variation in the influence of scientists in the policy‐making process? Why is it that scientists sometimes appear to exercise significant autonomy in shaping policy agendas, while at other times very little? Scientists are most influential, this paper contends, when they can leverage their recognized expertise by strategically co‐opting institutionalized channels of advice. This is most likely to occur in issue areas of high complexity and ambiguity when key policy makers are dependent upon scientists for their counsel. Policy entrepreneurs within competing scientific communities, prevented from accessing key decision makers, wait until windows of opportunity open to undermine the credibility of the incumbent experts, gain access to political leaders, and refocus the policy agenda. This theory is developed and tested through a case‐study analysis of the nuclear test‐ban debate during the Eisenhower administration from 1954 to 1958. The findings of this paper underscore the need to treat foreign policy decision making as a series of strategic interactions between multiple actors with a broader capacity to influence the policy‐making process than traditionally conceived. By doing so, scholars can better understand variations in government decision making across time and issue area, providing important insights into the role of experts in a wide range of public policy domains.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12018   open full text
  • Leaders' Cognitive Complexity, Distrust, and the Diversionary Use of Force.
    Dennis M. Foster, Jonathan W. Keller.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    Some scholars have suggested that when faced with domestic political problems, leaders employ simplified decision processes, preferring action to deliberation and highly visible diversionary uses of force to alternative policies. Others contend that domestically embattled leaders will pursue a more rational examination of the costs and benefits of various options—the sort of deliberation that will lead them to reject diversionary force in favor of less risky measures. Drawing on research in political psychology, we argue that leaders' cognitive processes are not constants but variables, and that both models are correct under certain circumstances. Leaders low in conceptual complexity (CC), and especially those with hawkish leanings, will pursue simplified decision‐making procedures and embrace diversionary strategies, while leaders who are high in complexity will pursue a more thorough consideration of risks and alternatives and generally avoid diversionary actions. We examine these expectations by testing the interactive effect of economic misery and leaders' CC on American force usage for the period 1953–2000. The findings indicate that more conceptually simple leaders—particularly when high in distrust, a trait linked to more hawkish policy inclinations—are significantly more likely to engage in diversion.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12019   open full text
  • The Effects of Rivalry on Rivalry: Accommodation and the Management of Threats.
    Seden Akcinaroglu, Elizabeth Radziszewski, Paul F. Diehl.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. May 02, 2013
    The paper investigates how states manage multiple rivalries when faced with immediate threats. We argue that accommodation of one rival allows states to shift resources from the management of another rival to deal with the costs of immediate threats. By examining enduring rivalries from 1966 to 1999, we show that states' reliance on accommodation in response to threats varies depending on the number of severe threats and the relative capabilities between the states and the threat‐issuing rivals. Findings show that when faced with severe but few threats, states prefer to accommodate rivals that did not issue the threat. They are also more likely to give larger concessions to such rivals and to those issuing less severe threats. Finally, the greater the military capability of a rival issuing a severe threat relative to that of the challenged state, the more likely that a threatening rival is accommodated.
    May 02, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12007   open full text
  • Presidential Personality: Not Just a Nuisance.
    Maryann E. Gallagher, Susan H. Allen.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. February 22, 2013
    Few systematic studies of US uses of force treat the inherent attributes of presidents as the key causal factors; nonetheless, the fact that individual leaders matter is evident to the public, the media, and foreign policymakers in other countries. This study advances the development of First Image explanations of conflict by empirically investigating the relationship between presidential personality and the variation surrounding foreign policy decision making. The importance of this type of variance has been understudied in international relations, and the consistency of leaders' policy decisions has important strategic implications for interstate conflict. Relying on Big Five measures of US presidents' personality traits, we find that leaders who have a high tendency toward Excitement Seeking are more likely to use force to carry out their foreign policy objectives, while those who are more Open to Action exhibit a greater variance around their foreign policy decision making. In sum, the personality traits of individual leaders influence not only the choices they make, but the consistency of their choices, which has important consequences for US foreign policy.
    February 22, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12006   open full text
  • Military Leadership, Institutional Change, and Priorities in Military Spending.
    Michael E. Flynn.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. February 04, 2013
    How does political competition among domestic actors influence foreign policy choice? Studies examining these questions often focus on the role of economic or partisan interests, and how they influence the preferences of decision makers who are subject to electoral institutions and pressures of their constituents. Less attention has been paid to how the preferences of other influential but unelected actors influence state behavior. I examine the influence of one such group by looking at how American military leaders shape decisions on military spending and force structure, while also examining how these decisions have been affected by changes to the institutions governing civil–military relations. Results indicate that military leaders occupying key positions can influence defense spending priorities in favor of their respective branches. Results also suggest the influence of military leaders has changed and is conditional upon the institutions governing the relationships between civilian decision makers and military leaders.
    February 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12005   open full text
  • Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War.
    Kevin Marsh.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. February 04, 2013
    This study examines the decision‐making process leading to President Barack Obama's decision to order a troop surge in Afghanistan in December 2009. I analyze the decision‐making process according to the precepts of the bureaucratic politics model and conclude that the bureaucratic politics model provides a compelling and descriptively accurate account of the Afghanistan surge decision‐making process. Actors' policy preferences were influenced by consideration of bureaucratic role and position within government, significant examples of political activity occurred throughout the strategy review, and the ultimate decision was a political compromise.
    February 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12000   open full text
  • Foreign Policy as Ethics: Toward a Re‐Evaluation of Values.
    Dan Bulley.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. February 04, 2013
    This article notes that while ethics is increasingly talked of in foreign policy, it remains a blindspot for foreign policy analysis (FPA). It argues that this must be rectified through a critical approach which conceptualizes foreign policy as ethics. The first section examines how even constructivist approaches, which are highly attuned to the intersubjective sphere, still generally avoid dealing with morality. The second section looks at the possibilities and limits of one piece of constructivist theorizing that explores the translation of morality into foreign policy via “norms.” This demonstrates the problems that a constructivist account, with its tendency toward explanatory description without evaluation, will always face. The final section argues, through an examination of EU foreign policy (from 1999 to 2004) and its innovative use of “hospitality,” that FPA must critically reassess the value of the norms and principles by which foreign policy operates in order to suggest potentially more ethical modes of encounter.
    February 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12003   open full text
  • Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation.
    Dan Reiter.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. February 04, 2013
    This article develops a theory connecting security commitments and the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. In a threatening environment, third party security commitments can reduce a state's fear of abandonment in the event of war and its motive for acquiring nuclear weapons. However, a threatened state may reject at least some kinds of security commitments, such as foreign deployed nuclear weapons, if it fears that such commitments increase the risks of entrapment, the possibility that the threatened state will be dragged into a war it would like to avoid. The article looks at three kinds of security commitments, alliances, foreign deployed nuclear weapons, and foreign deployed troops. In quantitative tests, it finds strong evidence that foreign deployed nuclear weapons reduce proliferation motives, only very limited evidence that alliances reduce proliferation motives, and no evidence that foreign deployed troops reduce proliferation motives. It also presents several qualitative evidence, which supports the quantitative evidence, and in particular helps explain why alliance ties sometimes do not prevent proliferation.
    February 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12004   open full text
  • Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.
    Sean D. Ehrlich, Eddie Hearn.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. January 25, 2013
    The political economy of trade literature argues that compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. Previous research has found support for many elements of the causal chain underlying embedded liberalism; however, there has been little research on the most crucial element of the causal chain, namely that compensation policies lead to increased support for trade. This article provides a direct test of the compensation hypothesis using a survey‐based experiment conducted in the United States that exposes half of the respondents to knowledge of compensation programs and then asks for their opinion on trade policy. The article explores whether knowledge of compensation increases support for trade as well as who is influenced by this knowledge and, thus, provides a crucial test of the embedded liberalism thesis.
    January 25, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12001   open full text
  • Constructing Regionalism Domestically: Local Actors and Foreign Policymaking in Newly Democratized Indonesia.
    Jürgen Rüland.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. January 25, 2013
    There is a dearth of studies exploring the construction of ideas on regionalism outside Europe. This article seeks to make a contribution to close this gap. It examines the construction of ideas on regionalism in Indonesia, the largest member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Theoretically, the paper draws from Acharya's concept of “constitutive localization” which it develops further. It offers an alternative explanation to studies which argue that as a result of mimetic behavior, social learning, and cost‐benefit calculations, regional organizations across the world become increasingly similar. While this may be the case in terms of rhetoric and organizational structure, it is not necessarily the case at a normative level. The Indonesian case shows that even though foreign policy stakeholders have increasingly championed European ideas of regional integration after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998, they have skillfully amalgamated them with older local worldviews through framing, grafting, and pruning. European ideas of regional integration thereby served to modernize and relegitimize a foreign policy agenda which seeks to establish Indonesia as a regional leader with ambitions to play a major role in global politics.
    January 25, 2013   doi: 10.1111/fpa.12002   open full text
  • Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK.
    Maria Koinova.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 12, 2012
    This comparative study explores the conditions and causal pathways through which conflict‐generated diasporas become moderate or radical actors when linked to homelands experiencing limited sovereignty. Situated at the nexus of scholarship on diasporas and conflict, ethnic lobbying in foreign policy, and transnationalism this article develops four types of diaspora political mobilization—radical (strong and weak) and moderate (strong and weak)—and unpacks the causal pathways that lead to these four types in different political contexts. I argue that dynamics in the original homeland drive the overall trend towards radicalism or moderation of diaspora mobilization in a host‐land: high levels of violence are associated with radicalism, and low levels with moderation. Nevertheless, how diaspora mobilization takes place is a result of the conjuncture of the level of violence with another variable, the linkages of the main secessionist elites to the diaspora. The article uses observations from eight cases of Albanian diaspora mobilization in the US and the UK from 1989 until the proclamation of Kosovo's independence in 2008.
    July 12, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00194.x   open full text
  • The North African Revolutions: A Chance to Rethink European Externalization of the Handling of Non‐EU Migrant Inflows.
    Mason Richey.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 12, 2012
    In this paper, I discuss EU and member state externalization of the handling of non‐EU, irregular migration flows. Following a historical and theoretical Introduction, I address in section “European Reactions to the Migration Flows Following the Arab Spring” the migration consequences of the 2011 North Africa revolutions, focusing particularly on how they provoked an EU migration policy crisis. Then, I show in section “Migration Policy Development in the EU: Fortress Europe or Strategic Incoherence?” how this was an outcome of the ineffectualness and strategic incoherence of EU immigration policy. This is ironic because the EU is criticized—incorrectly, I claim—for having developed a well‐oiled non‐entrée regime that skirts human/immigrant rights obligations by externalizing interdiction, detention, and processing of irregular migrants to countries with lower detention standards and higher human rights abuse rates. In section “The Member States' Role in the Externalization of European Migration Policy”, I demonstrate that when such externalization policies are enacted, they are less due to EU action and more a function of member state decisions. I show that EU periphery member states are responsible for the most problematic policies partially because constraints on EU‐level policy making incentivize these member states to erect “Fortress Europe” through their own devices.
    July 12, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00195.x   open full text
  • Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Context of Global Climate Norms.
    Marco A. Vieira.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 10, 2012
    This article is an enquiry into Brazil's evolving responses to global climate change norms. Following an overview of the evolution of international normative frameworks of climate change governance, I examine the relationship between some of these international norms and domestic environmental politics in Brazil. Internationally, the analysis focuses on the North/South political debate about climate change and its role in shaping understandings about the impact and responses to global warming. Domestically, I explore the evolving relationship between state and private actors in the decision‐making process. I argue that Brazil's official position on climate change negotiations is currently influenced by a nationalist/developmental approach based on the particular worldview of the dominant faction within the foreign ministry and backed up by private groups, powerful sectors in the military establishment, key ministries, and the presidency. Yet, this worldview has been increasingly undermined/permeated by other state and nonstate actors, who are more closely aligned with the environmental concerns of international stakeholders. The ensuing domestic conflict has important implications for the legitimacy and coherence of the Brazilian position in international climate change negotiations.
    July 10, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00191.x   open full text
  • NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance.
    Todd Sandler, Hirofumi Shimizu.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 10, 2012
    Motivated by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' farewell address to NATO, this article investigates whether NATO burden‐sharing behavior has changed during the last ten years. Based on a Spearman rank correlation test, we find almost no evidence that the rich NATO allies shouldered the defense‐spending burden of the poor allies during 1999–2009. In 2010, there is the first evidence of the exploitation of the rich. When allies' defense burdens are related to defense benefit proxies, a Wilcoxon test finds that there is no concordance between burdens and benefits after 2002. This is indicative of a less cohesive alliance, in which allies are not underwriting their derived benefits. We also find that allies' benefits, which are tied to their exposed border protection and terrorism risk, motivate defense spending. Allies' benefits, based on economic base and population, are less of a driver of defense spending for most NATO allies. We devise a broad‐based security expenditure burden that accounts for defense spending, UN peacekeeping, and overseas foreign assistance. In terms of this security burden, there is evidence of the exploitation of the rich by the poor beginning in 2004. Our findings indicate a two‐tiered alliance that faces significant policy challenges.
    July 10, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00192.x   open full text
  • The Taming of The Red Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China's Use of Force, 1949–2001.
    Xiaoting Li.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 10, 2012
    For a long time, the People's Republic of China was known to be prone to use military force to settle foreign policy crises or interstate disputes. Extending Alexander Wendt's analysis of different cultures of anarchy, I argue that Beijing's famed violence proneness—that is, its propensity to use force—was historically a product of the militarized or Hobbesian worldview held by China's leaders during Mao's reign, when the PRC acted as a revolutionary challenger against the international system. Since Mao's death, however, China has been increasingly integrated into the system and, consequently, has experienced a Lockean turn in its worldview, which softens its predilection for violence. A systematic, quantitative test of my theory provides strong evidence that the evolution of China's militarized worldview, rather than its expanding relative power, played a key role in driving Beijing's resort to force between 1949 and 2001.
    July 10, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00193.x   open full text
  • Two Courts Two Roads: Domestic Rule of Law and Legitimacy of International Courts.
    Emilia Justyna Powell.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 10, 2012
    The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) constitute two prominent international courts. However, there exists considerable variation in states' support for these two institutions. The Rome Statute, which recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC has been ratified by over half the states in the world; only a third of states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. How are we to understand this variation in state support for these two courts? I argue that there is an inherent link between the quality of a state's domestic legal system (rule of law) and perceived legitimacy of an international court. Empirical analyses of states' support for the ICJ and the ICC show that rule‐of‐law states lend support to the ICC, a court perceived by the international community as legitimate. Alleged bias of the ICJ has, on the other hand, substantially weakened support for this court among rule‐of‐law states.
    July 10, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00198.x   open full text
  • Liberal Democracy Promotion in Iraq: A Model for the Middle East and North Africa?
    Jeff Bridoux, Malcolm Russell.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    This article asks whether there are lessons that can be drawn from the democratization of Iraq for the possible democratization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the wake of the 2010–2011 Arab uprisings. The paper draws on the democratization program in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 to demonstrate that focusing on the promotion of a liberal democratic model in Iraq translated into a lack of operational flexibility, which let democracy assistance unable to cope with socio‐economic demands, local realities and reactions to democratization. Taking into account a variation in the intensity of interventionism between Iraq and MENA, the article argues that there is sufficient similarities between both cases to point Western democracy promoters in the direction of models of democracy that offer a more comprehensive response to the current political transition in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya than the traditional focus on the promotion of liberal democracy does.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00181.x   open full text
  • Roles and Realities: When and Why Gatekeepers Fail to Change Foreign Policy.
    Marijke Breuning.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    The adoption of international norms by a state depends on the active support of decision makers in key gatekeeping positions. Yet, political change does not inevitably follow the initiatives of norm entrepreneurs. The literature on norm dynamics has largely focused on successful norm change. This focus on cases that support the notion that norms matter constitutes selection on the dependent variable. To more fully grasp the role and limits of gatekeepers, it is important to also investigate cases where political resistance prevented the domestic adoption of international norms. This study uses an illustrative case study in which circumstances appeared ripe for a new policy direction but where change failed to materialize. The study concludes that gatekeepers matter, but also that norm change crucially, depends not only on gatekeepers’ ability to frame norms in terms that resonate domestically but also on their ability to build coalitions with other relevant political actors.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00178.x   open full text
  • Muslim Interest Groups and Foreign Policy in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom: Identity, Interests, and Action.
    Liat Radcliffe Ross.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    In the last two decades, Muslim minorities have organized politically as Muslims (as opposed to ethnic or national identities) to influence foreign policy in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. This paper evaluates to what extent and in what ways Muslim identity impacts upon the determination of the foreign policy interests and lobbying of Muslim interest groups in these pluralist democracies, as compared to other variables at the national and organizational levels. Analysis is based largely on primary documents, such as press releases and newsletters, issued by five leading Muslim interest groups in the US, Canada and the UK, as well as interviews with the leaders of these organizations.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00186.x   open full text
  • Running on Foreign Policy? Examining the Role of Foreign Policy Issues in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 Congressional Campaigns.
    Peter F. Trumbore, David A. Dulio.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    While there is a long, rich tradition of scholarship on the impact of foreign policy on presidential campaigns and elections, the question of the role of foreign policy concerns in congressional elections has been left largely unexplored. This is particularly surprising given that scholars have in recent years highlighted the significant impact of Congress on American foreign policy both as an institution and as the result of the foreign policy activism of individual members. This earlier research indicates that the role of foreign policy in congressional campaigns and elections deserves much more attention than it has so far received. In this project, we examine the use of foreign policy in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 congressional campaigns, analyzing the issue content of television advertisements produced by candidates seeking election to the US House of Representatives. We find that across the three election cycles, foreign policy issues became much more prominent over time but still remained a modest part of candidates' appeals to potential voters. We also find differences between candidates rooted in partisan identification and perceptions of policy performance on key foreign policy issues, and strong indications that candidates emphasize foreign policy issues that have significant local impact.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00187.x   open full text
  • The Domestic Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology.
    Timothy Hildebrandt, Courtney Hillebrecht, Peter M. Holm, Jon Pevehouse.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    The debate around humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect generally concerns a collective action problem on the international level: motivating states to participate in a multilateral coalition to stop a mass atrocity. This debate presupposes that states enjoy a domestic consensus about their rights and responsibilities to intervene. This article reconsiders this assumption and examines the sources of domestic political will for intervention, particularly the role of partisanship, ideology, and public opinion on Congressional members' willingness to support US intervention for humanitarian purposes. We analyze several Congressional votes relevant to four episodes of US humanitarian intervention: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. We find that public support for humanitarian intervention increases Congressional support and that other political demands, primarily partisanship and ideological distance from the president, often trump the normative exigencies of intervention. Our findings shed light on the domestic political dynamics behind humanitarian intervention and can help explain why some recent humanitarian missions have proceeded without seeking Congressional approval.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00189.x   open full text
  • Delineating the Scope Conditions of the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Noncompensatory Principle and the Domestic Salience of Foreign Policy.
    Kai Oppermann.
    Foreign Policy Analysis. July 03, 2012
    The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making would benefit from being clearer in spelling out the conditions under which it holds more or less analytic promise. The article makes the case that the concept of issue salience can help the theory address its shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the explanatory power of poliheuristic theory's two‐stage model largely depends on the noncompensatory principle of major domestic political loss avoidance on the first stage of the model to simplify the choice set to be considered on the second stage. This is more likely to happen, however, in the case of issues that are highly salient to a government's selectorate than in the case of issues that are of low salience in the domestic arena. The poliheuristic theory should thus be more powerful if it is applied to domestic high‐salience rather than low‐salience decisions. These theoretical contentions are illustrated in a case study on the decision making of the British Labour government under Tony Blair in the fields of European security and defense policy and the single European currency.
    July 03, 2012   doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00182.x   open full text