This paper contributes to agrarian debates through a discussion of the interactions between the interests and incentives of the rural classes, focusing especially on the leadership exercised by middle‐size farmers. In the recent past, class analysis associated with Marxism has given way to models of individual rational maximization, not least because of the lack of specific findings about the effects of peasant differentiation beyond the dichotomous class conflict between peasants and landlords. Information has replaced asset distribution as the main factor affecting effective governance and service provision. According to these theories, politicians did not deliver less because they were responding to the preferences of the large landowning classes, or because seemingly competitive elections were games of rotating chairs within a single dominant class but, rather, because the voters did not have enough information about the candidates and programmes. I bring the discussion back to peasant differentiation and class endowments using the case of communal action boards in Colombia, showing how the demand for information on candidates and developmental resources matters, but is dependent on class structures. I suggest that different rural groups access, use, and manipulate information with differing aims, and that the rural middle class is a fundamental actor in the demand for public goods.