This article studies the perception of the EU Commission's Secretariat General in policy‐making. Recently, research on EU institutions devotes increasing attention to analyzing structures and procedures of decision‐making in EU institutions, most notably the EU Commission. Conventionally, the EU Commission is portrayed as a fragmented organization, divided along the lines of staff nationality, sectoral responsibilities and cabinets and General Directorates (DGs). The Secretariat General has long been viewed a weak actor that is hardly able or motivated to steer internal decision‐making. However, recent research indicates a changing role of the Secretariat General as a pro‐active broker and last arbiter. This article studies how the Secretariat General is perceived by the DGs in policy coordination and argues that this perception depends on the pattern of political authority, bureaucratic roles and the relevance and the alternatives prevailing in the policy field. The article is based on data from a survey among Commission officials.