This paper examines the difference between the orthodox assumption that adult‐child sexual contact is both wrong and harmful and another that focuses upon moral panics. The latter view emphasises that the personal or social harm arising from adult‐child sexual contact is open to question. The tension between these two positions is laid out in order to examine their different assumptions about what exists (ontology), how it is understood (epistemology) and how we appraise power discrepancies in relationships (ethics). Resources from the philosophy of critical realism are deployed to critique the applicability of moral panic theory to child sexual abuse and understand the persistent presence of that theory, despite its poor evidence base. It is concluded that child sexual abuse is not a moral panic at all and that practitioners should be wary of the influence of this line of reasoning in their professional training and literature. ‘Examines the difference between the orthodox assumption that adult‐child sexual contact is both wrong and harmful and another that focuses upon moral panics’ Key Practitioner Messages A minority academic position is that adult‐child sexual contact is usually harmless and ethically and psychologically warranted in society. Public and professional concern about the contact is depicted as a ‘moral panic’. The recent history of that minority position is examined and justifications from policy libertarians and pro‐paedophile groups summarised. Using resources from the philosophy of critical realism, this position is critiqued for its unwarranted reliance on the assumption that adult‐child sexual contact has become a moral panic.