["\nAbstract\nThe anti‐corruption struggle has become an international political doctrine since the 1990s. On the one hand, it has been anchored in organizations that promote ideas and models of ‘good governance’: non‐governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, the World Bank, and so on. On the other hand, it has acquired normative force in conventions of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD), and other institutions that induce changes in national laws. The mobilization of this doctrine in the Brazilian national space is simultaneously related to the effects of political conjuncture and to broader structural factors. Since the re‐democratization of the country, legal elites have made increasing corporate and political gains. At the same time, the anti‐corruption prescriptions have reinforced political and economic groups’ discourse seeking to re‐establish the neoliberal agenda of the 1990s. In Brazil, this agenda's central axis focuses on the (de)legitimation of the social rights enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, and of the social policies implemented in recent decades. Among these structural factors, we can highlight the corporate stature and political credit acquired by judicial agents since the re‐democratization of the country. Looking at international variables as a starting point, this article aims to shed light on the links between Brazilian institutions and international anti‐corruption initiatives. The results are based on a comparison of the trajectories of core actors in this process and the main anti‐corruption initiatives of the 2000s in Brazil. These initiatives, paradoxically, have contributed to positioning judicial agents as central protagonists of a new version of the Brazilian authoritarian political tradition.\n", "Journal of Law and Society, Volume 47, Issue S1, Page S74-S89, October 2020. "]