Inference and Explanation in Counterfactual Reasoning
Cognitive Science / Cognitive Sciences
Published online on January 31, 2013
Abstract
This article reports results from two studies of how people answer counterfactual questions about simple machines. Participants learned about devices that have a specific configuration of components, and they answered questions of the form “If component X had not operated [failed], would component Y have operated?” The data from these studies indicate that participants were sensitive to the way in which the antecedent state is described—whether component X “had not operated” or “had failed.” Answers also depended on whether the device is deterministic or probabilistic—whether X's causal parents “always” or only “usually” cause X to operate. Participants' explanations of their answers often invoked non‐operation of causally prior components or unreliability of prior connections. They less often mentioned independence from these causal elements.