Over the last several decades, elections and parties have become common features of most authoritarian regimes. While recent research on hybrid regimes has often focused on how dictators use these nominally democratic institutions to maintain their non-democratic rule, there is reason to suspect that electoral authoritarianism may pose particular threats to a regime’s stability. Theories of collective behaviour suggest that electoral authoritarian regimes might face higher levels of anti-regime mobilization since parties and elections can help regime opponents overcome collective action problems and coordinate their efforts to challenge incumbents. An analysis of 136 authoritarian regimes over the last several decades indicates that regimes that hold nominally competitive elections are characterized by higher levels of political unrest than those with no elections. Furthermore, election years serve as a focal point for mobilizing anti-regime activity. These findings imply that authoritarian rulers face a trade-off when instituting a system of regular elections; while legislatures, parties and elections provide numerous benefits to incumbents, they also increase the frequency of anti-regime protests and other disruptive, mass political action.