Through a conceptual and comparative analysis of 14 presidential interruptions in Latin America between 1980 and 2010, this article seeks to improve the current conceptualization of executive instability in presidential regimes and provide contingent answers to three debates: 1) ‘Do political institutions or pressure from below constitute the greater peril to presidential survival?’; 2) ‘Do presidential interruptions constitute a solution to an ongoing crisis, or further deepen the crisis?’; and 3) ‘Are presidential interruptions good or bad for democracy?’ The article argues that these questions have not been answered satisfactorily because the literature has assumed unit homogeneity, that is, that all interruptions are equal in terms of antecedents and aftermath, when in fact the cases of interruption demonstrate heterogeneity on these issues. This heterogeneity can be explained by two variables: the opposition’s primary motivation for challenging the president; and the degree of undemocratic behaviour demonstrated by the president and opposition during the crisis. Finally, based on these two variables, the article presents a typological map of crises and interruptions that helps define the scope conditions of the concept, captures the heterogeneity between the cases and seeks to provide a useful tool for future analysis of presidential interruptions.