This cross‐sectional study investigates the influence of a company's remuneration structure on managers’ opportunistic behaviour. The findings support the proposed hypothesis that a higher level of compliance with Remuneration Principle 8—ASX Corporate Governance Council) is associated with a lower level of earnings management. The findings support the efficient functioning of the ASX proposed remuneration structure. This cross‐sectional study investigates the influence of remuneration structures on financial reporting quality, based on a sample of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Compliance with Remuneration Principle eight issued by ASX (providing recommendations on formation, operation and disclosure of remuneration committees) is expected to improve financial reporting quality represented by a decreased level of earnings management. This study expands the corporate governance literature by examining an under‐researched mechanism to address the agency problem. Earnings management, as a consequence of the agency problem, is measured using the level of absolute discretionary accruals. In this study, we use the modified Jones model to measure the level of discretionary accruals and the existence of reduced earnings management. The study is conducted using a random sample of 214 firm‐year observations selected from the ASX listed companies. Our findings show a higher level of compliance with the principle on remuneration is associated with lower levels of earnings management. The findings support the efficient functioning of the ASX‐proposed remuneration structure in reducing earnings manipulations.