Research summary: This paper uses signaling theory to bring together two complementary research streams that have largely ignored each other: strategic human resource management and media relations management. We argue that when publicly traded firms voluntarily and publicly disclose positive information about their value creation and appropriation activities, they also send positive signals to managerial labor markets regarding executives' capabilities. Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive association between public disclosures and voluntary executive turnover. An analysis of pharmaceutical and communications equipment firms from 1990 to 2004 supports this prediction, underscoring the need to understand better the effects of voluntary public disclosures on a firm's ability to protect its human capital. More generally, our results highlight the importance of considering the impact of a single signal on multiple receivers. Managerial summary: Given the organizational benefits of positive media coverage, the considerable effort that firms put into managing their image in the media is not surprising. We argue and show, however, that when a firm enhances its public image it also improves its executives' positions in the managerial labor market and, by so doing, increases their likelihood of voluntarily leaving the firm. In particular, we find that corporate press releases, an important mechanism for managing information released in the public domain to signal a firm's competitive advantages, may result in unintentional loss of senior management talent. This trade‐off suggests that firms should increase coordination between their strategy, human resources, and corporate communications/investor relations departments to ensure that they collectively weigh the benefits and costs of publicly disclosing value‐relevant information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.