In the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell trial and Giubilini and Minerva's article ‘After‐birth abortion’, abortion‐rights advocates have been pressured to provide an account of the moral difference between abortion, particularly late‐term abortion, and infanticide. In response, some scholars have defended a moral distinction by appealing to an argument developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in A defense of abortion. However, once Thomson's analogy is refined to account for the morally relevant features of late‐term pregnancy, rather than distinguishing between late‐term abortion and infanticide, it reinforces their moral similarity. This is because late‐term abortion requires more than detachment – it requires an act of feticide to ensure the death of the viable fetus. As such, a Thomsonian account cannot be deployed successfully as a response to Giubilini and Minerva. Those wishing to defend late‐term abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide will need to provide an alternative account of the difference, or else accept Giubilini and Minerva's conclusion.