The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is famous for playing a central role in promoting the process of European integration. Although the Court has always been criticized for this pro‐integrationist role, Member States have never cut back the CJEU's power. Recently, however, the environment for legal integration has changed: the CJEU is dealing more and more with politically sensitive issues; and that in a period when the integration project as such is becoming increasingly contested. Contrary to the expectations of many scholars, this had not led to more resistance against the CJEU's case law or its power. This article approaches this surprising fact by investigating the CJEU's jurisprudence on Golden Shares, which has substantially reduced national competencies in the contentious issue of corporate control. It shows that the persistent acceptance of the CJEU can be explained with the low and manageable short‐term costs of legal integration.