Research Summary In the wake of the mass incarceration movement, many states must now manage the rebound of decarceration. Thermodynamic forces of the justice system, however, have pushed former fiscal pressures of institutions onto that of community corrections. Encouraged by the positive findings of recently piloted innovations, several jurisdictions have taken great interest in the implementation of deterrence‐based sanctioning models when dealing with supervision violations. Among the first to implement a statewide turn to this style of sanctioning, Washington State's swift‐and‐certain (SAC) policy was implemented in June 2012. The intent of SAC was to expand the model found in Hawaii's Opportunity Probation and Enforcement (HOPE) to a wider criminal justice population, while emphasizing the reduction of confinement costs. This study focused on the impact of SAC with regard to supervision outcomes for participants. By using a quasi‐experimental design, we examined confinement, recidivism, treatment, violation, and costs outcomes of SAC participants. Findings reveal that SAC participants were found to incur fewer sanctioned incarceration days after a violation, reduced odds of recidivism, possessed greater treatment program utilization, reduced their propensity of committing violations over time, and as a result, imposed lower correctional and associated costs. The SAC model provides noteworthy positive effects and no appreciable negative impacts on public safety. Policy Implications We further discuss the impact of SAC in the context of deterrence‐based sanctioning. Specifically, we explain how practices such as SAC may impact the future of sanctioning community supervision conditions. Although many policies that emphasize deterrence demonstrate inconsistent findings, immediate advantages of SAC take the form of fiscal savings, indicating that these novel methods provide a form of justice reinvestment. Additionally, connecting deterrence‐based supervision methods to reductions in most recidivism measures suggests that proportionality and quality assurance may increase the effectiveness of these policies. We recommend ways that such nuanced implementation may be fruitful, as well as suggest ways of conceptualizing the theory of deterrence. Policy makers can appropriately work its components into supervision practice without depreciating the importance of treatment and addressing criminogenic needs.