This article investigates the implementation of the International Safety Management Code in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. In particular, it examines the tension between management focus on speedy production and seafarers’ participation in safety-related decision-making and analyses how this tension is managed. It shows that while on paper companies have policies stating safety commitment in compliance with the International Safety Management Code, in practice shore management tends to prioritise efficient production. When Occupational Health and Safety and ship’s sailing schedules are in conflict, managers implicitly request shipmasters to prioritise the ‘core interest’ of the company. Although the International Safety Management Code endows shipmasters with overriding authority in relation to shipboard safety management, they tend to read between the lines and tacitly follow managers’ intentions. The study suggests that if the implementation of the International Safety Management Code makes a difference, it is the practice that managers become more subtle in giving orders to exert their dominance. The study further reveals that the management’s practice is not only irresponsive to seafarers’ safety concerns, but also makes rather limited contributions to promote Occupational Health and Safety management.