Lone‐Actor Terrorist Target Choice
Behavioral Sciences & the Law / BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW
Published online on November 20, 2016
Abstract
Lone‐actor terrorist attacks have risen to the forefront of the public's consciousness in the past few years. Some of these attacks were conducted against public officials. The rise of hard‐to‐detect, low‐tech attacks may lead to more public officials being targeted. This paper explores whether different behavioral traits are apparent within a sample of lone‐actor terrorists who plotted against high‐value targets (including public officials) than within a sample of lone actors who plotted against members of the public. Utilizing a unique dataset of 111 lone‐actor terrorists, we test a series of hypotheses related to attack capability and operational security. The results indicate that very little differentiates those who attack high‐value targets from those who attack members of the public. We conclude with a series of illustrations to theorize why this may be the case. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.