Are left‐wing governments in Latin America, as proclaimed by their leaders, really pro‐labor? It is often argued that left‐wing governments in Latin America have implemented pro‐labor policies. In this paper we put these claims to an empirical test using 37 aspects of de facto (practices) and de jure (laws) violations of labor rights. Using panel data on 26 Latin American and Caribbean countries during the period 1985–2002, we do not find any effect of left‐leaning chief executives on labor rights. While left‐leaning chief executives do legislate laws protecting labor rights, the enforcement of these laws is abysmally weak. Further evidence suggests that cohesive left‐wing governments are more likely to legislate laws protecting labor rights than diverse governments. These results are robust to alternative measures of ideology, estimation methods, and controlling for endogeneity. The policy implications suggest that irrespective of the political ideology, upholding labor rights in Latin America requires strengthening the enforcement capacity.