In current debate, it is frequently argued that EU law requires or facilitates the implementation of ‘downturn‐austerity’, that is, spending cuts, wage deflation, and tax increases during an economic downturn. More specifically, this ‘thesis of the constitutionalization of downturn‐austerity in Europe’ has two dimensions: a (narrow) normative and a (broader) causal one. The former holds that downturn‐austerity is a legal obligation under EU law; the latter assumes that the European constitutional framework effects downturn‐austerity without necessarily claiming a legal obligation. I will argue that the former is incorrect, and yet shapes the hegemonic understanding of EU law. I will maintain that the normative constitutionalization thesis should be understood as an ideological communication, which aims to cloak the significant distributive effects of the crisis measures with an unwarranted aura of legal necessity, political coherence, and academic legitimacy.