This article investigates how political institutions affect government–media relationships. Most studies of media-politics focus on majoritarian parliamentary or presidential systems and on how party systems affect journalism. This tends to neglect important issues that pertain in more constitutionally complex democracies, such as the consociational institutions in postconflict societies. Taking the Northern Irish context as a strategic case study, we analyze data from thirty-three semistructured interviews with the actors responsible for communicating political issues in Northern Ireland: political journalists and the two groups of government communicators, civil service Government Information Officers (GIOs) and Ministerial Special Advisers (SpAds). By examining their roles and relationships in this context, we demonstrate the importance of considering the institutional design of the democratic system itself when attempting to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced theory of media-politics. In Northern Ireland, the absence of an official political opposition in the legislature, together with the mandatory nature of the multiparty coalition, means that the media have come to be perceived by many political and media actors as the opposition. This in turn influences the interpersonal interactions between government and media, the way political actors try to "manage" the media, and the media’s approach to reporting government.
As part of a larger European Union (EU)-funded project, this paper investigates the coverage of corruption and related topics in three European democracies: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Based on Freedom House data, these countries are characterized by different levels of press freedom. A large corpus of newspaper articles (107,248 articles) from the period 2004 to 2013 were analyzed using dedicated software. We demonstrate that freedom of press is not the only dimension that affects the ability to and the way in which news media report on corruption. Because of its political partisanship, the Italian press tends to emphasize and dramatize corruption cases involving domestic public administrators and, in particular, politicians. The British coverage is affected mainly by market factors, and the press pays more attention to cases occurring abroad and in sport. The French coverage shares specific features with both the British and the Italian coverage: Newspapers mainly focus on corruption involving business companies and foreign actors, but they also cover cases involving domestic politicians. Media market segmentation, political parallelism, and media instrumentalization determine different representations preventing the establishment of unanimously shared indignation.
Media coverage can influence how citizens think about their political leaders. This study explores how three types of media bias (visibility bias, tonality bias, and agenda bias) affect voter assessments of politicians’ traits. Bias effects should be stronger for political traits (such as competence) than for nonpolitical traits (such as likability). Biases may also interact in their effects: Specifically, visibility bias should moderate the impact of tonality bias. Combining media, party, and survey data through manual content analysis of newspaper coverage (N = 2,680) and party press releases (N = 1,794), as well as a three-wave voter survey (n = 927) during the 2013 Austrian election campaign, we find substantial effects of tonality bias and agenda bias on political trait perceptions. The effects are less clear for nonpolitical trait perceptions. Although visibility bias has no direct impact, there is evidence that it moderates effects of tonality bias on candidate perceptions.
Internationally, scholars have raised substantial concerns regarding unfavorable news coverage of female political candidates and representatives. However, prior research has scarcely considered the intersectional effects of political actors’ race and gender in this context. I investigate these dynamics through a case study of the U.K. 2010 general election, a breakthrough year for black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) women in British politics. Only three had previously been elected to parliament but a further seven joined their ranks that year. While headlines celebrated the possibility of a "small revolution" resulting in "the most diverse parliament ever," the press also subjected BAME female candidates to exceptional scrutiny regarding their credentials and ability to "transform politics." Employing a quantitative content analysis of national newspaper coverage, I find that the apparent newsworthiness of BAME women’s intersectional identity was a double-edged sword. While they arguably enjoyed a visibility advantage compared with white female candidates, their coverage was also exceptionally negative and narrowly focused on their ethnicity and gender. I argue that as national legislatures become increasingly diverse, single axis analyses of the effects of politicians’ race, gender, or other axes of identity are insufficient to capture their combined effects on press coverage of politics.
This paper develops a way for analyzing the structure of campaign communications within Twitter. The structure of communication affordances creates opportunities for a horizontal organization power within Twitter interactions. However, one cannot infer the structure of interactions as they materialize from the formal properties of the technical environment in which the communications occur. Consequently, the paper identifies three categories of empowering communication operations that can occur on Twitter: Campaigns can respond to others, campaigns can retweet others, and campaigns can call for others to become involved in the campaign on their own terms. The paper operationalizes these categories in the context of the 2015 U.K. general election. To determine whether Twitter is used to empower laypersons, the profiles of each account retweeted and replied to were retrieved and analyzed using natural language processing to identify whether an account is from a political figure, member of the media, or some other public figure. In addition, tweets and retweets are compared with respect to the manner key election issues are discussed. The findings indicate that empowering uses of Twitter are fairly marginal, and retweets use almost identical policy language as the original campaign tweets.
The present study adds to the framing literature by providing a test of Mauro Porto’s "News Diversity" standard for professional journalism: providing multiple, equally persuasive frames in every news story. What are the effects of multiple versus single media frames on a foreign policy issue, and how do they interact with people’s foreign policy values? Previous studies have looked at how single frames influence opinions, how frames interact with values, and a few studies have investigated the effects of two competing frames at varying levels of persuasiveness. None, however, have used four, equally strong frames on a foreign policy issue and measured their effects among those with differing foreign policy values. We found that exposure to only single frames tended to move participants away from their stated values and in the direction of the frame, while exposure to multiple, competing frames kept participants’ opinions closer to their stated values—without merely reinforcing previously held opinions.
The transition from low-choice to high-choice media environments has raised new concerns about selective exposure. In this context, two types of selective media exposure are relevant. One is selectivity based on political ideological preferences, the other selectivity based on political interest. Evidence for both has been found primarily in an American context, while there is less research on European countries. This is problematic, as the opportunity structures for different forms of selectivity vary across media environments. Against this background, the purpose of this study is to investigate the two types of selective exposure in a country—Sweden—where the opportunity structures for selective exposure differ from the American context. This study investigates both types of selective exposure in relation to televised party-leader interviews. Based on panel survey data, the findings show that selective exposure based on political interest is substantially more important than selective exposure based on ideological preferences in explaining exposure to party-leader interviews. To substantiate this finding, the results are replicated with partisan learning as the dependent variable.
Previous research finds that nongovernmental organization (NGO) publicity strategies—despite digital technologies—continue to focus heavily on garnering coverage in the mainstream news media. Drawing on theories of path dependence and interviews with NGO professionals, this paper identifies three factors that explain why this should be so. First, donors continue to value media coverage as a platform to learn about advocacy groups, as well as a mechanism for measuring their impact on political discourse. Second, political officials still value media coverage as a way to learn about advocacy demands. Third, NGOs occupy a position that is socially proximate to journalism, which leads the former to see the latter as an ally in the pursuit of publicity. Together, these factors confirm and extend the new institutional concept of "path dependence" by demonstrating how path dependence in one field (philanthropy, politics) can reinforce path dependence in another (NGO). These "reinforcing path dependencies" in turn interact with established mechanisms of institutional production (start-up costs, feedback effects, knowledge accumulation) to explain why NGOs continue to persist in media-centered publicity strategies despite new technological possibilities.
Research on televised election debates has been dominated by studies of the United States. As a result, we know far less about other national contexts, including the many parliamentary democracies that now hold televised election debates. This article makes two contributions to address this. Theoretically, the study argues that traditional approaches for understanding the development of campaign communication practices (particularly, Americanization and hybridization) are limiting when applied to television debates, and instead offers an alternative theoretical approach, the concept of speciation drawn from biological science. This is then applied in the empirical section of the article in a comparative analysis of the evolution of televised election debates in four parliamentary democracies: Australia, Canada, West Germany/Germany, and the United Kingdom. Based on this analysis, the article argues that the logic of parliamentary democracy coupled with more diffuse party systems has created a distinctive type of televised debate, generally more open to smaller parties based on their success at winning seats in the legislature.
Research on televised election debates has been dominated by studies of the United States. As a result, we know far less about other national contexts, including many parliamentary democracies that now hold televised election debates. This article makes two contributions to address this. Theoretically, the study argues that traditional approaches for understanding the development of campaign communication practices (particularly, Americanization and hybridization) are limiting when applied to television debates and instead offers an alternative theoretical approach, the concept of speciation drawn from biological science. This is then applied in the empirical section of the article in a comparative analysis of the evolution of televised election debates in four parliamentary democracies: Australia, Canada, West Germany/Germany, and the United Kingdom. Based on this analysis, the article argues that the logic of parliamentary democracy coupled with more diffuse party systems has created a distinctive type of televised debate, generally more open to smaller parties based on their success at winning seats in the legislature.
In 2006, Chinese officials revealed an extensive plan to increase the nation’s soft power in Africa through a number of initiatives to increase the presence and relevance of Chinese media in Africa. However, the question remains: Has China been successful in enhancing its soft power via its news media expansion in the African region? Although it is easy to find sweeping proclamations regarding the popularity of Chinese media throughout Africa, there have been limited efforts to systematically measure the effect of these media on African public opinion toward China. This study seeks to fill this void. Using Pew Global Attitudes Project data, I explore correlations between attitudes toward China and the extent of the Chinese media presence across six African nations in 2013. In addition, to better test for a causal effect of the post-2006 expansion, I employ a second analysis in which I compare these relationships in 2007 with these same relationships in 2013. By comparing changes in these relationships over time, this analysis provides tentative empirical support that the sweeping efforts undertaken to expand the reach and relevance of Chinese media in Africa have moved African public opinion in the desired direction.
Academic analysis of the growth and nature of political campaigning online has concentrated largely on textual interactions between politicians, parties, their members, and supporters, as well as voters more widely. In evaluating the shift from traditional to online campaigning techniques, the use of social media’s increasingly visual capabilities has been comparatively neglected in research. This article considers one type of online visual political communication, the online political poster, in terms of its strategic campaign functions relating to persuasive and organizational roles. The article uses a case study of an extensive data set of online political posters collected from political parties in the United Kingdom, on Facebook, between September 2013 through to and including the general election in May 2015, to try to understand how parties used online political posters and how audiences responded to them. The findings show that despite a clear emphasis on sharing images, very few received widespread attention, arguably limiting their persuasive role. However, their prevalence suggests a role relating to parties trying to maintain relationships with existing online supporters as a form of displaying virtual presence, credibility, and belonging, paralleling the function of traditional window posters and yard signs but in a social media setting.
Early research in western contexts finds evidence of online participation leading to political engagement. We test this hypothesis in a nonwestern campaign context. We discuss India’s complex "hybrid media system," political parties, leaders, and issues in the 2014 national election that saw more use of digital information channels by all parties, and more so by the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the young Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) than the incumbent Indian National Congress (INC). We hypothesize that online engagement and, specifically, sharing of campaign information is a significant predictor of political engagement in the campaigns of each of these three parties. Our dependent variable is a scale of engagement in campaign activities. Independent variables include campaign interest, issue salience, exposure to outdoor party publicity, attention to political information in various traditional media, party contact and sharing information with others (both measured face-to-face and electronically), and controlling for age, gender, and education. Our models, based on survey data from Delhi, Bengaluru, and Mumbai, show that party contact, sharing campaign information, and campaign interest are significant predictors of engagement while the other items vary in terms of significance.
The role of digital media practices in reshaping political parties and election campaigns is driven by a tension between control and interactivity, but the overall outcome for the party organizational form is highly uncertain. Recent evidence contradicts scholarship on the so-called "death" of parties and suggests instead that parties may be going through a long-term process of adaptation to postmaterial political culture. We sketch out a conceptual approach for understanding this process, which we argue is being shaped by interactions between the organizations, norms, and rules of electoral politics; postmaterial attitudes toward political engagement; and the affordances and uses of digital media. Digital media foster cultures of organizational experimentation and a party-as-movement mentality that enable many to reject norms of hierarchical discipline and habitual partisan loyalty. This context readily accommodates populist appeals and angry protest—on the right as well as the left. Substantial publics now see election campaigns as another opportunity for personalized and contentious political expression. As a result, we hypothesize that parties are being renewed from the outside in, as digitally enabled citizens breathe new life into an old form by partly remaking it in their own participatory image. Particularly on the left, the overall outcome might prove more positive for democratic engagement and the decentralization of political power than many have assumed.
Social media have the potential to influence power relations in political parties as they allow individual candidates to campaign more independently of the central party. In this paper, we scrutinize the relationship between individualization and digital social media in a study that combines the 2013 Norwegian Candidate Survey with candidates’ Twitter data. We ask, first, to what extent are social media used as an individualistic campaign tool? Second, does an individualized social media campaign style increase influence in the Twitter sphere? Third, what constitutes success on Twitter? We found two main styles of social media campaigning: a party-centered and an individualized style. Moreover, an individualized style did increase the possibility of being active on Twitter, but it had a negative effect on Twitter influence. The Twitter influentials are young, male, and relatively centrally placed in their parties. In a hybrid communication system, it appears that the candidates who gain influence in social media are those who are able to create a synergy between traditional media channels and social media.
In Spain, the 2014 European Elections saw the unexpected rise of a new party Podemos, which obtained five European Parliament seats only three months after its formation. In the Spanish National Elections in December 2015, this party obtained 20.66 percent of the votes, which made it the third biggest party. Our objective was to analyze the old and new elements of Podemos’ communication and campaign strategies. The methodology followed here used this new party as a strategic case study by a qualitative approach. The analysis focused on three key fronts: (1) the role of communication, (2) mediatization of politics, and (3) use of digital media. The results suggested that Podemos’ 2014 electoral campaign combined presence on broadcast television and use of intense digital media to boost citizens’ engagement and self-mediation. Accordingly, it was established as a new transmedia party. This case also demonstrates that mediatization can also occur in two-way street dynamics, that is, from politics to the media, where the former generates an influence on the latter. This finding opens the door to help overcome the media-centric vision. Finally, we discussed future questions about the influence on other political actors’ communication strategies in different parts of the world from an international perspective.
This article presents a case study of the use of digital tools by campaign organizations in Germany’s 2013 federal election. Based on observations and in-depth interviews with key personnel in the campaigns of six of the parties running for Parliament, I examine whether German campaigns’ use of digital tools follows the usage practices that have been identified in studies of campaigns in the United States. I group how campaigns use digital tools into four categories: organizational structures and work routines, presence in information spaces online, support in resource collection and allocation, and symbolic uses. I show that these categories capture how German parties use digital tools. U.S.-based studies can thus provide helpful interpretive frameworks for studying digital campaigning in other countries. However, I also reveal that there are important differences between German and U.S.-based online campaigning. These differences stem from the different levels of intensity with which digital tools are deployed in each country.
Digital media are often blamed for accelerating the decline of political parties as channels for citizen participation. By contrast, we show that political engagement on social media may revitalize party activities because these platforms are means for both party members and ordinary citizens to discuss politics and engage with and around political parties. Using online surveys conducted in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, we find that party members engage in a wider variety of party-related activities than average respondents, but the same can also be said of nonparty members who informally discuss politics on social media. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between party membership and engagement decreases as the intensity of political discussion on social media increases. This suggests that political discussions on social media can narrow the divide in party-related engagement between members and nonmembers, and to some extent flatten rather than reinforce existing political hierarchies. Finally, we find that the correlation between party membership and engagement is stronger in Germany, where party organizations are more robust, than in Italy and the United Kingdom, highlighting the role of party organizational legacies in the digital age.
This paper investigates the multidirectional causal relationships between negative economic coverage in two national newspapers and parliamentary questions addressing the economic crisis in Spain and the Netherlands, while controlling for the "real" economy as portrayed by stock market indices. Weekly level vector autoregression (VAR) analyses demonstrate for both countries that newspaper coverage is affected by stock market ratings and parliamentary questions. In Spain, newspaper coverage also affects parliament. A more detailed analysis shows that in Spain, the newspaper that is close to the government is ignored by the opposition as a source for parliamentary questions, while this newspaper also ignores the attention the opposition pays to negative economic developments in its parliamentary questions. In the Netherlands, we do not find any differences across newspapers. These findings reflect the differences in political and media systems and specifically the differences in the levels of consensus-orientation and political parallelism between the two countries.
The aim of this article is to examine press-party parallelism during the 2011 national elections in Turkey. The article reports findings from a content analysis of 9,127 news articles and editorial columns from fifteen newspapers regarding the trajectory of press-party parallelism over the course of the twelve-week national elections campaign period. We focus on two indicators of press-party parallelism: (1) respective "voice" given to the two leading parties, calculated as the ratio of news that quoted sources from the incumbent Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) to the leading opposition party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and (2) news articles’ tones toward AKP and CHP. The newspapers that were content analyzed were first categorized into three groups based on survey data regarding the voting intentions of their readers: (1) a group of "conservative" newspapers whose readers intended to vote primarily for AKP, (2) a group of "mainstream broadsheets," and (3) a group of "opposition" newspapers with a readership base intending to vote for CHP. The findings suggest that over the course of the election campaign, internal pluralism in both conservative and opposition papers declined in terms of voice given to respective parties and tone of news coverage.
While alternative media have long been playing important roles in the politics of protests and resistance in many countries, the Internet has led to the emergence of online alternative media and arguably expanded the reach of such outlets. This article focuses on the audience of Internet alternative media. It examines the factors associated with usage and whether and how usage relates to political participation. Analysis of survey data (N = 1,018) in Hong Kong shows that, not surprisingly, Internet alternative media usage was driven by preexisting political attitudes and critical views toward the mainstream media. But social media usage could also drive alternative media usage even among people who did not hold congruent preexisting attitudes. Meanwhile, alternative media usage leads to protest participation and support for unconventional protest tactics. The study thus provides empirical evidence regarding how Internet alternative media can facilitate the formation of an active online counterpublic and the role of social media in potentially enlarging the counterpublic.
Across a sample of twenty-seven European nations, we examine variation in the level of factual political knowledge in relation to self-reported exposure to news programs aired by public or commercial channels, and to broadsheet or tabloid newspapers. Unlike previous studies, we estimate the effects of exposure to these news outlets while controlling for self-selection into the audience. Our results show that the positive effects of exposure to broadsheets and public broadcasting on knowledge remain robust. Finally, we show that only exposure to broadsheets (and not to public broadcasting) narrows the knowledge gap within nations; relatively apathetic individuals who read broadsheet newspapers are able to "catch up" with their more attentive counterparts.
Commentators regularly lament the proliferation of both negative and/or strategic ("horse race") coverage in political news content. The most frequent account for this trend focuses on news norms and/or the priorities of news journalists. Here, we build on recent work arguing for the importance of demand-side, rather than supply-side, explanations of news content. In short, news may be negative and/or strategy-focused because that is the kind of news that people are interested in. We use a lab study to capture participants’ news-selection biases, alongside a survey capturing their stated news preferences. Politically interested participants are more likely to select negative stories. Interest is associated with a greater preference for strategic frames as well. And results suggest that behavioral results do not conform to attitudinal ones. That is, regardless of what participants say, they exhibit a preference for negative news content.
This paper examines diversity in online news reporting and explanatory factors that shape news production. The analysis is based on online news from six countries (the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, and Italy), comparing online-only news sites and legacy media. The analysis shows that most online media reported in a diverse way, comprising multiple topics and actors. Furthermore, event-driven news journalism explains the occurrence of high diversity in news reporting. Available resources and the intensiveness of online reporting (the extent as well as the editing style) also account for diversity. We draw from these findings to make a contribution to research on diversity in online news and to comparative communication studies. Qualitative comparative analysis is used to reflect on the direction and meaning of changes in journalistic practices in the current media environment.
This article presents a comparative study of investigative journalism in nine countries in the Central and Eastern European region (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). The purpose is descriptive and analytical. Descriptively, the article charts the presence and provision of investigative journalism across the region and inventories and assesses the various funding forms that exist against the background of the recent (2008–2009) financial crisis. Analytically, the article focuses on assessing the relative autonomy (defined as autonomy from external actors) and effects (defined as the removal from office and sentencing of political actors revealed to be engaged in legal and moral transgressions, commonly various forms of corruption). The article finds investigative journalism across the region in general to be weak in terms of autonomy and effects, but stronger in countries that have had more stable and richer media markets (notably Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic). The article further finds that in some countries (notably Romania and Bulgaria), alternative news online sources play an increasingly important role as providers of investigative journalism.
The article discusses the negative consequences of globalization in the new international arena that arose following the Great Recession of 2008 that enabled emerging economies such as China, Russia, and Angola to take center stage, reconfiguring power relations between Western and non-Western countries. As new global flows of capital in media industries have been emerging, it is relevant to consider how investors from autocratic political regimes with illiberal views on the media articulate with Western culture’s founding prerogatives of media and journalism. To do this, we singled out the Angola–Portugal relationship. Results show that the clientelistic dynamics in Portugal’s media system, enhanced by the economic crisis, facilitate the entrance of the Angolan capital, which, in turn, may perpetuate clientelism and drive the reversal of media democracy in the country.
The press had great potential to influence perceptions of Sarah Palin during the 2008 campaign, given her relative obscurity when picked to be the Republican vice-presidential nominee. Prior literature on press treatment of women running for national office suggests that Palin was likely to receive coverage that disadvantaged her due to her gender. We scrutinize press coverage of Palin’s campaign for evidence that she was treated differently and that these differences affected public opinion. Our sample of over 2,500 individual newspaper articles published during the campaign is paired with the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey. We demonstrate that Palin’s coverage differed in significant ways from that of her male counterpart. Her gender, appearance, and family status were disproportionately mentioned in her coverage, and such mentions tended to dampen public opinion about her. In addition, the tone of Palin’s coverage was markedly negative, increasingly so over time, and was significantly related to reader opinion about her. While Palin was a unique candidate for national-level office, these findings should give pause to those concerned with equitable press treatment of women on the campaign trail.