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Pacific Focus

Impact factor: 0.179 5-Year impact factor: 0.239 Print ISSN: 1225-4657 Online ISSN: 1976-5118 Publisher: Wiley Blackwell (Blackwell Publishing)

Subjects: Area Studies, International Relations

Most recent papers:

  • Bring the State Back In: Conflict and Cooperation Among States in Cybersecurity.
    Yoonyoung Cho, Jongpil Chung.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    This article analyzes the limitation of cooperation and the expansion of conflict between states in cyberspace. Like traditional security spaces around the world, global cyberspace is also an anarchy system with no absolute authority or institutional status. In such a situation, based on cyber sovereignty and cyber power, the state tries to create an institution applicable to domestic and international cyberspace to make a cyber system favorable to the state itself. Since, unlike traditional power, cyber power has both material and non‐material elements, a state cannot know the level of another state's cyber power. For this reason, conflicts among states in the cyber domain are intensifying. The most active states competing for the upper hand in cyberspace are the United States and China. They lead to different levels of recognition and strategies concerning the cyber domain. While the competition between the United States and China invites conflict, it also triggers temporary cooperation among states. The UN's cybersecurity activities are also fragmented by various inter‐government institutions and management organizations. However, the differences in strategy between the United States and China affect other states. Ultimately, although the direction of discussions on cybersecurity has been set based on the Group of Government Experts activities in the UN and the need for inter‐state cooperation has been acknowledged, such cooperation would be only temporary because states consider domestic policy and strategy to be more important than international or regional cooperative organizations.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12096   open full text
  • Thailand's Inconsistent Involvement in ASEAN: The Shifting Domestic Coalition Towards the ASEAN Free‐trade Area.
    Sunida Aroonpipat.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    Although the formation and development of economic regionalism promoted by Thailand have demonstrated some movement towards a deeper economic integration in ASEAN that had been predicted by the Eurocentric theories, it is evident that Thailand's economic regionalism has not developed in a linear fashion. Indeed, the nation's ambitious commitment as a vigorous supporter of ASEAN economic cooperation has been interrupted by backtracking and delaying commitments to economic regionalism. This inconsistent involvement of Thailand in ASEAN has challenged the rationale of the Eurocentric theories, which claim economic interests as the basis for deepening economic integration. Since their focus on an economically oriented rationale limits the capacity to understand political and other causes (and consequences) of economic regionalism, they could not sufficiently explain the case of Thailand's unsteady progress towards regional consolidation. Particularly, the Eurocentric theories struggle to explain why different administration periods have interpreted economic interests differently and why economic interests have not always been the major cause for pursuing economic regionalism. Given the inadequacy of Eurocentric theories, this article attempts to explore an alternative explanation of Thailand's inconsistent involvement in economic regionalism by focusing on the ASEAN Free‐Trade Area. The article applies the domestic coalition approach with a divergent institutional configuration. Instead of an economically oriented rationale, the study suggests that the rationale for deeper economic regionalism with ambitious commitment has hinged upon the liberal‐minded coalition of dominant actors, along with the relative centralization of domestic political institutions.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12095   open full text
  • Reversed Asymmetry in Japan's and Korea's FTAs: TPP and Beyond.
    Byung‐il Choi, Jennifer Sejin Oh.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    This paper examines recent reversals and divergences in Japan's and Korea's free‐trade agreement (FTA) patterns and strategies through the cases of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, the Japan–Australia FTA, and the Korea–China FTA. Throughout the 2000s, South Korea was much more proactive in pursuing FTAs with major trade partners and agricultural exporters compared to Japan. Departing from its past FTA practices, however, Japan recently concluded the Japan–Australia FTA and the TPP negotiations, which include substantial liberalization of Japan's politically sensitive and heavily protected agricultural sector. In contrast, Korea has increasingly been taking a more protective stance in its recent FTAs and has been hesitant to join the TPP negotiations. This paper argues that changes in Japan's and Korea's domestic trade governance – in other words the institutions of trade policy‐making that encompass the authority structure, decision‐making processes, and coordinating mechanisms among various societal and political actors – explain Japan's and Korea's shifting FTA patterns and strategies.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12091   open full text
  • China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear Test.
    Byoung‐Kon Jun.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    This article aims to evaluate the will of the Chinese government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2270 following North Korea's fourth nuclear test (1 January 2016), thereby seeking out the implications on China's sanctions against the DPRK after its fifth nuclear test (9 September 2016). The results of analysis in this article can be summed up as follows. First, the following instances capture the willingness of the Chinese government regarding the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK: (i) China agreed to stronger sanctions against North Korea (Resolution 2270); (ii) China boasted about its wholehearted support for – and complete willingness to implement – the sanctions at home and abroad; and (iii) upon the agreement, Beijing revealed the lists of items banned from export to North Korea and items subject to additional sanctions more promptly than before. Second, in spite of China's expressed willingness, the following instances demonstrate that there remain some limitations to Beijing's will regarding a thorough implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang: (i) the Chinese government argued that the United States should be responsible for sanctions against the North after its fourth nuclear test; (ii) China proposed the parallel approach of pursuing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and a peace treaty; (iii) China placed an emphasis on improving the living conditions of North Koreans; and (iv) China expressed opposition to deployment of terminal high‐altitude area defense on the Korean Peninsula. Third, such reactions are indicative of China's key essentials behind enforcing sanctions against the DPRK, which are the pursuit of Chinese national interests and the prevention of loss of those interests. To that end, China attempts to bypass the United States’ monitoring and pressure, considers the growing strategic value of North Korea as a result of intensifying conflicts between the United States and China, and induces the DPRK into a realm of dialogue. The fact that China needs to secure influence over North Korea and maintain the North Korean regime in a stable state even after its fifth nuclear test indicates that its sanctions against North Korea will be implemented within a boundary of not causing the regime collapse or chaos.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12092   open full text
  • The Rise of the Chinese Navy: A Tirpitzian Perspective of Sea Power and International Relations.
    Daniel Connolly.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    Western commentators often view the emergence of a modernizing Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) through the theoretical lens of Alfred Thayer Mahan, an influential 19th century American naval theorist who advocated an imperialistic brand of sea power modeled on the British example. This approach, however, risks painting a misleading picture of China's naval ambitions because it is based on a hegemonic theory of naval power that most regional powers cannot realistically follow. Instead, this article turns to the writings of Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the short‐lived German battle fleet that unsuccessfully challenged British naval dominance during World War I. Applying his ideas about naval power and hegemony to East Asia's strategic context is a useful heuristic device for revealing key logics behind three facets of US–Chinese naval rivalry: (i) China's anxieties over access to markets; (ii) the importance of alliance value; and (iii) the fiscal, operational, and technological dynamics that shape naval arms races between a hegemon and its weaker regional contender. In all three cases, the application of non‐hegemonic naval theory raises important questions about the sustainability and justice of current US naval strategy in the Western Pacific while simultaneously laying bare the major pitfalls of China's current trajectory.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12093   open full text
  • Realistic Relations? How the Evolving Bilateral Relationship is Understood in China and Australia.
    Mark Beeson, Jinghan Zeng.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2017
    China's remarkable economic development has had profound domestic and international effects. Among the most important of these is China's growing impact on the region of which it is an increasingly important and influential part. For countries such as Australia, which has rapidly become deeply economically integrated with – even dependent on – China, this presents a major and much‐discussed challenge as it tries to balance economic and strategic priorities. Australia provides an important and revealing illustration of how China's elites view key states in its region, which have assumed a growing economic and even strategic importance. This paper aims to develop a more comprehensive overview of the way the strategic, economic and political dimensions of the Sino–Australia relationship are understood in both countries. It also highlights the importance of realist thinking in both Australia and China.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12094   open full text
  • At the Nexus of Advocacy and Accountability: New Challenges and Strategies for Japanese Development NGOs.
    Hyuk‐Sang Sohn, Bok Cheol Jeong, Taekyoon Kim.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    This study explores how Japanese development non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) had altered their patterns of advocacy and accountability after changes in political structure that occurred in the 2000s when the Democratic Party of Japan created the two‐party system and the Liberal Democratic Party took power again. After the 1990s, a unique feature of development NGOs actively performing advocacy and accountability within the ODA domain, while also eagerly reaching political authorities by forming networks, was found. Behind their efforts were the appearance and expansion of the Democratic Party of Japan through its systematic and political ties. As concluding remarks, the active participation of civil society not only represents the level of internal resources mobilized within the civil society network, but is also an indicator on how supportive the policy space at the bottom is towards civil society.
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12086   open full text
  • Cracks in the Blood‐Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC–DPRK Relations in the Post‐Cold War World.
    Min‐hyung Kim.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    The Sino–DPRK relationship had often been described, at least until the end of the Cold War, as one of “lips and teeth” or “blood‐cemented” brothers. However, remarkable changes in the previously strong Sino–DPRK relations have been observed in recent years. Most importantly, the DPRK has ignored the People's Republic of China's repeated warnings to withhold nuclear tests, instead conducting them five times in a row since 2006. In response to those tests, China has vehemently criticized the DPRK. In addition, it voted for UN Security Council resolutions that imposed strict sanctions on Pyongyang. China even imposed its own sanctions against the DPRK. The strained relationship between China and North Korea is demonstrated by the fact that China's new president, Xi Jinping, has met South Korea's President Park Geun‐hye eight times since he came to office in 2013, whereas he has never had a summit meeting with North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong‐un, who succeeded his father, Kim Jong‐il, in 2011. What has driven this dramatic change in the relationships of these two military allies? This paper argues that while multiple factors have pushed formerly strong Sino–DPRK relations into a new direction, the three most important factors are mistrust between two allies (historical), diverging interests (strategic), and growing Sino–ROK ties (economic and political).
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12087   open full text
  • The Offensive Realists Are Not Wrong: China's Growth and Aggression, 1976–2001.
    Sung Chul Jung, Kihyun Lee.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    Is China's rise a threat? Offensive realists see rising China as a main cause of global instability in the 21st century. Because all states seek security through power maximization, China will clash with the United States for regional hegemony in Asia. But critics of the offensive realist view emphasize common interests, global institutions, and domestic constraints, particularly since China's rapid growth makes the country more open to and dependent on the global economy. This study compares these competing approaches to China's growth and regional stability and develops hypotheses based on four factors that could influence China's interaction with other nations: China's own level of economic power, its growth rate, whether a potential antagonist is allied with the United States, and whether the two countries have a territorial dispute. Then it conducts a logit analysis of China's military aggression against Asian states and major powers in the post‐Mao period. The results show that China's growing power has encouraged its initiation of military conflicts, and that Beijing has become aggressive against its opponents in territorial disputes, but not more so against America's Asian allies than against other countries. The findings suggest that China's continued rise will likely contribute to its firm position in the South and East China Seas and its resolute protection of core strategic and economic interests.
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12088   open full text
  • 21st Century Maritime Power‐Politics in the Indian Ocean Region with Special Reference to the Bay of Bengal.
    Mohd Aminul Karim.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    The aim of this paper is to project the emerging power‐relations in the maritime realm between geopolitical players in the Indian Ocean region. These power‐relations involve military shields and spears, infrastructure development, alignment–alliance relations, international trade routes, critical choke points, energy, and above all geopolitical implications. The methods followed in the paper are content analysis, case‐method, interview, observation, and so forth. The paper concludes that emerging power polarizations are visible and are gradually taking a tangible shape in the form of military–economic condominium, presumably coming from opposite directions.
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12090   open full text
  • China, An Upstream Hegemon: A Destabilizer for the Governance of the Mekong River?
    Heejin Han.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    Transboundary rivers have remained one of the sources of contention and cooperation among states in international politics. The Mekong is one such river along which China and five Southeast Asian countries have organized their political, economic, and social lives. Studies examining the water politics of this river have argued that the lack of a comprehensive institution to govern this regional common pool resource and the growing power asymmetry between China, an upstream riparian state, and its Southeast Asian neighbors dampen the prospect for an effective governance of the river. Particularly, the economic rise of China and its concomitant increase in demand for energy and water resources has raised concerns about the negative impacts that this would have on the downstream countries. Examination of recent developments regarding the Mekong River suggests, however, that China has adopted a more collaborative approach by engaging in joint development projects and exchanging information and technology via existing sub‐regional and regional multilateral bodies since the early 2000s. The study concludes that this growing evidence of cooperation should be taken into consideration for a more comprehensive understanding of China's policy towards the Mekong River.
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12085   open full text
  • The Norm‐Diffusion Capacity of ASEAN: Evidence and Challenges.
    Laura Allison‐Reumann.
    Pacific Focus. April 10, 2017
    Norms associated with the “ASEAN Way,” namely non‐interference, respect for sovereignty, informality, and consensus, primarily reflect processes of interaction. Yet these processes have rarely been examined from the perspective of ASEAN's attempts at norm diffusion. To date, greater attention has been placed on ASEAN as a norm recipient. This article asks how and to what extent ASEAN is a norm entrepreneur both within the region and beyond. It provides examples of norm diffusion by ASEAN by offering two diffusion mechanisms – enmeshed and innocuous – and analyzes the challenges associated with norm diffusion. These mechanisms demonstrate how ASEAN diffuses norms as reflected through its normative framework and internal and external pressures.
    April 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12089   open full text
  • The Tourism of North Korea in the Kim Jong‐un Era: Propaganda, Profitmaking, and Possibilities for Engagement.
    Dean J. Ouellette.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    In this article, I explore changes in North Korean tourism, with a focus on the industry since Kim Jong‐un came to power. The study: highlights North Korea's concept of “socialist tourism” and recent developments; investigates Western social media to uncover how non‐mainstream digital media characterizes the country as a unique travel destination; discusses investment and profitmaking with respect to Chinese investors and tourists; and suggests tourism as a possible path to consider for future peaceful engagement approaches.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12084   open full text
  • Proving Korea's Claim of Sovereignty over Dokdo: The Evidentiary Relevance of Imperial Ordinance No. 41 of 27 October 1900.
    Seokwoo Lee.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    Korea's claim of ownership and possession over Dokdo is based on original title and the continuous exercise of sovereignty from earlier Korean kingdoms up until and through the modern period. Japan argues that Dokdo was terra nullius, belonging to no country, when it incorporated Dokdo into Japan in 1905 as part of Shimane Prefecture. A critical piece of evidence contradicting this Japanese argument is Imperial Ordinance enacted on 27 October 1900 by the Empire of Korea, which purports to indicate that the Empire of Korea understood that Dokdo was an inherent part of Korea. This paper is an attempt to highlight this imperial ordinance in the context of Korea's claim of sovereignty and argues for its relevance and veracity using principles of evidence taken from US law. As a piece of evidence, the Empire of Korea's Imperial Ordinance No. 41 of 27 October 1900 supports two major contentions of the Korean government in its sovereignty claim to Dokdo in contradiction to Japan's assertions of sovereignty. First, it serves to prove Korea's position that pursuant to international law, Korea had sovereignty over Dokdo at the turn of the 20th century and second, it undermines the Japanese claim that Dokdo belonged to no state in 1905 given Korea's ownership, which would invalidate the terra nullius rationale of Japan's annexation of Dokdo. Assuming Korea's position on the content of Imperial Ordinance No. 41 to be true, it is quite evident that it would be deemed to be relevant in demonstrating Korea's case for sovereignty over Dokdo. Nevertheless, an objection would certainly be raised by Japan as to the relevance of the imperial ordinance given the different designation of Dokdo (Seokdo) in the document. In such an instance, the question of relevance comes down to the reason and experience of the judge along with the supporting evidence that has been given.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12081   open full text
  • Prospects and Issues in Systemizing Ecological Defense Planning: Case Study of Korea.
    Ryo Hinata‐Yamaguchi.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    This paper purports to outline the prospects and issues in systemizing ecological defense planning and to assess the progress in the ROK. While the defense sectors in the United States and a number of European states have taken steps toward systemizing ecological measures in recent years, progress in the ROK has been slow. Problems point to not only technical challenges in systemizing ecological measures, but also to the lack of political and bureaucratic facilitation. To examine the problem in question, the paper is divided into four sections. First, the paper will outline the environmental impact of military institutions and their actions. Second, the progress in systemizing ecological measures in the defense sector will be examined. Third, problems in Korea's handling of environmental issues relating to the defense sector will be assessed. Then, in the fourth section, the paper will outline the key steps the ROK must take in systemizing ecological defense planning. The paper concludes that further efforts are needed in conceptualizing and systemizing ecological defense planning to not only shape new norms in the defense sector and their activities, but also to comprehensively address both traditional and non‐traditional security concerns in the region.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12083   open full text
  • Hedging, Strategic Partnership, and Taiwan's Relations with Japan Under the Ma Ying‐jeou Administration.
    Tse‐Kang Leng, Nien‐chung Chang Liao.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    This article examines Taiwan's new hedging policy toward China and its evolving relations with Japan. Taiwan under President Ma Ying‐jeou focused on hedging its bets against China's rise through engagement, accommodation, and soft balancing. Meanwhile, Taipei and Tokyo are also forging a strategic partnership as they cautiously achieve low‐commitment agreements for deeper cooperation, including signing an important fisheries agreement. Nevertheless, both international and domestic challenges may constrain the flexibility of Taipei's hedging strategy. Given the uncertainty and complexity in East Asia, Taipei will continue its hedging strategy as a way to expand its external cooperation in the region.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12080   open full text
  • From Middle Power to Pivot Power: Korea as an Arctic Observer in the Age of Eurasia.
    Iain Watson.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    Whilst identification of Korea's Arctic issue agenda and motives has been established, there is little examination as to determining why certain issues and partnerships are being developed at certain points in the context of regional geopolitical shifts. I argue that Korea's role in the Arctic represents a shift in Korea's middle power strategy from bridge nation to pivot nation. Korea's current Arctic strategy links to a wider transcontinental strategy. As a result, conventional middle power criteria are being challenged by a strategy based on network centrality rather than “middle” structural location or resource concentration. This shift represents not just “middle power” leverage but opens potentially different understandings and expectations over what counts as middle power leverage.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12079   open full text
  • Nationalism and Construction of Regional Security Order in Northeast Asia.
    Fahua Qiu.
    Pacific Focus. December 22, 2016
    Based on the perspectives of popular nationalism and state nationalism, this article investigates the current status of nationalism as well as its effects on the regional security order in Northeast Asia. The rise of nationalism in Northeast Asia is multifaceted and presents a dynamic development trend, which has a profound impact on the regional security order in Northeast Asia. Although the popular nationalism of Northeast Asian nations has various effects on the diplomatic decision‐making of the respective governments, all of these versions of nationalism affect normal communications among nations in the region. Thus, each government should be careful when utilizing nationalism to realize its political purposes. Indeed, Japan and China should learn from the lessons of history in World War II and avoid falling into the abyss of state nationalism. Each nation in Northeast Asia should pay more attention to the rise of nationalism in the region, constrain its narrow‐mindedness and exclusiveness, and aspire to rational patriotism. By doing so, a peaceful, secure, and prosperous regional security order in Northeast Asia could be constructed.
    December 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12082   open full text
  • Republic of China's Decision‐Making Process in Regards to Drawing a U‐shaped Line on the Map of the South China Sea and Its Implications.
    Hurng‐Yu Chen.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    When the government of the Republic of China drew a U‐shaped line around the islands on a map of the South China Sea in 1947, the decision‐makers were only referring to the islands within this line. Because the Republic of China held just 3 nautical miles of territorial waters, they could not possibly be thinking of including the sea areas within this U‐shaped line. However, with the development of the international Law of the Sea, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, heated discussions arose around the legal status of this U‐shaped line. It had been regarded as the islands’ attribution line, a historic waters line, a historical rights line, and a state boundary line. This article uses official archives to trace the original thinking of these decision‐makers and to infer the meaning of this U‐shaped line.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12074   open full text
  • Why do Territorial Disputes Escalate? A Domestic Political Explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute.
    Hyun Joo Cho, Ajin Choi.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    Why has the Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute escalated recurrently? This study examines the sources of the 2010 and 2012 escalations in territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. We review existing explanations and their limitations and introduce new hypotheses based on the effect of political leaders' interests in the escalation of territorial disputes. We argue that when competition among leaders intensifies or leaders' political vulnerability increases, it is more likely that leaders who are seeking to retain or take office will behave more assertively in claiming rights over territories; therefore, a territorial dispute is more likely to escalate. We find that when Japanese leaders have needed to strengthen their political position during elections, they have adopted aggressive strategies in the dispute to avoid criticism from both the public and political oppositions about their weak postures against China. In China, the succession process has intensified political struggles and has led leaders to pursue a hardline policy with respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Chinese government and the media have also fueled anti‐Japanese protests to increase internal cohesion for successful leadership transition. This study not only provides a domestic political explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, but also serves as supporting evidence or process tracing for the theoretical proposition that leadership change is associated with the escalation of territorial disputes.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12073   open full text
  • China–India Growing Strides for Competing Strategies and Possibility of Conflict in the Asia–Pacific Region.
    Zafar Khan.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    As competing strategies between China and India are being played out in the Asia–Pacific region, competition, cooperation, and containment have become the common practices between these regional powers. However, the possibility of conflict, which may not be in the interest of any regional or extra‐regional powers, cannot be ignored. In this context, it needs to be observed closely as to what strategic approaches are prioritized and played out by these competing powers. If both China and India tend to keep their deterrent forces limited and stay within their legitimate continental and maritime domains without necessarily threatening or decreasing the security of other states – that is, to stay defensive rather than aggressive and escalatory – the prospect for conflict diminishes. However, if both India and China strategically pose more assertions and expand their strategic imperatives, then this could have certain strategic repercussions that might invite conflict in the region. This article addresses the competing strategies played out between China and India. It discusses the strategic aspirations, force modernization and the possibility of conflict between these two regional powers in the Asia–Pacific region. It also discusses the strategic imperatives of cooperation, containment, and competition between the regional powers, as well as how and under what hypothetical scenario the possibility of conflict between the two states might be increased.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12072   open full text
  • Analyzing Kim Jong‐un's Survival Strategy from the Comparative Authoritarian Perspective.
    Bon Sang Koo, Jun Young Choi, Junseok Kim.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    This paper shows that we can properly analyze Kim Jong‐un's survival strategy by employing the knowledge accumulated in comparative studies of contemporary authoritarianism. According to Geddes et al.'s classification, North Korea belongs to a hybrid type that possesses the characteristics of the personalist and single‐party types. Recent comparative studies demonstrate that personalist rulers who are not convinced of their firm control of the military tend to hesitate to strengthen it, even though they know that the military is the most effective tool for controlling threats by political elites and the general public. This theoretically explains why the young ruler who experienced a short power succession period did not continue his father's “military‐first policy,” and his divide‐and‐rule approach is inevitably different from his father's. Accordingly, we expect that the ruler of the unconsolidated regime will target the core of the military, the army faction, and utilize security forces as typical personalist rulers do. These are supported in practice. We also observe that Kim Jong‐un controls the military by utilizing the organizations of the institutionalized party, the Korean Workers' Party, and appointing party officers to key posts in the military. This positively affects his regime stability, which distinguishes his regime from the pure personalist type.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12071   open full text
  • Similar but Divergent Pathways: US–Cuba and US–North Korea Relations.
    Wootae Lee, Seong‐yong Park.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    The United States and Cuba moved to end five decades of hostility and agreed to revive diplomatic relations in December 2014 while US President Barack Obama finally made an official visit to Cuba on 20 March 2016 as the first sitting president to do so in 88 years. In contrast with the Cuban case, US–North Korea relations are only getting worse due to the North Korean nuclear program. The United States adopted new legislation for strong economic sanctions against North Korea after the country's fourth nuclear test was carried out on 6 January 2016 and its launching of a long‐range missile on 6 February 2016. This study aims to find an answer as to why Cuba and North Korea are walking different paths in their relationships with the United States even though they have been subject to similar sanctions from the US. Recent analysis shows that factors in security, international and economic surroundings, geostrategic factors and domestic politics contribute to notable divergence between Cuba and North Korea in regards to their relationships with the United States.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12070   open full text
  • Security Cooperation between South Korea and Australia: Bilateral for Minilateral?
    Jae Jeok Park.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    Security cooperation between South Korea and Australia has increased in recent years. What has been driving this increasingly enhanced security cooperation between the two states, which are about 7,500 km apart from each other? This article approaches the question from the angle of minilateral security cooperation, which has been growing in the Asia–Pacific. It is relatively easier to build minilateral security cooperation upon an existing bilateral alliance relationship or strategic partnership. This practice has been led in the Asia–Pacific by the United States, which has been maintaining the so‐called hub‐and‐spoke alliance network and expanding its security interactions with non‐allied states. It is in this vein that this article locates security cooperation between the two US allies, South Korea and Australia, in the larger context of the US‐led minilateral security network in the Asia–Pacific. After observing that South Korea and Australia have been enhancing their security cooperation, the article looks into those states' stances on the US attempt to facilitate security linkage among its Asia–Pacific allies. Then, the article examines the (un)desirability and (im)possibility of developing trilateral or quadrilateral security cooperation among South Korea, Australia, the United States and Japan. It claims that the expectation of a US‐led minilateral security cooperation being developed is a key reason for the recent enhancement of bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Australia. Lastly, it discusses some issues to consider in further promoting South Korea–Australia security cooperation in the context of US‐led minilateral security cooperation.
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12069   open full text
  • 21st‐Century Northeast Asian Order and America's Choice.
    Euikon Kim.
    Pacific Focus. August 08, 2016
    The emerging new order in Northeast Asia in the 21st century is attributable to a few factors. First, the relative decline of the United States as the hegemonic power contributes to it. Second, the rise of China is also responsible. Buttressed by remarkable economic growth over the past 20 plus years, China is eager to regain its traditional influence and status as the regional hegemon. Third, the relative decline of Japan leads to Northeast Asian power restructuring. Fourth, North Korea is another major factor leading to instability in Northeast Asia. Finally, the rise of South Korea is also responsible for Northeast Asian power restructuring. In the intermediate and long‐run, the US policy toward Northeast Asia will be centered on China, and its China policy will be characterized by engagement and/or hard balancing. To pursue the goal, the United States should further develop close ties with its allies, such as South Korea and Japan, and pursue improved relations with Vietnam and the Philippines. At the same time, the United States should persuade China that cooperating with its neighboring countries would be in its intermediate and long‐term interests. In other words, the United States should firmly and persistently pursue the policy of the “Asianization of China.”
    August 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12075   open full text
  • The Strategic Balance in East Asia and the Small Powers: The Case of the Philippines in the Face of the South China Sea Dispute.
    Renato Cruz De Castro.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    How does a small power respond and adjust to a fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balancing by major powers generated by a territorial dispute? This paper observes that notwithstanding the major powers’ mistrust, suspicion, and rivalry, such precarious stability in the South China Sea dispute is sustained by a balance‐of‐power system. This system is an offshoot of the small littoral states’ (in this case, the Philippines’) policy of engaging the external maritime powers (the United States and Japan) to counter China's heavy‐handedness in dealing with this territorial row. Apprehensive of China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the United States and Japan are increasing their strategic involvement in the maritime territorial row. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. To cope with China's heavy‐handedness, the Philippines builds up the deterrence capability of its armed forces and forges security partnerships with the United States and Japan. The Philippines hopes that this move will ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the regional balance of power. In conclusion, the paper considers the Philippines’ policy as myopic, since it overlooks the fact that the volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea might be the proverbial “calm before the storm.” It is crucial that the Philippines puts its house in order, economically keeps pace with its more dynamic Southeast Asian neighbors, increases its defense spending, formulates a coherent national security strategy, and concentrates on building a credible armed forces to avoid free‐riding on its allies, and more importantly, to enable the country to weather the approaching storm.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12068   open full text
  • Using Analytical Eclecticism for Improved Policy Relevance: Is There a Case for South Korean Support of Abenomics?
    Robert E. Kelly.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    Peter Katzenstein's “analytic eclecticism” argues for problem‐driven, policy‐relevant international relations, where “messy” problems in the world encourage creative recombinations of theory and sidestep paradigmatic debates. Ideally, the rigor of theory and originality springing from atypical reconfigurations improve policy recommendations. This paper applies this approach to South Korea and Abenomics. Seoul's elites have generally opposed Abenomics, but my eclectic approach argues for six theoretically informed but practically relevant ways in which Japan's reflation is, in fact, in the national interest: First, as a “responsible middle power” in the G‐20, “Global Korea” is expected to act with a wider view of its national interest in support of global institutions. Second, as a major trading partner, Japan's reflation is good for Korean growth. Third, an appreciated won is good for heavily indebted Korean consumers. Fourth, a normally growing Japan is good for Korean security. Fifth, a normalized Japan is more likely to deal calmly with Korea on history issues. Sixth, a normalized Japan is likelier to contribute to the costs of eventual unification. Per the eclectic approach, these arguments, first, are not selected for paradigmatic commensurability, but rather for problem/policy‐relevance. Second, they leverage international relations theory to enrich the menu of options in the ROK policy space.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12067   open full text
  • South Korea and Japan since World War II: Between Ideological Discord and Pragmatic Cooperation.
    Shale Horowitz.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    Since the end of World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan have gone through significant changes – from distant and hostile in the 1950s, to cooperative and increasingly close through about 2005, to the last decade of serious deterioration. Three frameworks are used to understand change and continuity in South Korea–Japan relations: a realist perspective emphasizing either structural military power relations or “revealed” patterns of military threat; an institutional perspective that emphasizes similarities or differences in political institutions; and an ideological regime‐type perspective that includes ideologies as well as institutions as influences on government or leadership preferences. The third framework captures two types of ideological factors that have exerted significant influences on South Korea–Japan relations: the existence of a small range of competitive ideological regime types or government types specifying national ideals and national development roadmaps; and historical legacies of intense conflict, which tend to produce ideological and diversionary frictions that cause conflict to persist or recur. Only the last factor, the history issue, is readily subject to policy control: the best way forward to restore cooperative and stable relations is for South Korean and Japanese leaders to agree informally on truthful and empathetic norms governing historical judgments, and for Japanese political and opinion elites to agree informally to marginalize those that defy such norms.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12066   open full text
  • South Korea's China Policy, Evolving Sino–ROK Relations, and Their Implications for East Asian Security.
    Min‐hyung Kim.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    This paper analyzes South Korea's China policy since the Korean War and discusses the implications of evolving Sino–ROK relations for East Asian security. South Korea's engagement policy toward China since their diplomatic normalization in 1992 has been so successful that the Chinese government now describes the two countries' relationship as “a matured strategic cooperative partnership,” which is the second highest in the pecking order of China's diplomatic relations. China has quickly become South Korea's largest trading partner, replacing the United States. Sino–ROK political and social ties have also deepened following their robust economic ties. However, growing Sino–ROK ties have significant implications for East Asian security, as South Korea is a key US ally, whereas China is North Korea's main ally and patron. This paper contends that South Korea's relations with the United States and China should not be viewed as a zero‐sum game. Seoul will not sever its close security ties with Washington due to its strategic partnership with Beijing, just as Beijing would not abandon Pyongyang because of its strong economic ties with Seoul. Given Beijing's persistent support for the survival of Pyongyang's regime and North Korea's increasing nuclear threat, Seoul's leadership is well aware that its most reliable security partner is the United States. As long as the US–ROK alliance remains strong, therefore, Seoul is likely to keep pursuing the deepening of the strategic partnership with Beijing, as it is necessary not only for South Korea's future economic prosperity but also for coping with North Korea's growing threats and provocations.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12065   open full text
  • What Affects Korea–US Relations?
    Hayam Kim, Uk Heo.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    Despite a plethora of studies on ROK–US relations, few have systematically examined the factors that have caused changes in the relationship between the two states. To fill this gap in the literature, this article investigates the factors that have caused the fluctuation in the relationship between South Korea and the United States in recent years. The authors argue that three factors have affected ROK–US relations in recent decades: (i) domestic politics; (ii) the international factor; and (iii) a series of incidents that contributed to the rise of anti‐US sentiments in South Korea. These changes in the internal and external political environment have altered the relationship between Seoul and Washington and have caused considerable friction between the two countries.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12064   open full text
  • China's Engagement Patterns towards North Korea.
    Wenzhi Song, Sangkeun Lee.
    Pacific Focus. April 14, 2016
    Analysis of China's response to North Korea's grave provocations confirms that China has been adjusting its policy toward North Korea, considering North Korea's stability and the likelihood of US military intervention while pursuing an engagement with North Korea. China has pursued soft engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been low and North Korea has been unstable, semi‐hard engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been high and North Korea has been stable, and hard engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been low and North Korea has been stable. China has increased its pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize since North Korea's third nuclear test. However, this is merely hard engagement and cannot result in a fundamental change of China's policy toward North Korea. Unless China changes its strategic goal to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it will retain its engagement policies toward North Korea.
    April 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12063   open full text
  • Linking Spokes Together: The Philippines' Gambit of Harnessing the United States' Alliances in its External Balancing Policy against an Emergent China.
    Renato Cruz De Castro.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    This article examines the Philippines' strategy of external balancing against an aggressive China as it intensifies its security ties with the United States, its only strategic and long‐standing ally. This course of action aims to strengthen the country's defense relations with the United States, particularly in developing the territorial defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In this process, the Philippines finds it similarly essential to establish security ties with other bilateral defense partners of the United States, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In conclusion, the article argues that fostering informal security arrangements with these countries enables the Philippines to confront a pressing and persistent maritime issue in Southeast Asia: China's expansion in the South China Sea.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12022   open full text
  • Mutual Priority and Aid Effectiveness: Is South Korea a Major Donor to its Major Recipients?
    Jinhwan Oh.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    If donor and recipient countries act with mutual priority with regard to official development assistance (ODA), the recipient can manage the ODA with less transaction cost and the donor can pay extra attention to its recipient with more responsibility for development. For example, the United States and Japan used to be South Korea's primary donors and South Korea used to be their primary recipient, as well. This could be a factor explaining the effectiveness of aid that South Korea had received in the past. However, this mutual priority is not observed when South Korea is disbursing its ODA as a donor. Policies of providing more ODA to stronger commercial ties as well as the current international trend of donor proliferation and recipient fragmentation may explain this.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12023   open full text
  • South Korea and the Pitfalls of East Asian Monetary Regionalism: Do Neighbors Mean Neighborly Behavior?
    Youngwon Cho.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, monetary regionalism has been widely advocated as a means to shelter East Asia from not only the volatility of global financial markets but also from the US‐dominated International Monetary Fund. While the primary obstacle to deepening regional monetary cooperation centered around the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is cogently identified as being political, the existing literature focuses mostly on the rivalry between the likely lenders, China and Japan, and neglects the likely borrowers. Using the case of South Korea, this paper provides a cautionary tale of the CMI from a borrower's perspective. Any workable liquidity‐support arrangement, regional or otherwise, requires a robust surveillance mechanism to address the problem of moral hazard inherent to such a lending facility. In turn, an effective surveillance mechanism inevitably implies a significant political leverage for the lenders and vulnerability for the borrowers, an outcome that cannot be assumed to be avoidable by the CMI just by the virtue of its regional scope. There is little basis to expect that being neighbors necessarily means neighborly behavior; mere geographic proximity does not make China and Japan any less self‐interested than the United States, nor does it make Korea's potential political costs more tolerable.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12025   open full text
  • Land Developers, States, and Collusive Clientelism in Marketizing China.
    Wooyeal Paik.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    Their undeniable contribution notwithstanding, the interlocked interests of land developers and local states are frequently condemned as clientelistic collusion and engendered corruption by the party leaders, not to mention a majority of ordinary citizens. Even though the “patron–client”‐type entanglement between these actors in the Chinese political economy has been widely recognized, the concrete conditions, which deepen such clientelist structure and mutual penetration, much more than other industries in China and its counterparts in other developing countries, have not been scrutinized. What are the political logics and dynamics of such dyadic relations between these two key actors in the Chinese context and in comparison with other industries? Who are the actors and what are the goods transacted in this industry? Which ownership types of land developer form the industry? How can we link the ownership forms to similar and distinct clientelistic characteristics and their variations? This paper tries to answer this set of questions in order to understand the enigmatic issue of land developers, whose importance is undeniable in contemporary Chinese politics, but on which the established literature has not provided concrete analysis.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12021   open full text
  • Jasmine Does Not Bloom in Pyongyang: The Persistent Non‐transition in North Korea.
    Antonio Fiori, Sunhyuk Kim.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    At the beginning of 2011, the world was shaken by an “earthquake” which struck the Middle East and African regions. Following the Arab Spring or Jasmine Revolution, many pundits stated that North Korea could be the next to be affected by this wind of change, and the North Korean dictatorial leadership could collapse soon. This assumption acquired further validity soon after Kim Jong‐il's death. This paper draws on the democratic transition and consolidation literature that has grown considerably in the last decades. According to this literature, a few factors facilitate and promote democratization – most prominently, an elite split between hardliners and softliners; the emergence of civil society and its pro‐democracy movement; and a certain degree of international pressure. Through an analysis of these factors, this paper shows why North Korea is “resistant to change” and will not follow in the Middle East's footsteps. We argue that the main reason for the non‐transition in North Korea is the absence of the conditions that have been identified in the democratization literature as critical factors promoting democratic transition.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12020   open full text
  • The Military Security Policy of Taiwan: Current Situation and Challenges for the Future.
    Robert Czulda.
    Pacific Focus. April 01, 2014
    This paper examines the current defense doctrine of the Republic of China (Taiwan), including its evolution – from the offensive approach during the first phase of Taiwan's history, later approaches of “resolute defense, effective deterrence” and “effective deterrence, resolute defense” – to an adjusted approach in the 2000s that was a more realistic and feasible doctrine aimed mainly at preventing the People's Republic of China's forces from landing and establishing secure footholds, based on an asymmetric approach. The main elements touched upon in this article are those related to Taiwan's military security, including current and future challenges and threats, Taiwanese perception of the international environment, an assessment of capabilities and procurement plans of its armed forces (land forces, navy, air force, air defense), problems of political and military allies as well as decreasing military spending that negatively impacts modernization efforts. The final part of this paper presents various recommendations that would allow Taiwan to boost its defense potential.
    April 01, 2014   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12019   open full text
  • Rethinking Beijing's Geostrategic Sensibilities to Tibet and Xinjiang: Images and Interests.
    Jungmin Seo, Young Chul Cho.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    The aim of this essay is to examine the ways in which Beijing perceives the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang differently in the context of its geostrategic thinking in international politics today. In doing so, this essay will provide a deeper understanding of Beijing's different geostrategic sensibilities of Tibet and Xinjiang in regard to rising China's national security interests in Central and South Asia. This essay argues that, although Beijing publicly sees the Tibet and Xinjiang problems as issues of securing Chinese sovereignty, geostrategically Beijing alludes to a subtle difference in its perception of the two regions: (i) the Tibet problem is a practical, domestic issue to be handled by Beijing's paternalistic engagement of modernization, and is a symbolic issue regarding how to manage rising China's benign image abroad while harshly oppressing any separatist voices in Tibet; and (ii) in Beijing's geostrategic thinking, Xinjiang's security importance seems to be defined in terms of energy security for China's economic growth, which is integral to social stability and the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy, as well as the transnational Islamic terrorist movement interlinked with Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12012   open full text
  • The Long Quest for an International Order with Chinese Characteristics: A Cultural Perspective on Modern China's Foreign Policies.
    Chris Connolly, Jörn‐Carsten Gottwald.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    The role of the People's Republic of China in international relations (IR) is academically contested and politically crucial. While the dominance of (neo‐)realist perspectives of China's rise as a threat to the current order is receding, new approaches in the study of the foreign policies of the People's Republic of China and their impact on global issues are needed. This paper follows Lebow's cultural theory of IR by adapting the categories of “appetite” – Lebow's code for material interests – and “spirit” – non‐materialistic objectives, such as prestige or international standing – to the study of Chinese foreign policy‐making since the Xinhai revolution. The paper argues that China seeks to transform the system not merely as a means of attaining prestige or other liberalist or realist concerns. One of the key defining images of Chinese elites over time has been – and continues to be – one of China as a leading civilization setting global norms and standards. Applying Lebow's theory to foreign‐policy making therefore allows the integration of a normative dimension without immediately entering the dogmatic clashes among IR theorists. By proposing a long‐term perspective on China's engagement with the international system over the past 100 years, we assert that the desire for prestige and honor within the international system is one key determinant in China's behavior. Clearly, it cannot explain all of China's foreign policy choices. It highlights, however, how China's self‐esteem has meant that it has constantly sought to remake the rules to take account of China's own self‐image.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12011   open full text
  • A Normalized Dragon: Constructing China's Security Identity.
    Chris Ogden.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    What has structured Chinese security practice over the last 100 years since the Xinhai (1911) Revolution? Moreover, what are the ideational principles and norms that have influenced China's international relations? Employing an analytical framework concerning norm creation (“security identity”), this article details how different norms originated, became established and subsequently served to orientate Chinese foreign policy behavior. Such a process has been critically informed by China's international interaction, learning and experience across the last 100 years, revealing how past relations can inform present and future conduct. Undertaking an analysis in this fashion implies not so much how a state “should” behave but instead indicates the broad continuities structuring its security practice. From the focus upon security identity (which gives ideational rather than structural explanations of security behavior), our analysis rests upon the elucidation of three inter‐related normative sources. These three sources have been tempered via the interplay between China's international interaction and internal political developments, and show the ideational precedents in China's foreign policy behavior. The three sources are: (i) the political (internal political developments); (ii) the physical (relations with neighboring/bordering states); and (iii) the perceptual (conceptions of self, the international system and their mutual relationship). Overall, the article finds a relative consistency to how security has been ideationally conceived of in China, and highlights three core norms essential to such a conception – centralized control, territorial restoration, and (re)becoming a great power.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12010   open full text
  • Beyond Balancing? China's Quest For Security and Power in East Asia.
    Yves‐Heng Lim.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    Observing the evolution of China's interaction with its international environment, Zhang Baijia argued that the advent of the Xinhai Revolution marked the beginning of China's participation in the modern interstate system. Becoming a more “normal” player after seven decades of foreign aggressions and encroachments, China could hardly have been more aware of the realist rule that, in an anarchic international environment, security can never be taken for granted. The lesson regarding the price of weakness had lasting consequences for China, and, by the end of the century, China had become, in Thomas Christensen's words, “the high church of realpolitik in the post‐Cold War world.”
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12009   open full text
  • Understanding Multiple and Competing Roles: China's Roles in the International Order.
    Catherine Jones.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    During the Xinhai revolution, China faced contending domestic identities, and its roles within the international order were assigned by external powers. In the 100 years that have followed, China's internal competing identities have become more stable and it now faces major challenges in reconciling its contending international identities. China's current ascendency returns it to a position of directing the international order, which resembles its position before the Xinhai revolution. As China changes international identities and gradually moves from being a developing state to a great power, it creates uncertainty among other states. In order for China's rise to continue, it needs to prevent this uncertainty from becoming conflict: it needs a stable international environment. This paper argues that by adopting a view of China's rise as a series of shifts in its identity, the scepter of conflict can be reduced because the uncertainty that is being created can be understood as well as contribute understanding about international behavior. This paper looks at the roles and identities displayed by China at the UN Climate Change conferences.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12008   open full text
  • Global Power Transitions and Their Implications for the 21st Century.
    Yi Feng.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    This essay presents a theoretical approach toward war and peace, reviews basic conditions for world leadership, discusses four modes of global power transitions, illuminates the likely emergence of the future superpowers, and summarizes the differences and common interests between the United States, the incumbent world leader, and China, a potential contender for the global leadership in the 21st century. The theoretical background is power‐transition theory, which predicts war when superpowers are close in power and peace when power preponderance exists. Power parity need be also considered in the context of common interests and preferences of superpowers. Conflict abates when the nations share fundamental rules of the game in world affairs. Four historical modes of transitions – co‐dominion, deterrence, confrontation, and cooperation – were identified. Of the four historical transitions, each time, the challenger surpassed the hegemon in economic power, and deterrence and confrontation by the hegemon against the challenger did not prevent the challenger from assuming global leadership in the long term. Among the newly rising nations (BRICs), China is discussed as a potential contender for world leadership. The economic and financial interdependence between the United States and China is currently the driving force in their relations. It shapes their political arrangements, necessitating coordination and cooperation in policy issues. While economic collaboration and interdependence drive the relations between the two, they are not sufficient conditions for a peaceful transition, until their political and security relations are solidified and their preferences coalesce substantively.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12007   open full text
  • Contemplating Chinese Foreign Policy: Approaches to the Use of Historical Analysis.
    Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard, Kun‐Chin Lin.
    Pacific Focus. August 04, 2013
    Many have contemplated Chinese foreign policy and its future direction, but few have queried how Chinese history might illuminate both. This is unfortunate since researchers have shown that history can influence foreign policy agendas, discourses, and national goals. Moreover, it provides an invaluable tool for comparative analysis. The purpose of this introduction is to provide historical background to the articles comprising this special issue, whose contributors employ historical analysis, with the period preceding and following the Xinhai Revolution as a basis, to illuminate contemporary Chinese foreign policy – e.g., China's interest in remaking the international order and its security norms – or to suggest differences between past and present – for example, in regards to China's Asia–Pacific posture. This introduction also hopes to stimulate further work on Chinese history and foreign policy by highlighting similarities and differences between past and present with respect to, inter alia, pressures against China's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, the penetration of foreign actors and ideas into China, and domestic factors limiting China's efforts to filter external influences and to respond to them.
    August 04, 2013   doi: 10.1111/pafo.12006   open full text