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Journal of Applied Philosophy

Impact factor: 0.373 Print ISSN: 0264-3758 Online ISSN: 1468-5930 Publisher: Wiley Blackwell (Blackwell Publishing)

Subject: Ethics

Most recent papers:

  • Asylum for Sale: A Market between States that is Feasible and Desirable.
    Johannes Himmelreich.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. October 11, 2017
    The asylum system faces problems on two fronts. States undermine it with populist politics, and migrants use it to satisfy their migration preferences. To address these problems, asylum services should be commodified. States should be able to pay other states to provide determination and protection‐elsewhere. In this article, I aim to identify a way of implementing this idea that is both feasible and desirable. First, I sketch a policy proposal for a commodification of asylum services. Then, I argue that this policy proposal is not only compatible with the right to asylum, but also supported by moral considerations. Despite some undesirable moral features, a market in asylum facilitates the provision of asylum to those who need it.
    October 11, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12289   open full text
  • Kagan on Speciesism and Modal Personism.
    Doran Smolkin.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. September 27, 2017
    Shelly Kagan argues in his ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’ for four provocative claims: 1. speciesism is not necessarily a mere prejudice; 2. most people are not speciesists; 3. ‘modal personism’ more closely reflects what most people believe, and 4. modal personism might be true. In this article, I object to Kagan's account of what constitutes a ‘mere prejudice’, and I object to the sort of argument he uses to show that most people are not speciesist. I then attempt to motivate, and defend what I take to be the best version of modal personism; answer several problems for the view; and raise other problems that I think are harder to answer.
    September 27, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12287   open full text
  • Liberalism, Civil Marriage, and Amorous Caregiving Dyads.
    Eric M. Cave.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. September 05, 2017
    Recently, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending civil marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But a prominent recent liberal challenge to civil marriage claims otherwise. According to this challenge, by defining and conferring civil marriage, the state privileges some relationships over others that serve equally well the important liberal goal of fostering effective liberal citizenship, in violation of a prominent interpretation of the doctrine of state neutrality. Theorists who press this challenge, such as Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz, argue that it can be met effectively only by dismantling civil marriage and replacing it with more inclusive state‐maintained arrangements. So far, prominent responses to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage have focused on the special value of either the relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, or the special value of civil marriage itself. In this article, I develop an alternative reply to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage, one focusing instead on the special vulnerabilities of some of the liberally valuable relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, amorous caregiving dyads.
    September 05, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12282   open full text
  • Introduction: Symposium on The Nature and Value of Childhood.
    Anca Gheaus.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 04, 2017
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    August 04, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12280   open full text
  • Equal Opportunity and the Family: Levelling Up the Brighouse‐Swift Thesis.
    Daniel Engster.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 25, 2017
    Although liberal political philosophers have long recognised the tension between equal opportunity and the family, most have assumed there is little society can do to mitigate it. Brighouse and Swift argue, by contrast, that an analysis of the value of the family reveals limits on the rights of parents to benefit their children and hence points to a way to reconcile the family with equal opportunity. Their solution for resolving the tension between equal opportunity and the family, however, leads to some untenable conclusions. A better solution for promoting equal opportunity in the family is to level up the opportunities that less advantaged parents have to promote the development and wellbeing of their children so that they are on par with the opportunities of the most advantaged parents. Five strategies are outlined for achieving this goal. Once society has provided all parents with real opportunities to fulfil their fiduciary duties, Brighouse and Swift's argument for limited parental partiality can be applied without contradiction. The result is an alternate solution for mitigating the conflict between equal opportunity and the family in liberal political philosophy.
    July 25, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12279   open full text
  • The Taste Question in Animal Ethics.
    Jean Kazez.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 03, 2017
    Advocates of veganism often assume that food enjoyment has little moral weight, because it involves mere taste pleasure. Because of the triviality of taste pleasure, they consider it obvious that harming animals to secure particular tastes is ‘unnecessary’. After discussing the elements of taste, defending the importance of taste, exploring what ‘unnecessary harm’ means, and introducing a number of taste related thought experiments, I argue that harm to animals is not always unnecessary, when what's at stake is taste. However, by supplementing considerations involving necessity with considerations of character, I conclude that vegans are often, though not always, praiseworthy.
    July 03, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12278   open full text
  • Beneficence: Does Agglomeration Matter?
    Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 19, 2017
    When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine a number of recent proposals that appeal to agglomeration. None of them, we argue, succeeds.
    June 19, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12276   open full text
  • No Such Thing as Killer Robots.
    Michael Robillard.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 19, 2017
    There have been two recent strands of argument (one offered by Rob Sparrow and the other offered by Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser) arguing for the pro tanto impermissibility of fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS). On Sparrow's view, AWS are impermissible because they generate a morally problematic ‘responsibility gap’. According to Purves et al., AWS are impermissible because moral reasoning is not codifiable and because AWS are incapable of acting for the ‘right’ reasons. I contend that these arguments are flawed and that AWS are not morally problematic in principle. Specifically, I contend that these arguments presuppose an incoherent conception of an AWS as somehow making genuine decisions but not being morally responsible for those very same decisions. Rather than conceiving of AWS in this way, I argue that an AWS is either a socially‐constructed institution that has been physically instantiated or it is a genuine agent. If it is the former, then we should treat AWS as we do any other collective action problem. If it is the latter, then we should treat AWS as responsibility‐bearers, but also as bearers of rights and/or interests. To reject this disjunction is not only conceptually incoherent but also potentially morally dangerous.
    June 19, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12274   open full text
  • Against Pay Secrecy.
    Jeffrey Moriarty.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 24, 2017
    Many firms keep pay secret. They do not make information about what their employees are paid available inside or outside of the firm, i.e. to other employees or to the public at large. Indeed, many firms discourage their employees from, or sanction them for, disclosing their pay. Against this, I argue that there are good moral reasons for firms to be transparent about pay. Pay transparency prevents injustice, promotes autonomy, and increases efficiency. After presenting the positive case for pay transparency, I defend it against objections, including the most common reasons firms give for keeping pay secret.
    May 24, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12273   open full text
  • On the Strength of Children's Right to Bodily Integrity: The Case of Circumcision.
    Joseph Mazor.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 24, 2017
    This article considers the question of how much weight the infringement of children's right to bodily integrity should be given compared with competing considerations. It utilises the example of circumcision to explore this question, taking as given this practice's opponents' view of circumcision's harmfulness. The article argues that the child's claim against being subjected to (presumably harmful) circumcision is neither a mere interest nor a right so strong that it trumps all competing interests. Instead, it is a right of moderate strength. Indeed, even the aggregate strength of children's rights against the practice of (presumably harmful) circumcision as a whole is not so weighty so as to always trump competing interests. The harms are not sufficiently serious to justify such a status. And the expressive wrongs associated with non‐negligently benevolent harming are much less serious than those associated with intentional harming. The debate over banning circumcision thus cannot be conducted only in terms of competing rights. Competing interests, such as those that would be set back by the departure of religious citizens, should be considered as well and might plausibly justify allowing even a rights‐infringing practice to continue.
    May 24, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12275   open full text
  • Kidnapped: The Ethics of Paying Ransoms.
    Jeffrey W. Howard.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 10, 2017
    Should governments pay ransoms to terrorist organisations that unjustly kidnap their citizens? The United Kingdom and the United States refuse to negotiate with terrorist groups that kidnap and threaten to kill their people. In contrast, continental European countries, such as France and Germany, have regularly paid ransoms to rescue hostages. Who is right? This debate has raged in the public domain in recent years, but no sustained attempt has been made to subject the matter to philosophical scrutiny. This article explores this issue, focusing on the case of ransom payments to terrorist organisations. It contends that the state's duty to protect its citizens from murder grounds a defeasible obligation to pay ransoms. It considers the objection that a policy of paying ransoms endangers citizens abroad by increasing the likelihood of future kidnappings, and it explains why this objection is not sufficiently weighty. It then identifies a more powerful objection: namely, that a state's payment of ransoms makes the state complicit in the serious injustices that its ransom payments fund. It concludes that unless states can offset their contributions to such injustices, paying ransoms is wrong.
    May 10, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12272   open full text
  • Forgetting in Immortality.
    Ryan Marshall Felder.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. April 22, 2017
    In the philosophical debate about the desirability of immortality it is argued that immortality could never be desirable, since it requires us to either take on a life where none of our projects or interests stimulate us anymore, or else to loosen our connections to our past selves and no longer survive. I argue that both concerns can be met by considering the role that partial forgetting of past experiences would play in the immortal life. One who loses some non‐essential memories of their past stands to be able to enjoy experiences that have grown tiresome with age. My contribution is to clarify how partial forgetting of only the non‐essential memories allays concerns about our potentially loosened connections to our earlier states. I then consider an objection to my account, that since the standards governing collective memory might be more demanding than those governing individual memory, immortal people might sacrifice aspects of their collective lives to render their own immortal lives enjoyable.
    April 22, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12271   open full text
  • Parental Education and Expensive Consumption Habits.
    Danielle Zwarthoed.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. April 21, 2017
    The aim of this article is to investigate the general and special obligations of parents with respect to the shaping of consumption habits, from a liberal egalitarian perspective. The article argues that, in virtue of them being well placed to shape the next generation's consumption habits, parents have a duty of justice to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits in order to enable them to leave their fair share to others. In virtue of the special relationship they have with their children, parents have a duty of care, and this may also require parents to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits. Then the article discusses whether and under which conditions these duties hold in unjust circumstances, where a consumerist ethos is predominant and where other parents and educational agents do not collaborate effectively.
    April 21, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12270   open full text
  • Replies.
    R. Jay Wallace.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 25, 2017
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    March 25, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12247   open full text
  • Regret and Affirmation.
    Karen Jones.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 23, 2017
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    March 23, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12269   open full text
  • The Devout and the Disabled: Religious and Cultural Accommodation‐as‐Human‐Variation.
    Miklos I. Zala.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 19, 2017
    This article shows that we can identify a subset of religious and cultural accommodation cases that follow the structure of a particular disability model: the Human Variation Model. According to this model, disadvantageous disability arises because most social arrangements are tailored to the needs of individuals with typical characteristics; people with atypical features are frequently left out from these arrangements. Hence, the latter need personalised resources tailored to them, or their social and/or material environment ought to change according to their atypical characteristics. I argue, however, that not everyone's claim stemming from an atypical characteristic merits accommodation – it would be simply unreasonable to provide personalised resources to everyone or modify the environment to accommodate everyone's needs. In other words, these human variation claimants must be ‘reasonably accommodated’. Nevertheless, members of certain social groups have a justifiable claim to receive such accommodation and those in religious and cultural groups could be among them for two specific sociological reasons.
    March 19, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12267   open full text
  • Critical Philosophy of Race: Beyond the USA.
    Albert Atkin.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 12, 2017
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    March 12, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12268   open full text
  • The Challenge of Authenticity: Enhancement and Accurate Self‐Presentation.
    Adam Kadlac.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 15, 2017
    This article explores the significance of authenticity for debates about the ethics of enhancement. According to the view defended here, what lies at the heart of authenticity is a disdain for phoniness or fakery – two notions which essentially concern the way we present ourselves to others and, in turn, the way we are viewed by those others. Being authentic thus requires that we not pretend to be something or someone we are not or otherwise represent ourselves falsely to the outside world. As far as authenticity is concerned, then, the primary ethical challenge to the use of enhancements is to those uses that are hidden or unacknowledged – instances in which individuals represent themselves as having achieved or become something without technological assistance when, in fact, the converse is true. One is not undermining one's authentic self when one uses technology to accomplish a particular goal or undergoes some procedure to alter oneself, even quite radically. Rather, one is only being inauthentic to the degree that one passes off oneself and one's achievements as something they are not.
    February 15, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12266   open full text
  • Natural Duties of Justice in a World of States.
    Saladin Meckled‐García.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2017
    The agency objection to applying distributive justice globally is that principles of distributive justice need to apply to the behaviour of a special kind of institutional agent of distributive justice because of the special powers of that agent. No such agent exists capable of configuring cooperative arrangements between all persons globally, and so distributive justice does not apply globally. One response to institutional views of this kind is that they do not rule out Natural Duties of Justice that fall on all of us to bring about institutional agencies capable of global distributive justice. In this article I argue that this move presupposes a particular, teleological, conception of justice whilst institutional accounts most plausibly rest on a non‐teleological one. I provide an argument for favouring the non‐teleological conception. I also show why alternative ways of arguing for global Natural Duties of Justice do not get around this controversy. The debate is at the level of presuppositions about justice, and relying on a partisan conception is question begging.
    February 08, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12264   open full text
  • Ageing and Terminal Illness: Problems for Rawlsian Justice.
    Ben Davies.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 03, 2017
    This article considers attempts to include the issues of ageing and ill health in a Rawlsian framework. It first considers Norman Daniels’ Prudential Lifespan Account, which reduces intergenerational questions to issues of intrapersonal prudence from behind a Rawslian veil of ignorance. This approach faces several problems of idealisation, including those raised by Hugh Lazenby, because it must assume that everyone will live to the same age, undermining its status as a prudential calculation. I then assess Lazenby's account, which applies Rawls’ general theory of justice more directly to healthcare. Lazenby suggests that we should apply Rawls’ difference principle – which claims that any inequalities in social goods must benefit the worst off – to conclude that we should significantly prioritise treatment of young patients. I argue first that the existence of young terminally ill patients undermines a number of Rawlsian arguments for the difference principle. I then argue that the structure of ageing undermines the Rawlsian decision mechanism of the ‘veil of ignorance’ on which Lazenby relies. I conclude that age and terminal illness present significant problems for any comprehensive Rawlsian account of justice.
    February 03, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12265   open full text
  • Children's Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority Over Children.
    Anca Gheaus.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. January 24, 2017
    Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is in the so‐far little‐discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical pursuits and experimentation with one's self. I call these ‘special goods of childhood’ because individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a distinctive and weighty contribution to wellbeing. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice towards children. The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part of every child's upbringing.
    January 24, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12262   open full text
  • Why Childhood is Bad for Children.
    Sarah Hannan.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. January 05, 2017
    This article asks whether being a child is, all things considered, good or bad for children. I defend a predicament view of childhood, which regards childhood as bad overall for children. I argue that four features of childhood make it regrettable: impaired capacity for practical reasoning, lack of an established practical identity, a need to be dominated, and profound and asymmetric vulnerability. I consider recent claims in the literature that childhood is good for children since it allows them to enjoy special goods that aren't available in adulthood, or which are harder to access in adulthood. I raise some difficulties for these claims. Then I argue that whatever version of these views survives my criticism will not establish that childhood is overall good for children. This is because the goods of childhood aren't significant enough to outweigh the bad features associated with being a child. I conclude by suggesting that the badness of childhood for children means that we are likely to owe more to children than to adults.
    January 05, 2017   doi: 10.1111/japp.12256   open full text
  • Education, Sufficiency, and the Relational Egalitarian Ideal.
    Kirsty Macfarlane.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 09, 2016
    In recent decades political philosophers have increasingly been engaged with the issue of educational equality. However, egalitarians typically focus on achieving equality in the distribution of education, and ignore the relevance of an alternative, relational conception of equality. An exception to this is Elizabeth Anderson, who applies relational egalitarian principles to education in her 2007 article ‘Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective’. Although Anderson remains one of the few relational egalitarians to consider what this ideal requires in education, her arguments have received less attention than they deserve. In this article I examine Anderson's theory of fair educational opportunities for a democratic society of equals and develop an internal critique of her approach. I suggest that the sufficientarian standard Anderson proposes for education has the propensity to undermine the process of integration and the relations of equality she aspires to. Even if all children receive a sufficient education, inequality above the threshold could result in social divisions and status differentials that encourage informal segregation because people typically prefer to associate with other people who are similar to themselves. The article will finish by considering what implications this has for Anderson's relational egalitarian approach to education.
    December 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12260   open full text
  • Epistemic Privilege and Victims’ Duties to Resist their Oppression.
    Ashwini Vasanthakumar.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 09, 2016
    Victims of injustice are prominent protagonists in efforts to resist injustice. I argue that they have a duty to do so. Extant accounts of victims’ duties primarily cast these duties as self‐regarding duties (say, of Kantian self‐respect) or duties based on collective identities and commitments. I provide an account of victims’ duties to resist injustice that is grounded in the duty to assist. I argue that victims are epistemically privileged with respect to injustice and are therefore uniquely positioned to assist fellow victims. Primarily, they discharge this duty through testimony: victims alert other actors to the need for assistance and initiate and coordinate resistance efforts. I briefly provide an account of oppression that ranges from persecution to structural injustice. Through the examples of torture and ‘manterrupting’, I illustrate the duty and its limits. I outline shortcomings in victims’ epistemic privilege and explore means by which these can be overcome. I respond to objections from demandingness and fairness, arguing that victims have an essential, albeit circumscribed, role to play in defeating injustice.
    December 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12255   open full text
  • The Problem of Predation in Zoopolis.
    Andrée‐Anne Cormier, Mauro Rossi.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 18, 2016
    In this article, we argue that the phenomenon of predation is the source of several problems for Donaldson and Kymlicka's account of our duties towards wild and liminal animals. According to them, humans should adopt a general policy of non‐intervention with respect to predatory behaviour involving wild and liminal animals. They justify this recommendation by appealing to the status of those animals as, respectively, members of sovereign communities and denizens of human‐animal societies. Our goal is not to question their recommendation, but to challenge the reasons given in its support. On the one hand, we argue that, insofar as wild animal communities are incapable of dealing with massive predation, they do not possess the competence required for sovereignty. Moreover, we argue that, even if we leave the issue of competence aside, attributing sovereignty rights to communities including both predators and preys may not be the best way to protect wild animals’ fundamental interests. On the other hand, we argue that there exist two important disanalogies between human denizens and liminal animals, which render Donaldson and Kymlicka's denizenship framework problematic. We suggest that the ultimate justification for a general policy of non‐intervention lies in the significant risk of causing greater harm by acting otherwise, due to our limited knowledge and resources.
    November 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12250   open full text
  • On the Complementarity of the Ages of Life.
    Daniel Weinstock.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 18, 2016
    In a pair of influential papers, Tamar Schapiro argues that childhood is a ‘predicament’, in that children lack stable characters that allow them to be subjects of ascriptions of moral responsibility. Comparing childhood to the political ‘state of nature’, Schapiro holds that childhood is a stage of life from which agents must be liberated. I argue that the comparison to the state of nature gives rise to the implication that ‘instantaneous adulthood’ would be a desirable state. Canvassing the nascent literature on ‘intrinsic goods of childhood’, I hold that such views cannot defeat Schapiro's implications, as they are based on theories of value that beg the question against Schapiro's. Only if childhood can be shown to be a necessary stage toward a normatively attractive adulthood can the ‘instantaneous adulthood’ implication be defeated. I show that Schapiro's view is only plausible if it incorporates the endorsement condition and the articulacy condition. But these are incompatible with instantaneous adulthood. Childhood can be seen as the stage in life in which agents actively endorse their characters, and gain articulacy with respect to the maxims that constitute them.
    November 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12254   open full text
  • The Ethics of Germline Gene Editing.
    Christopher Gyngell, Thomas Douglas, Julian Savulescu.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 09, 2016
    Germline Gene Editing (GGE) has enormous potential both as a research tool and a therapeutic intervention. While other types of gene editing are relatively uncontroversial, GGE has been strongly resisted. In this article, we analyse the ethical arguments for and against pursuing GGE by allowing and funding its development. We argue there is a strong case for pursuing GGE for the prevention of disease. We then examine objections that have been raised against pursuing GGE and argue that these fail. We conclude that the moral case in favour of pursuing GGE is stronger than the case against. This suggests that pursuing GGE is morally permissible and indeed morally desirable.
    November 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12249   open full text
  • Climate Change, No‐Harm Principle, and Moral Responsibility of Individual Emitters.
    Simo Kyllönen.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 04, 2016
    The article defends the no‐harm principle as an intuitively plausible and a common‐sense way to justify individual emitters’ duties to take more radical steps in the fight against climate change. The appearance of climate change as requiring large‐scale collective action should not lead us astray with respect to the fundamental moral nature of the problem: individual emitters who knowingly sustain and foster the carbon intensive ways of acting also bear personal moral responsibility for the foreseeable climate‐related harm and acquire in line with the no‐harm principle a direct personal duty to contribute to the efforts of preventing the harm. The article examines more closely the so‐called collectivistic approach, according to which emitters’ responsibilities are primarily collective, and argues that without individualistic grounds of emitters’ personal moral responsibility for the harm the collectivistic approach fails to provide unstructured emitters with sufficient reason to act together and fulfil their correlative duty of effective harm prevention. The article argues that since an emitter's personal moral responsibility warrants others to expect her personal engagement in the efforts of effective harm prevention and can justify blame if she fails, identifications of personal responsibility may also significantly increase unstructured emitters’ collective capability of remedying the climate crisis.
    November 04, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12253   open full text
  • The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision.
    Reuven Brandt.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 03, 2016
    In this article I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children's intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that arguments in defence of the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable responsibilities towards their biological offspring, I note that the precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision remain somewhat unclear.
    November 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12251   open full text
  • Autonomy, Respect, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Crisis.
    Matthew Burch.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 03, 2016
    Article 12(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities guarantees persons with disabilities ‘the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’ In its General Comment on Article 12, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities claims that this guarantee necessitates the abolition of the world's dominant approach to mental capacity law. According to this approach, when a person lacks the mental capacity to make a particular legal decision at the material time, the state authorises a third‐party to make it on her behalf. The Committee declares such substituted decision‐making a violation of the Convention's guarantee of legal capacity on an equal basis, and therefore demands it be replaced by an allegedly non‐discriminatory alternative called supported decision‐making. This article argues that we should reject the Committee's demand in its current form, because the most influential version of the new approach to supported decision‐making suffers from serious conceptual flaws that make it inferior to the mental capacity approach. However, I then argue that the Committee's demand stems from a legitimate ethical concern with respect and equality that ought to inform the CRPD's implementation process.
    November 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12248   open full text
  • La Révolution est un bloc? Wallace on Affirmation and Regret.
    James Lenman.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 03, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    November 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12252   open full text
  • Reclaiming Proportionality (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2016).
    Arthur Ripstein.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 28, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    August 28, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12238   open full text
  • Liability to Deception and Manipulation: The Ethics of Undercover Policing.
    Christopher Nathan.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 18, 2016
    Does undercover police work inevitably wrong its targets? Or are undercover activities justified by a general security benefit? In this article I argue that people can make themselves liable to deception and manipulation. The debate on undercover policing will proceed more fruitfully if the tactic can be conceptualised along those lines, rather than as essentially ‘dirty hands’ activity, in which people are wronged in pursuit of a necessary good, or in instrumentalist terms, according to which the harms of undercover work are straightforwardly overcome by its benefits. This article motivates the ‘liability view’ and describes its attractions, challenges, and implications.
    August 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12243   open full text
  • Decoupling Marriage and Parenting.
    Laurie Shrage.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 09, 2016
    This article argues for separating the institutions of marriage and parenting, conceptually and legally. Marriage is neither necessary nor adequate for fostering cooperative and stable co‐parenting. Because promoting marriage fails to protect all children, the state should develop a more suitable formal mechanism whereby co‐parents can commit to cooperate in good faith in order to best serve the interests of their children. Like civil marriage, many of the terms of these contracts are aspirational and not enforceable, though they can guide arrangements for custody and financial support. Co‐parenting agreements need not be limited to two parents, nor need they be limited to legal parents, but can include de facto parents, such as stepparents, foster parents, and other support parents. One important aim of these agreements is to recognise and support the valuable work that married or unmarried co‐parents perform, and to protect the parental rights of caregivers in different kinds of situations.
    August 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12241   open full text
  • Raising a Child with Respect.
    Norvin Richards.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 09, 2016
    Parents whose children will become adults are expected to help them do so, as opposed to only keeping them alive while they manage it on their own. The parental help must respect the child's standing as a separate individual: our children aren't ours to shape to our design, even if our aim is to help them flourish. But then how are we to raise our children with respect for their individuality? According to Matthew Clayton, doing so requires refraining from attempting to provide our child with any values that reasonable persons would dispute. According to Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, it doesn't require that: parents have a right to try to instil values, including disputable ones, because they must have this right if families are to enjoy ‘family relationship goods’. I argue against Clayton's position, and against Brighouse and Swift's. I introduce a different approach, and flesh it out in light of a difficulty it faces. I then return to the initial problem, identifying some ways in which the approach I've offered explains how to raise one's child with respect.
    August 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12239   open full text
  • The Distinctiveness of Polyamory.
    Luke Brunning.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2016
    Polyamory is a form of consensual non‐monogamy. To render it palatable to critics, activists and theorists often accentuate its similarity to monogamy. I argue that this strategy conceals the distinctive character of polyamorous intimacy. A more discriminating account of polyamory helps me answer objections to the lifestyle whilst noting some of its unique pitfalls. I define polyamory, and explain why people pursue this lifestyle. Many think polyamory is an inferior form of intimacy; I describe four of their main objections. I explain how commitment to ‘the polyamorous possibility’ prompts one to viscerally experience personal, practical, and social constraints. Unlike monogamous dynamics, these confrontations are mediated by third parties who destabilise the familiar dynamics of coupled life. Polyamory can be emotionally challenging but, as I outline in the article, it is sustained by interpersonal emotional work that helps people feel and understand their emotions, communicate without confrontation, and contain the difficult emotions of others. This work is qualitatively and quantitatively intensified in polyamory. Finally, I rebut objections to polyamory whilst also acknowledging the ways polyamory has its own pitfalls.
    August 05, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12240   open full text
  • Visiting the Ruins of Detroit: Exploitation or Cultural Tourism?
    Elizabeth Scarbrough.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 02, 2016
    Are Detroit ruin tours a form of morally permissible cultural tourism, or do these tours amount to a form of exploitation? To answer this question I compare Detroit ruin tours with ‘slum tours’ – guided tours of slums in the world's major cities. I argue that exploitation of the sort we find in slum tourism also exists, to a lesser extent, in Detroit ruin tours. To show this I detail two different accounts of exploitation and argue that Ruth Sample's account best captures what is most morally problematic with slum tours and ruin tours. I then identify the similarities and differences between slum tours and ruin tours, and provide suggestions for how ruin tours could be retooled to avoid some (but not all) of the worries of exploitation. Finally, I suggest that with the proper framing Detroiters could embrace photographic tours as a new form of cultural tourism.
    August 02, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12237   open full text
  • On White Ignorance, White Shame, and Other Pitfalls in Critical Philosophy of Race.
    Marzia Milazzo.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 03, 2016
    This article examines Samantha Vice's essay ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’ (2010), which sparked a storm of controversy in South Africa, as a starting point for interrogating understandings of whiteness and racism that are dominant in critical philosophy of race. I argue that a significant body of philosophical scholarship on whiteness in general and by white scholars in particular obfuscates the structural dimension of racism. The moralisation of racism that often permeates philosophical scholarship reproduces colourblind logics, which provide individualistic explanations for structural problems, thereby sustaining white dominance. In the process, I show that notions of white guilt, white habits, white ignorance, white invisibility, white privilege, and white shame as they are theorised in much critical philosophy of race share a crucial limitation: they minimise white people's active interest in reproducing the racist status quo. Studies, such as Vice's, that frame racism as a moral dilemma while silencing its institutionalisation and the central cause for its existence and longevity – that is, white people's investment in maintaining economic, political, and symbolic power – further naturalise white supremacy.
    July 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12230   open full text
  • Pessimism About Motivating Modal Personism.
    Adam James Roberts.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 03, 2016
    In ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’, Shelly Kagan sketches an account on which both actually being a person and possibly being a person are relevant to one's moral status, labelling this view ‘modal personism’ and supporting its conclusions with appeals to intuitions about a range of marginal cases. I tender a pessimistic response to Kagan's concern about motivating modal personism: that is, of being able to ‘go beyond the mere appeal to brute intuition, eventually offering an account of why modal personhood should matter in the ways we may intuitively think that it does.’
    July 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12235   open full text
  • Overall Lifelong Fortune: A Critique of the Intrinsic Potential Account.
    Doran Smolkin.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 03, 2016
    It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant.
    July 03, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12232   open full text
  • Fiduciary Duties and Moral Blackmail.
    Simon Keller.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 01, 2016
    In meeting legal or professional fiduciary obligations, a fiduciary can sometimes come to share a special moral relationship with her beneficiary. Special moral relationships produce special moral obligations. Sometimes the obligations faced by a fiduciary as a result of her moral relationship with her beneficiary go beyond the obligations involved in the initial fiduciary relationship. How such moral obligations develop is sometimes under the control of the beneficiary, or of an outside party. As a result, the fiduciary can be the target of a distinctive kind of moral manipulation; it is sometimes possible to force a fiduciary to perform a particular act by placing her into circumstances under which she is morally obliged to perform it, because all her other options are morally unacceptable. This is moral blackmail. Moral blackmail is a powerful force within many sorts of human interactions. By understanding the ways in which fiduciaries become vulnerable to moral blackmail, we can better understand the pressures faced by fiduciaries in keeping their personal and professional lives separate, the dynamics of certain kinds of employment negotiations, and the injustice that results when women take on the bulk of the work within caring professions.
    July 01, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12234   open full text
  • Justice, Injustice, and Critical Potential Beyond Borders: A Multi‐Dimensional Affair.
    Miriam Ronzoni.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 01, 2016
    Until fairly recently, positions within the global justice debate have been quite polarised along the statism/cosmopolitanism dichotomy. Recently, the dichotomy has been challenged (although somewhat unsystematically), but the idea that the proximity of a view to cosmopolitanism also tracks its critical potential in political terms has not. This article rejects this premise. In order to do so, it also provides a novel, more systematic challenge to the statism/cosmopolitanism dichotomy. The main suggestion is that we should consider two aspects simultaneously, and identify positions within the debate on the basis of how they relate to both of these. First of all, participants in the debate can make three different kinds of claims, which I shall call moral, political, and institutional. Secondly, views position themselves within a spectrum in each of the three dimensions, rather than deciding between cosmopolitanism and statism – and at different at different points of the spectrum with regard to their moral, political, and institutional commitments respectively. This account gives us a better grasp of what taking a stand in the global justice entails. Crucially, it enables us to understand that the transformative and critical potential of a specific view depends on a variety factors, and not only on its stand at the moral level. One can be fairly critical of the status quo without endorsing a cosmopolitan, or even nearly cosmopolitan, moral outlook. In short, the moral story is not the whole story.
    July 01, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12233   open full text
  • Answering to Future People: Responsibility for Climate Change in a Breaking World.
    Tim Mulgan.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 18, 2016
    Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify ourselves to specific others – especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect. One challenge for contemporary ethics is to extend this interpersonal urgency to our relations with those future people who are harmed or affected by our actions. In this article, I explore our responsibility for climate change by imagining a possible ‘broken future’, damaged by the carbon emissions of previous generations (including ourselves), and then asking what its inhabitants might think of our current behaviour, our moral thinking, and our excuses. In particular, I will focus on a simplified scenario where present people can only avoid a broken future by sacrificing Rawlsian favourable conditions. Suppose we refuse to avoid a broken future, on the grounds that we cannot be expected to make such great sacrifices. If the broken future lacks favourable conditions, will its inhabitants accept our excuses? Will they hold us responsible for things we regard as excusable? If so, should we be guided by their judgements or by our own?
    June 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12222   open full text
  • The Ethics and Politics of Child Naming.
    Eldar Sarajlic.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 15, 2016
    This article examines the issue of justification of government's intervention in the parental acts of child naming, a neglected topic in the recent philosophical literature. It questions the ability of some of the current theories in family ethics to respond to this problem, and argues that both permissive and restrictive theories fail to provide a plausible argument about the proper limits of government regulation of child naming practices. The article outlines an alternative solution that focuses on the child's right to authenticity and suggests that only those names that infringe upon this right invite justified state intervention.
    June 15, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12231   open full text
  • Just Schools and Good Childhoods: Non‐preparatory Dimensions of Educational Justice.
    Colin M. Macleod.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 13, 2016
    This article offers an account of at least some of the non‐preparatory dimensions of education and their significance for a theory of educational justice. I argue that just schools should play a role in facilitating goods of childhood. I also defend an egalitarian view about the access children should have in school to the resources and opportunities associated with the non‐preparatory dimensions of education.
    June 13, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12227   open full text
  • Against the Political Exclusion of the Incapable.
    Nicholas John Munn.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 13, 2016
    Political exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from the franchise. It is appealed to by states and theorists alike to justify excluding young people (under 18) and many people with cognitive disability from the franchise. Defenders of this exclusion claim that no wrong is done by this exclusion and that states gain some significant benefits from this restricting of the franchise. I have argued elsewhere that political exclusion as currently practiced in modern liberal democratic states in fact causes significant harms, as it excludes some people who have the relevant capacity for political participation. Here, I argue that the exclusion of incapable actors prevents no significant harms to democratic outcomes, and that it confers no significant democratic benefits on the states practising this exclusion. As such, I argue that we ought to heavily modify and perhaps even abandon the capacity standard for political inclusion.
    June 13, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12229   open full text
  • Harming Civilians and the Associative Duties of Soldiers.
    Sara Van Goozen.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 09, 2016
    According to International Humanitarian Law and many writing on just war theory, combatants who foresee that their actions will harm or kill innocent non‐combatants are required to take some steps to reduce these merely foreseen harms. However, because often reducing merely foreseen harms place burdens on combatants – including risk to their lives – this requirement has been criticised for requiring too much of combatants. One reason why this might be the case is that combatants have duties to each other and to their compatriots, such as duties to keep them safe, which are weighty enough to override their duties to foreign non‐combatants. In this article, I argue that arguments against the requirement to limit merely foreseen harms which rely on combatants' associative duties fail to establish that it is permissible for combatants to prioritise their own safety over the reduction of merely foreseen harms. Although the argument based on associative duties might work in individual cases, factors peculiar to the situation of combatants mean that such justifications are not normally available to them.
    June 09, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12228   open full text
  • Facsimiles of Flesh.
    Bob Fischer, Burkay Ozturk.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 29, 2016
    Ed Gein was a serial killer, grave robber, and body snatcher who made a lampshade from human skin. Now consider the detective who found that lampshade. Let's suppose that he would never want to own it; however, he does find that he wants a synthetic one just like it – a perfect replica. We assume that there is something morally problematic about the detective having such a replica. We then argue that, given as much, we can reach the surprising conclusion that it's morally problematic to consume realistic fake‐meat products. After explaining why we might the detective's replica lampshade morally problematic, we clarify the analogy between the replica and fake meat products. Then, we defend it against a number of objections, the most notable one being we can sever any association between fake meat and the real stuff without moral cost. We conclude by pointing out that our argument generalises: if it works, then there is something morally problematic about many fake animal products, including fake leather and fur.
    May 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12223   open full text
  • Embracing Impossible Justice.
    Christopher Jay.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 29, 2016
    It is often thought that considerations of practicality speak in favour of accepting the principle that if there is no practical alternative to something then that thing is not unjust. I present an argument which suggests that there are in fact practical costs to accepting such a principle, so that on grounds of practicality we perhaps ought to reject it. That argument does not assume that there are any demands of justice which it is impossible to meet, but only that we are very fallible when it comes to knowing what the possibilities are. I then argue that rejecting that principle and embracing a notion of ‘impossible justice’ has positive practical benefits in respect of putting us in a position to respond appropriately to really necessary injustices if there are any.
    May 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12225   open full text
  • Private School, College Admissions and the Value of Education.
    Liam Shields.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 29, 2016
    In this article, I defend a proposal to cap the proportion of students admitted to elite colleges who were educated at elite, often private, schools to not more than the proportion of students who attend such schools in society as a whole. In order to defend this proposal, I draw on recent debates that pit principles of equality against principles of adequacy, and I defend the need for a pluralist account of educational fairness that includes both elements. I argue that while equality best captures our convictions about unfairness in access to the instrumental and positional benefits of education, such as job prospects and college admission, adequacy best captures our convictions about unfairness in stunting the development of human talent and the intrinsic benefits of education. The proposal to cap the proportion of private school students at elite universities advances both of these, usually conflicting, principles because it permits unequal but efficient talent development through the vehicle of private tuition and elite schooling, and yet promises to seriously curtail the unfair positional instrumental benefits of private or elite schooling by having those students compete against each other and not students who did not attend elite schools. The policy also achieves its aim consistent with preserving some attractive aspects of parental choice. Towards the end of the article I consider a number of practical objections and an alternative proposal.
    May 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12221   open full text
  • Remedial Responsibility for Severe Poverty: Justice or Humanity?
    Jesse Tomalty.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 23, 2016
    Remedial responsibility is the prospective responsibility to assist those in great need. With tens of millions of people worldwide suffering from severe poverty, questions about the attribution of remedial responsibility and the nature of the relevant duties of assistance are among the most pressing of our time. This article concerns the question of whether remedial responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice or of humanity. I discuss three kinds of situation in which an agent owes remedial responsibility to another suffering from severe poverty. In the first, the remedially responsible agent foreseeably and avoidably caused the poverty. In the second, the poverty was caused by forces outside the control of any agent, such as natural disaster. And in the third situation, the agent who was originally attributed remedial responsibility fails to fulfil it, and so remedial responsibility for the poverty in question is acquired by a secondary bearer. According to David Miller, remedial responsibility is a matter of justice in the first two situations, but not in the third. I argue that his grounds for thinking that remedial responsibility in the second situation are in tension with his view that remedial responsibility is not a matter of justice in the third situation. This has important implications in our world in which remedial responsibilities too often go unfulfilled.
    May 23, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12224   open full text
  • Government Surveillance and Why Defining Privacy Matters in a Post‐Snowden World.
    Kevin Macnish.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 19, 2016
    There is a long‐running debate as to whether privacy is a matter of control or access. This has become more important following revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 regarding the collection of vast swathes of data from the Internet by signals intelligence agencies such as NSA and GCHQ. The nature of this collection is such that if the control account is correct then there has been a significant invasion of people's privacy. If, though, the access account is correct then there has not been an invasion of privacy on the scale suggested by the control account. I argue that the control account of privacy is mistaken. However, the consequences of this are not that the seizing control of personal information is unproblematic. I argue that the control account, while mistaken, seems plausible for two reasons. The first is that a loss of control over my information entails harm to the rights and interests that privacy protects. The second is that a loss of control over my information increases the risk that my information will be accessed and that my privacy will be violated. Seizing control of another's information is therefore harmful, even though it may not entail a violation of privacy. Indeed, seizing control of another's information may be more harmful than actually violating their privacy.
    May 19, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12219   open full text
  • Knowing and Not‐knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism.
    Emma C. Bullock.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 18, 2016
    Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible.
    May 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12220   open full text
  • Mandatory Vaccination: An Unqualified Defence.
    Roland Pierik.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 18, 2016
    The 2015 Disneyland outbreak of measles in the US unequivocally brought to light what had been brewing below the surface for a while: a slow but steady decline in vaccination rates resulting in a rising number of outbreaks. This can be traced back to an increasing public questioning of vaccines by an emerging anti‐vaccination movement. This article argues that, in the face of diminishing vaccination rates, childhood vaccinations should not be seen as part of the domain of parental choice but, instead, as a non‐negotiable legal obligation. The first part of the article formulates and defends two arguments in favour of unqualified mandatory childhood vaccination laws. First, government should not permit parents to put their children at avoidable risk of death and suffering; second, government should guard the common good of herd immunity to protect vulnerable persons. The second part rejects legal and pragmatic objections against such mandatory vaccination laws.
    May 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12215   open full text
  • Intimacy, Autonomy and (Non) Domination.
    James Humphries.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 18, 2016
    Accounts of autonomy which acknowledge the importance of non‐domination – that is, of being structurally protected against arbitrary interference with one's life – face an apparent problem with regards to intimate relationships (whether romantic or otherwise). By their very nature, such relations open us up to psychological and material suffering that would not be possible absent the particular relationship; even worse, from the non‐domination point of view, is that this vulnerability seems to be structural in a way exactly analogous to (for example) workplace or social domination. If being powerless to prevent an employer causing me harm constitutes domination at work, then what relevant differences can support the intuition that being powerless to prevent my partner causing me comparable pain is not autonomy‐hostile? I argue for the reassuring view that the obligations and possibility of pain arising from such relations aren't necessarily dominating; they would be so only if we believed that any obligation we have not explicitly agreed to is a restriction on our autonomy, and that is false. I conclude with a note of caution: even though intimate relations aren't necessarily dominating, they will often be contingently so if they take place in a wider social context of domination – such as that which we currently inhabit.
    May 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12218   open full text
  • Morality and Interpretation: Commentary on Jonathan Glover's Alien Landscapes?
    Jeanette Kennett.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. April 06, 2016
    What is required of the interpreter of disordered minds and what can we learn from the process? Jonathan Glover's book focuses on human interpretation and its role in psychiatry. His hope is that a more careful and sensitive exploration of minds that are very different from our own, will assist us to answer a range of important questions about human agency, identity and responsibility. In this commentary I will focus on the process and purpose of interpretation and expand on some of the moral issues that arise out of the interpretive challenges posed by mental disorders.
    April 06, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12209   open full text
  • Response to Alien Landscapes? Commentaries.
    Jonathan Glover.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 29, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    March 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12212   open full text
  • Socratic Questioning in Alien Landscapes?
    Rachel Cooper.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 29, 2016
    This commentary considers the role of Socratic questioning in Alien Landscapes? I discuss the three roles that Glover sees Socratic questioning playing in psychiatry: 1. Questioning to clarify problems, 2. Questioning to treat symptoms, 3. Questioning to reconstruct lives. Although I am broadly sympathetic to the idea that philosophical conversations can help us conceptualise, and deal with, mental distress, I raise two concerns. First, is there any way of providing courses of transformative Socratic questioning cheaply (e.g. through manualisation)? Second, how close is the connection between helping individuals to develop systems of belief and value that fit epistemic norms and helping them to live flourishing lives?
    March 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12210   open full text
  • Expert Testimony, Law and Epistemic Authority.
    Tony Ward.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 29, 2016
    This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority (and epistemic deference), one strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski's defence of a stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to practical authority as she maintains. Zagzebski elucidates a kind of deference that courts generally, and rightly, try to avoid. Her concept of ‘first person reasons’, however, does capture an important aspect of the deliberations of conscientious legal actors.
    March 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12213   open full text
  • What Is It Like to Be an Alien?
    Matt Matravers.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 28, 2016
    This brief article is concerned with an aspect of Jonathan Glover's book, Alien Landscapes?. After reflecting a little on the book as a whole, the question that is taken up is, ‘Why might a book that seeks to help those without mental disorders understand what they are like “from the inside” be of interest to laymen and practitioners in the criminal law?’. One answer lies in part in the way that ‘what it is like from the inside’ might interact with judgements of criminal responsibility. Taking its cue from examples used by Glover the article considers, and puts pressure on, the ‘dual view’ he proposes: that when dealing with those with mental disorders we should treat them as responsible agents in the sense of not withholding from them Strawson's ‘reactive attitudes’, while nevertheless accepting that their personalities and behaviours are the results of large doses of ‘bad luck’.
    March 28, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12211   open full text
  • Planting Some New Thoughts on the Landscape.
    Shaun Gallagher.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 28, 2016
    In this comment on Jonathan Glover's Alien Landscapes? I'll focus on two issues: social cognition in autism, and delusions; and I'll introduce a new topic – solitary confinement – as a supplement to Glover's far‐ranging analyses.
    March 28, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12208   open full text
  • Fiduciary Duties and the Ethics of Public Apology.
    Alice MacLachlan.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 22, 2016
    The practice of official apology has a fairly poor reputation. Dismissed as ‘crocodile tears’ or cheap grace, such apologies are often seen by the public as an easy alternative to more punitive or expensive ways of taking real responsibility. I focus on what I call the role‐playing criticism: the argument that someone who offers an apology in public cannot be appropriately apologetic precisely because they are only playing a role. I offer a qualified defence of official apologies against this objection, considering them through the lens of fiduciary duties. This focus draws our attention to formal or impersonal relationships that are nevertheless normatively rich, capable of sustaining trust, concern, and care. At the same time, I highlight several pitfalls for fiduciary apologisers, including the tension between apology as a mode of truth telling and the duty of confidentiality. I consider whether the fiduciary apologiser, in reflecting on her fiduciary obligations, has ‘one thought too many’ for genuine apology, and argue that the issue of mixed motives is not limited to fiduciary contexts, cautioning against excessive idealism in our conception of apology. I conclude with some reflections on possible conflicts between fiduciary obligations and the conscientious desire to apologise.
    March 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12214   open full text
  • Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence.
    Miriam Bankovsky.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 14, 2016
    From the Ancient Greeks, through medieval Christian doctrine, and into the modern age, philosophers have long held envy to be irrational, a position that increasingly accompanies the political view that envy is not a justification for redistributing material goods. After defining the features of envy, and considering two arguments in favour of its irrationality, this article opposes the dominant philosophical and political consensus. It does so by deploying Rawls's much‐ignored concept of ‘excusable envy’ to identify a form of envy that is not imprudent and does not mis‐describe. With this work completed, the article then argues – no doubt controversially – that excusable envy constitutes good grounds for redistribution or inequality‐mitigation. In so doing, the article throws light on the moral significance of certain forms of uncivil disobedience, and also offers a new vocabulary for popular ‘politics of envy’ debates, which are yet to acknowledge the role of social institutions in reproducing envy‐excusing economic inequalities.
    March 14, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12194   open full text
  • Autonomy, Vote Buying, and Constraining Options.
    James Stacey Taylor.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 11, 2016
    A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. (1) Autonomy is of great moral value; (2) removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; (3) hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; (4) thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments.
    March 11, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12205   open full text
  • Introduction to Special Issue on Applied Epistemology.
    David Coady, Miranda Fricker.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 11, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    March 11, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12207   open full text
  • What's So Bad About Killer Robots?
    Alex Leveringhaus.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 06, 2016
    Robotic warfare has now become a real prospect. One issue that has generated heated debate concerns the development of ‘Killer Robots’. These are weapons that, once programmed, are capable of finding and engaging a target without supervision by a human operator. From a conceptual perspective, the debate on Killer Robots has been rather confused, not least because it is unclear how central elements of these weapons can be defined. Offering a precise take on the relevant conceptual issues, the article contends that Killer Robots are best seen as executors of targeting decisions made by their human programmers. However, from a normative perspective, the execution of targeting decisions by Killer Robots should worry us. The article argues that what is morally bad about Killer Robots is that they replace human agency in warfare with artificial agency, a development which should be resisted. Finally, the article contends that the issue of agency points to a wider problem in just war theory, namely the role of moral rights in our normative reasoning on armed conflict.
    March 06, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12200   open full text
  • Democracy, Epistemology and the Problem of All‐White Juries.
    Annabelle Lever.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 04, 2016
    Does it matter that almost all juries in England and Wales are all‐White? Does it matter even if this result is the unintended and undesired result of otherwise acceptable ways of choosing juries? Finally, does it matter that almost all juries are all‐White if this has no adverse effect on the treatment of non‐White defendants and victims of crime? According to Cheryl Thomas, there is no injustice in a system of jury selection which predictably results in juries with no minority members so long as this result is not deliberate, and does not adversely affect the treatment of minority defendants and victims of crime. My view is different. In and of itself, I believe, something is wrong with a system of jury selection that predictably results in all‐White juries in a diverse society, such as our own. Absent reason to believe that we lack a better alternative to current modes of jury selection, a commitment to democratic government and to the equality of citizens – or so I will argue – condemns existing arrangements as unjust, whether or not they have adverse effects on jury decisions, or on the ways in which our society approaches issues of race and crime.
    March 04, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12203   open full text
  • Theorising and Exposing Institutional Racism in Britain: The Contribution of Ann and Michael Dummett to Critical Philosophy of Race.
    Robert Bernasconi.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 04, 2016
    By helping to introduce the relatively new concept of institutional racism into Britain, Sir Michael and Ann Dummett expanded the concept of racism beyond the limited sense it had been given in the 1940s and 1950s when racism tended to be associated with the scientific concept of race and when the focus tended to fall on the intent to harm or speak harm of a group that was identified as a race by science. They recognised that ‘race’ was primarily a political and not a scientific concept. This led them in a different direction from that taken by the next generation of mainstream philosophers working in this area, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, who adopted the UNESCO approach of highlighting the scientific deficiencies of the concept of race. However, although they both succeeded in developing ways to break through the forms of self‐deception that allow institutional racism to go unnoticed and at the same time offered instructive insights into the ways politicians hide behind the racism of others, I argue that they failed to see, as clearly as Sartre and Fanon did, that the conception of institutional racism necessitates a structural changes in society beyond anything they contemplated.
    March 04, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12206   open full text
  • Better Dread (if Still Dead) than Red: High‐Brown Passing in John Hearne's Voices Under The Window.
    Charles W. Mills.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 29, 2016
    In his pioneering Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro‐Caribbean Philosophy, Paget Henry points out that because of the region's colonial history, Caribbean philosophy is far more often found ‘embedded’ in other discourses, such as literature, than in explicit theorising. Following Henry's lead, I seek to find the philosophical ‘moral of the story’ of Voices Under the Window, the 1955 first novel of the late Jamaican writer John Hearne (1926–94), which some critics regard as his best work. In a novel with significant autobiographical elements, Hearne, a ‘high‐brown’ or ‘red’ Jamaican, recounts the story of Mark Lattimer, likewise a ‘red man’ positioned at the upper edge of the ‘brown’ stratum of the white/brown/black Jamaican social pyramid. Lattimer moves from a race‐denying attempt to ‘pass’ in World War II Britain to a Marxist social activism upon his later return to post‐war Jamaica, but is killed in a black protest riot. His tragic fate raises important philosophical questions about race, colour, class, and personal and social transformation that remain very relevant today, especially considering the failure of 1970s Anglo‐Caribbean radicalism to fulfil its revolutionary promise.
    February 29, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12202   open full text
  • Selecting Against Disability: The Liberal Eugenic Challenge and the Argument from Cognitive Diversity.
    Christopher Gyngell, Thomas Douglas.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 26, 2016
    Selection against embryos that are predisposed to develop disabilities is one of the less controversial uses of embryo selection technologies (ESTs). Many bio‐conservatives argue that while the use of ESTs to select for non‐disease‐related traits, such as height and eye‐colour, should be banned, their use to avoid disease and disability should be permitted. Nevertheless, there remains significant opposition, particularly from the disability rights movement, to the use of ESTs to select against disability. In this article we examine whether and why the state could be justified in restricting the use of ESTs to select against disability. We first outline the challenge posed by proponents of ‘liberal eugenics’. Liberal eugenicists challenge those who defend restrictions on the use of ESTs to show why the use of these technologies would create a harm of the type and magnitude required to justify coercive measures. We argue that this challenge could be met by adverting to the risk of harms to future persons that would result from a loss of certain forms of cognitive diversity. We suggest that this risk establishes a pro tanto case for restricting selection against some disabilities, including dyslexia and Asperger's syndrome.
    February 26, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12199   open full text
  • Arguing for a New Form of Taxation: Lifetime Hourly Averaging.
    Douglas Bamford.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 25, 2016
    This article presents an argument for a new form of tax calculation. Firstly it is argued that Hypothetical Insurance is the best method to determine the correct type of distributive policies and the precise amounts that should be redistributed. Hourly averaging is then presented as a new candidate policy for both assisting the less economically fortunate and taxing the more economically fortunate. The article then argues that hourly averaging compares favourably against rival policies as a hypothetical insurance choice.
    February 25, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12195   open full text
  • Joint Epistemic Action: Some Applications.
    Seumas Miller.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 25, 2016
    The notion of a joint action is a familiar one in the philosophical literature. Moreover, the notion of epistemic action has recently been discussed in the literature. Elsewhere I have suggested that these two notions can be brought together to yield the notion of joint epistemic action and provided a relational individualist analysis of joint epistemic actions. In this article I extend this analysis and show how this extended analysis applies to different kinds of important epistemic institutional phenomena: (1) voting in a democracy; (2) financial benchmarks, e.g. LIBOR (the London interbank offered (interest) rate) and; (3) profiling using computer databases. Each of these institutional mechanisms is important in its own right. Moreover, each is a species of a more widespread generic social form that I refer to as joint institutional mechanisms which, I suggest, are ubiquitous yet somewhat diverse in character. Accordingly, there is a need to distinguish them from the more basic phenomenon of joint action but also to taxonomise them. The latter is a large task to which this article is a first step.
    February 25, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12197   open full text
  • Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices.
    Katharine Jenkins.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 23, 2016
    This article argues that rape myths and domestic abuse myths constitute hermeneutical injustices. Drawing on empirical research, I show that the prevalence of these myths makes victims of rape and of domestic abuse less likely to apply those terms to their experiences. Using Sally Haslanger's distinction between manifest and operative concepts, I argue that in these cases, myths mean that victims hold a problematic operative concept, or working understanding, which prevents them from identifying their experience as one of rape or of domestic abuse. Since victims in this situation lack the conceptual resources needed to render their experience sufficiently intelligible, they are suffering a form of hermeneutical injustice. Attending to this distinctive case sheds new light not only on the functioning of social myths of this kind but on the nature of hermeneutical injustice itself, since the case of the victim who accepts myths is importantly different from other cases of hermeneutical injustice discussed in the literature to date. In practical terms, this analysis supports calls for juries in rape trials to be warned about rape myths at the start of the trial, and may have implications for calls for statutory Sex and Relationships Education in schools.
    February 23, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12174   open full text
  • In Defence of Reasonable Doubt.
    Georgi Gardiner.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 23, 2016
    In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified – at least in large part – by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this article I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence‐based justifications of the standard of proof.
    February 23, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12173   open full text
  • Black Consciousness as Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice.
    George Hull.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 22, 2016
    The ideas of the South African Black Consciousness Movement developed as an intellectual response to the situation of black South Africans under apartheid. Though influential, Black Consciousness ideas about how the injustice of apartheid was to be conceptualised, and what form resistance to it consequently needed to take, have always awoken controversy. Here I defend the original Black Consciousness theorists, Bantu Steve Biko and Nyameko Barney Pityana, against charges of racial inherentism, espousing a prescriptive conception of black identity, and racism. I argue that, on Biko and Pityana's account, a central aspect of the injustice of South African apartheid was a hermeneutical injustice – at first deliberately perpetrated, but structurally self‐reproducing – against the oppressed groups. Thus illuminated, I argue, the ideas of the original Black Consciousness theorists have great plausibility, connect interestingly with contemporary thinking about race and justice, and are of practical relevance today both in South Africa and elsewhere.
    February 22, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12201   open full text
  • Connecting Applied and Theoretical Bayesian Epistemology: Data Relevance, Pragmatics, and the Legal Case of Sally Clark.
    Matthew J. Barker.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 18, 2016
    In this article applied and theoretical epistemologies benefit each other in a study of the British legal case of R. vs. Clark. Clark's first infant died at 11 weeks of age, in December 1996. About a year later, Clark had a second child. After that child died at eight weeks of age, Clark was tried for murdering both infants. Statisticians and philosophers have disputed how to apply Bayesian analyses to this case, and thereby arrived at different judgments about it. By dwelling on this applied case, I make theoretical gains: clarifying and defending pragmatic principles of inference that are important for estimating key probabilities in a range of cases. Then, partly by drawing on such principles, and uncovering overlooked data on post‐partum psychosis, I make applied gains: improving the rationality of judgments about the Sally Clark case in particular, judgments important to future similar cases.
    February 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12181   open full text
  • The Ethics of Immigration Revisited: Response to Brock, Fabre, Risse and Song.
    Joseph H. Carens.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 18, 2016
    To a large extent, the differences between my four interlocutors and me have more to do with the way we choose to frame a question or approach a problem than with substantive disagreements. In her discussion of temporary workers and the brain drain, Gillian Brock implicitly assumes a different background framework of moral responsibility from the one I adopt in my book. Similarly, Cécile Fabre asks important questions about the intersection of immigration and criminal justice, but ones that I chose not to pursue in quite the same way or, in some cases, at all. Matthias Risse says that political theory should be ‘action‐guiding’, and I try to problematize that claim, at least to the extent that it limits the questions we can ask. Finally, I applaud the attention that Sarah Song brings to the link between political community and social membership but resist her suggestion that this shows that political community is more fundamental than social membership. I also suggest the need to clarify further the limits to democratic self‐determination.
    February 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12196   open full text
  • Toxic Funding? Conflicts of Interest and their Epistemological Significance.
    Ben Almassi.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 18, 2016
    Conflict of interest (COI) disclosure has become a routine requirement in communication of scientific information. Its advocates defend COI disclosure as a sensible middle path between the extremes of categorical prohibition on for‐profit research and anything‐goes acceptance of research regardless of origin. To the extent that COI information is meant to aid reviewer and reader evaluation of research, COIs must be epistemologically significant. While some commentators treat COIs as always relevant to research credibility, others liken the demand for disclosure to an ad hominem attack, impugning integrity when better evidence of research credibility is available. Kevin Elliott has argued for clearer justification of COI relevance to research credibility: some interests may be feared to corrupt research results, while others do not, and Elliott provides criteria to discern which financial COIs are actually relevant to research credibility. In this article, I seek to revise and extend Elliott's proposed criteria to COIs more widely. Specifically, I consider the relevance of financial interests as well as nonfinancial advocacy interests to the credibility of research into environmental equity as funded by industry and community groups, with particular attention to criticism and defence of the 1987 United Church of Christ study on the racial demographics of toxic waste facility siting in the United States.
    February 18, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12180   open full text
  • Personal Sovereignty and Our Moral Rights to Non‐Interference.
    Susanne Burri.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 17, 2016
    In this article, I defend the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of deontology against a criticism raised by Michael Otsuka. The paradox of deontology revolves around the question whether it should always be permissible to infringe someone's right to non‐interference when this would serve to minimize the overall number of comparable rights infringements that occur. According to the inviolability approach, rights to non‐interference protect and give expression to our personal sovereignty, which is not advanced through the minimization of rights infringements. This seems to dissolve the paradox. Otsuka, however, contends that the proposed solution relies on too narrow an understanding of personal sovereignty. He argues that there is an enforceability dimension to personal sovereignty that would seem to undermine the inviolability approach. While I agree with Otsuka that enforceability is an important aspect of personal sovereignty, I argue that properly construed, the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty does not undermine the inviolability approach.
    February 17, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12175   open full text
  • Overview of The Ethics of Immigration.
    Joseph H. Carens.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 17, 2016
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    February 17, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12193   open full text
  • Effective Altruism and its Critics.
    Iason Gabriel.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 12, 2016
    Effective altruism is a philosophy and a social movement that aims to revolutionise the way we do philanthropy. It encourages individuals to do as much good as possible, typically by contributing money to the best‐performing aid and development organisations. Surprisingly, this approach has met with considerable resistance among activists and aid providers who argue that effective altruism is insensitive to justice insofar as it overlooks the value of equality, urgency and rights. They also hold that the movement suffers from methodological bias, reaching mistaken conclusions about how best to act for that reason. Finally, concerns have been raised about the ability of effective altruism to achieve systemic change. This article weighs the force of each objection in turn, and looks at responses to the challenge they pose.
    February 12, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12176   open full text
  • Justice for Irregular Migrants, Refugees and Temporary Workers: Some Issues for Carens.
    Gillian Brock.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 10, 2016
    The Ethics of Immigration is a wonderfully comprehensive and insightful journey through all the major contemporary ethical issues concerning immigration. Through this outstandingly well‐crafted work, Carens builds a compelling case for many important positions on how we should treat migrants. Nevertheless, I believe there are some tensions in his arguments that could do with more analysis. I present some of these issues in this article. These include some important problems with arguments for the right to education for children of irregular migrants and those concerning admission, his general position on refugees, and his views about what is required in order to treat temporary workers fairly.
    February 10, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12187   open full text
  • Immigration and Democratic Principles: On Carens’ Ethics of Immigration.
    Sarah Song.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 10, 2016
    Carens has done more than any other political theorist or philosopher to develop the normative perspective of prospective migrants from within the liberal democratic tradition, but he has not sufficiently engaged with the other side of the argument – in particular, with the value of political community and the principle of collective self‐determination. What is at stake for the immigrant‐receiving country that might justify its claim to control immigration? I first examine Carens’ theory of social membership and its connection to political community. I then discuss his method of ‘political theory from the ground up’ and his interpretation of democratic principles. I conclude with a discussion of the principle of collective self‐determination.
    February 10, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12188   open full text
  • From Social Values to P‐Values: The Social Epistemology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
    Stephen John.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    In this article I ask two questions prompted by the phenomenon of ‘politically patterned’ climate change denial. First, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to cognitive experts’ testimony? Building on work in philosophy of science on inductive risk, I argue they can. Second, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's testimony? I argue that they cannot (at least, in the way identified in the first part of the article), because of the high epistemic standards which govern that body's assertions. The conclusion discusses the theoretical and practical implications of my arguments.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12178   open full text
  • Epistemic Injustice and Illness.
    Ian James Kidd, Havi Carel.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12172   open full text
  • Divide and Rule Better: On Subsidiarity, Legitimacy and the Epistemic Aim of Political Decision‐Making.
    Yann Allard‐Tremblay.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This article argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The article presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The article then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision‐making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher‐level political units to assist lower‐level political units.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12179   open full text
  • On the Significance of Membership in Approaches to Global Justice: Putting Carens in Context.
    Mathias Risse.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    My main theme is to compare Carens' take on membership with Michael Blake's and mine. Both Carens and Blake think membership matters enormously in the context of global justice. But they develop this point very differently. However, from the standpoint of my theory (pluralist internationalism), Carens’ and Blake's accounts have symmetrical shortcomings. Neither view takes a genuinely globally balanced approach to immigration.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12189   open full text
  • Ethics of Immigration: The Issue of Convicted Criminals.
    Cécile Fabre.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    In this paper, I explore and probe Joseph Carens’ remarks, in his recent book The Ethics of Immigration, on the immigration status of foreign convicted criminals who have served their sentence, and who wish either to immigrate into our country or who are already here. Carens rejects deportation when it is not called for by considerations of national security, and agrees that considerations of public order can justify barring convicted foreign criminals from entering the country. I broadly agree with his arguments against deportation: my remarks in this respect are clarificatory and exploratory as much as anything else. But (I argue) both his argument for open borders and his scepticism with respect to radical cosmopolitanism are in tension with his claim that past criminal convictions can act as a bar to entry.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12186   open full text
  • Rose's Prevention Paradox.
    Christopher Thompson.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 08, 2016
    Geoffrey Rose's ‘prevention paradox’ occurs when a population‐based preventative health measure that brings large benefits to the community – such as compulsory seatbelts, a ‘fat tax’, or mass immunisation – offers little to each participating individual. Although the prevention paradox is not obviously a paradox in the sense in which philosophers understand the term, it does raise important normative questions. In particular, should we implement population‐based preventative health measures when the typical individual is not expected to gain from them? After canvassing other attempts to address the paradox, I argue that what is significant about the prevention paradox is that it involves intra‐personal trade‐offs; the costs and benefits of the choice to implement or not implement a preventative health measure fall on the same individuals. The intra‐personal nature of these trade‐offs has two implications. First, the solutions to the paradox proposed by other authors are deficient. Second, the policy choice to not implement some preventative health measures can be normatively justified.
    February 08, 2016   doi: 10.1111/japp.12177   open full text
  • The Moral Case for Intelligent Speed Adaptation.
    Jilles Smids.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 11, 2015
    Speeding is a major problem in road safety. Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) is a potential solution, but the moral acceptability of ISA has been called into question both in the popular media and in academic discussions. In this article, a moral case is made for making warning and limiting versions of ISA obligatory in all cars. The practice of car driving involves frequent speeding, which imposes unacceptable risks of harm on other road users. In this article, I argue that ISA can therefore be justified on the basis of the harm it prevents, as is the current criminalisation of speeding. I defend obligatory ISA against three objections. First, ISA is likely to introduce some additional risk for drivers. However, drivers should accept these risks to reduce the risks from driving for other parties to an acceptable level. Second, although limiting ISA reduces drivers' options for moral agency and exercising self‐restraint to some extent, this consequence is defensible. Third, accepting ISA does not commit us to accepting an entire range of other behaviour‐regulating technologies.
    December 11, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12168   open full text
  • What the Old Right of Necessity Can Do for the Contemporary Global Poor.
    Alejandra Mancilla.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 11, 2015
    Given the grim global statistics of extreme poverty and socioeconomic inequalities, moral and political philosophers have focused on the duties of justice and assistance that arise therefrom. What the needy are morally permitted to do for themselves in this context has been, however, a mostly overlooked question. Reviving a medieval and early modern account of the right of necessity, I propose that a chronically deprived agent has a right to take, use and/or occupy whatever material resources are required to guarantee her self‐preservation, or the means necessary to acquire them. There are three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: the need is basic, the claimant does not violate other equally important moral interests, and it is a last resort. I present two recommendations to be followed by the claimants, and offer some examples where this principle may be applied today. I reply to the objections that understanding the right of necessity in this way kills its intuitive plausibility, and that it is a remedy worse than the disease. I conclude that, while not the best solution for the problem of global poverty, the exercise of this right should be accepted if we believe in the human right to subsistence.
    December 11, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12170   open full text
  • Criminalising Unknowing Defence.
    Suzanne Uniacke.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 11, 2015
    Should a legal plea of self‐ or third‐party defence include an ‘awareness component’ that requires that the actor was aware of the justificatory facts at the time of action? Some theorists argue that in cases of so‐called unknowing defence, where an actor in fact averts an otherwise unavoidable danger to himself or another person although unaware at the time of action that this is what he is doing, the objective facts alone should allow a plea of self‐ or third‐party defence. Cases of unknowing defence raise issues that are highly significant to the nature of justification and liability. In this article I reject some common approaches to this issue and I offer an account of why acts of unknowing defence are appropriately subject to criminal liability for the complete offence (e.g. murder).
    December 11, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12171   open full text
  • Cyberattacks as Casus Belli: A Sovereignty‐Based Account.
    Patrick Taylor Smith.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 11, 2015
    Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non‐violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty‐based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence‐based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response.
    December 11, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12169   open full text
  • Is the Same‐sex Marriage Debate Really Just about Marriage?
    Christopher Arroyo.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 01, 2015
    In What is Marriage? One Man and One Woman: A Defense, Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson and Robert George defend the ‘conjugal marriage’ while claiming to make no moral judgments about homosexuality. My contention in this article is that the argument of What is Marriage is not sufficiently different from the arguments of classical new natural law theorists (NNLT), and, therefore, What is Marriage does not remain neutral on the question of whether homosexuality is moral. First, I give an overview of some classical NNLT arguments on the nature of marriage and their sexual ethic. Next, I present What is Marriage's account of conjugal marriage as a comprehensive union of two people, focusing on what makes a genuinely bodily union. I then move to the central contention of this article. By drawing on its understanding of genuinely bodily union and its account of the harm of same‐sex marriage, I argue that What is Marriage is committed to the view that same‐sex sexual unions cannot be good, since on its account of things there can be no shared sexual goods in a same‐sex sexual ‘union’.
    December 01, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12161   open full text
  • Children and Added Sugar: The Case for Restriction.
    Theodore Bach.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 01, 2015
    It is increasingly clear that children's excessive consumption of products high in added (or extrinsic) sugar causes obesity and obesity‐related health problems like type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and metabolic syndrome. Less clear is how best to address this problem through public health policy. In contrast to policies that might conflict with adult's right to self‐determination — for example sugar taxes and soda bans — this article proposes that children's access to products high in added sugars should be restricted in the same way that children's access to tobacco products is restricted. The article first considers how the recommended policy will protect a child's right to an open future while not violating parental rights. The article then explores how the implementation of the recommended policy can help transform the social meaning of sugar and thereby curb the parental supply of added sugar to children — a central cause of obesity. The article also addresses several potential objections.
    December 01, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12162   open full text
  • Prospects for an Inclusive Theory of Justice: The Case of Non‐Human Animals.
    Brian Berkey.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. December 01, 2015
    In this article, I argue that there are three widely accepted views within contemporary theorising about justice that present barriers to accepting that non‐human animals possess direct entitlements of justice. These views are (1) that the basis of entitlements of justice is either contribution to a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage or the capacity to so contribute; (2) political liberalism, that is, the view that requirements for coercive state action can be justified only by appeal to the ideal of citizens as free and equal and the principles of justice that are entailed by that ideal; and (3) that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of what John Rawls calls the ‘basic structure of society’, and not to the conduct of individuals. I then consider several attempts to ground direct entitlements of justice for animals via modest revisions to one or more of these widely accepted views, and argue that they fail, and that, more generally, any such attempt must fail. I claim that any theory that can include direct entitlements for animals must reject (1) and at least one of (2) and (3), and that there are reasons to think that those who are inclined to endorse direct entitlements for animals are unlikely to be satisfied with any view that does not reject all three of the widely accepted views. I conclude by briefly noting some of the important implications of rejecting all of these views.
    December 01, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12163   open full text
  • Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays: A Critique.
    Christian Barry, Robert Kirby.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. October 29, 2015
    Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary‐pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays (both in general and in the particular case of human‐induced climate change). Our aim in this article is to examine their critiques. We conclude that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human‐induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose.
    October 29, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12160   open full text
  • Sufficiency Grounded as Sufficiently Free: A Reply to Shlomi Segall.
    Lasse Nielsen.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. October 15, 2015
    Telic sufficientarianism is the view that it is better, other things equal, if people are lifted above some sufficiency threshold of special moral importance. In a recent contribution, Shlomi Segall has raised the following objection to this position: The telic ideal of sufficiency can neither be grounded on (i) any personal value, nor (ii) any impersonal value. Consequently, sufficientarianism is groundless. This article contains a rejoinder to this critique. Its main claim is that the value of autonomy holds strong potential for grounding sufficiency. It argues, firstly, that autonomy carries both personal value for its recipient as well as impersonal value, and that both of these values are suitable for grounding sufficiency. It thus follows that we should reject both (i) and (ii). Secondly, although autonomy is presumably the strongest candidate for grounding sufficiency, the article provides some counterargument to Segall's rejection of the other candidates — the impersonal value of virtue; the personal value for the allocator; and the personal value for others. If the arguments are sound, they show that we need not worry about sufficientarianism being groundless.
    October 15, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12159   open full text
  • Is the Requirement of Sexual Exclusivity Consistent with Romantic Love?
    Natasha McKeever.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. September 23, 2015
    In some cultures, people tend to believe that it is very important to be sexually exclusive in romantic relationships and idealise monogamous romantic relationships; but there is a tension in this ideal. Sex is generally considered to have value, and usually when we love someone we want to increase the amount of value in their lives, not restrict it without good reason. There is thus a call, not yet adequately responded to by philosophers, for greater clarity in the reasons §why it might be reasonable for a couple to adopt a policy of sexual exclusivity. This article argues that we cannot justify the demand for sexual exclusivity by a need to protect the relationship from the risk of one partner ‘trading‐up’, or by appealing to jealousy. However, sexual exclusivity can be intelligible if it supports the romantic relationship and helps to distinguish it from other relationships. Nonetheless, sexual exclusivity ought not to be the hegemonic social norm that it currently is in some societies because this diminishes the potential value it might have and gives the idea of faithfulness the wrong focus.
    September 23, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12157   open full text
  • Better to Exploit than to Neglect? International Clinical Research and the Non‐Worseness Claim.
    Erik Malmqvist.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 10, 2015
    Clinical research is increasingly ‘offshored’ to developing countries, a practice that has generated considerable controversy. It has recently been argued that the prevailing ethical norms governing such research are deeply puzzling. On the one hand, sponsors are not required to offshore trials, even when participants in developing countries would benefit considerably from these trials. On the other hand, if sponsors do offshore, they are required not to exploit participants, even when the latter would benefit from and consent to exploitation. How, it is asked, can it be worse to exploit the global poor than to neglect them when exploitation is voluntary and makes them better off? The present article seeks to respond to this challenge. I argue that mutually beneficial and voluntary exploitation can be worse than neglect when — as is typically true of exploitative international research — it takes advantage of unjust background conditions. This is because, in such cases, exploitation overlaps with another, less familiar wrong: complicity in injustice. Recognising complicity as a distinct wrong should make us judge exchanges arising from background injustice more harshly than we typically do, in research and elsewhere.
    August 10, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12153   open full text
  • Is Not Doing the Washing Up Like Draft Dodging? The Military Model for Resisting a Gender Based Labour Division.
    Sandrine Bergès.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 10, 2015
    I will examine a version of Bubeck's and Robeyns' proposals for ‘care duty’ which looks at the ways in which care work is analogous to defence work, and what the implications are for the best models in terms both of distributive justice and serving the common good. My own analysis will differ from Bubeck's and Robeyns' in two respects. First I will apply their arguments to all aspects of care including housework. This will mean making a case for housework counting as a form of care work as it is not usually regarded as such, and in particular, would probably be excluded from Robeyns' own account as she follows Bubeck's earlier characterisation of care as involving face‐to‐face interaction. Secondly, I will explore various ways in which care, and especially housework, could and has been distributed by appealing to a number of military models, concluding that the best gender‐just distribution of care requires a style of care experience modelled on universal military service. I will consider a number of objections to my view before concluding that not doing one's share of the housework could indeed come to be regarded as not doing one's duty as a citizen.
    August 10, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12152   open full text
  • Licensing Parents in International Contract Pregnancies.
    Andrew Botterell, Carolyn McLeod.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2015
    The Hague Conference on Private International Law currently has a Parentage/Surrogacy Project, which evaluates the legal status of children in cross‐border situations, including situations involving international contract pregnancy (or ‘surrogacy’). Should a convention (or other legal instrument) focusing on international contract pregnancy emerge from this project, it will need to be consistent with the Hague convention on Intercountry Adoption. The latter convention prohibits adoptions unless, among other things, ‘the competent authorities of the receiving State have determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to adopt’ (Article 5a). Included in it, therefore, is a parental vetting or licensing requirement. In our view, a similar requirement must also appear in any Hague Convention on international contract pregnancy if the two conventions are to be ethically consistent with one another. In particular, there should be a licensing requirement in such a convention for at least some of the prospective parents in contract pregnancy arrangements. We consider several arguments against this conclusion, and argue that none of them is successful.
    August 05, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12143   open full text
  • Lessons from Law About Incomplete Commodification in the Egg Market.
    Kimberly D. Krawiec.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2015
    This article seeks to illustrate egg donation's incompletely commodified status through an analysis of two cases of first impression, highlighting the tensions that arise from attempts to reconcile egg donation's reality as a robust commercial industry with the nonmarket norms that traditionally underlie reproduction. Antitrust and taxation litigation may seem unlikely sources for guidance in navigating the tensions in egg donation's uncertain place between the worlds of gift and market exchange. Nonetheless, this litigation forces an explicit consideration of how egg donation is perceived, talked about, and operationalized, and where along the gift‐market spectrum it fits. These cases also engage familiar questions of commodification, coercion, and exploitation, which are surprisingly central litigation issues.
    August 05, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12144   open full text
  • Is There a Right to Surrogacy?
    Christine Straehle.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2015
    Access to surrogacy is often cast in the language of rights. Here, I examine what form such a right could take. I distinguish between surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, and surrogacy as a contractual right. I find the first interpretation implausible: it would give rise to claims against the state that no state can fulfil, namely the provision of sufficient surrogates to satisfy the need. Instead, I argue that the right to surrogacy can only be plausibly understood as a contractual right. I then investigate two different sets of harms that are often employed to argue against such a contractual interpretation of the right to surrogacy: (1) harm to women's interests in a gendered society, and (2) harm to the sense of self of the surrogate. I assess both of these through the analytical lens of vulnerability. I find neither of them to be convincing arguments against surrogacy contracts. In conclusion, I agree that surrogacy contracts should be carefully regulated, but I disagree with those who call for prohibition of the right to surrogacy as a contractual right.
    August 05, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12145   open full text
  • Commodification and Exploitation in Reproductive Markets: Introduction to the Symposium on Reproductive Markets.
    Vida Panitch.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2015
    There is no abstract available for this paper.
    August 05, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12146   open full text
  • Luck, Justice and Systemic Financial Risk.
    John Linarelli.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 05, 2015
    Systemic financial risk is one of the most significant collective action problems facing societies. The Great Recession brought attention to a tragedy of the commons in capital markets, in which market participants, from the first‐time homebuyer to Wall Street financiers, acted in ways beneficial to themselves individually, but which together caused substantial collective harm. Two kinds of risk are at play in complex chains of transactions in financial markets: ordinary market risk and systemic risk. Two moral questions are relevant in such cases. First, from the standpoint of interactional morality, does a person have a moral duty to avoid risk of harm to others if their financial transactions contribute in some way, however small, to the loss or harm? This article identifies the conditions in which persons are morally responsible in such cases. Second, from the standpoint of institutional morality, how should society distribute the risk of harm associated with massively complex financial markets? This question is considered in the context of the home mortgage credit market. Luck egalitarianism, in particular a Dworkinian insurance scheme to allocate risks and resources relating to mortgage credit and private home ownership, offers substantial promise.
    August 05, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12148   open full text
  • Exploitation in International Paid Surrogacy Arrangements.
    Stephen Wilkinson.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 14, 2015
    Many critics have suggested that international paid surrogacy is exploitative. Taking such concerns as its starting point, this article asks: (1) how defensible is the claim that international paid surrogacy is exploitative and what could be done to make it less exploitative? (2) In the light of the answer to (1), how strong is the case for prohibiting it? Exploitation could in principle be dealt with by improving surrogates' pay and conditions. However, doing so may exacerbate problems with consent. Foremost amongst these is the argument that surrogates from economically disadvantaged countries cannot validly consent because their background circumstances are coercive. Several versions of this argument are examined and I conclude that at least one has some merit. The article's overall conclusion is that while ethically there is something to be concerned about, paid surrogacy is in no worse a position than many other exploitative commercial transactions which take place against a backdrop of global inequality and constrained options, such as poorly‐paid and dangerous construction work. Hence, there is little reason to single surrogacy out for special condemnation. On a policy level, the case for prohibiting international commercial surrogacy is weak, despite legitimate concerns about consent and background poverty.
    July 14, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12138   open full text
  • Customary Trade and the Complications of Consent.
    Shmuel Nili.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 14, 2015
    Global justice theorists have given much attention to corporations' purchases of state‐owned natural resources controlled by dictators. These resources, the common argument goes, belong to the people rather than to those who exercise effective political power. Dictators who rely on violence to secure their political power and who sell state‐owned natural resources without authorisation from their people, or from their people's elected delegates, are therefore violating their peoples' property rights. But many dictatorships also distribute natural resource revenue to the population, and stopping to purchase natural resources from them is therefore likely to produce relative deprivation for the people, even while increasing the chances of the people gaining control over their property. Given these circumstances, can corporations buying the people's natural resources from a distributive dictatorship appeal to the people's consent as justification for such purchases? I consider this question by inspecting three types of consent to which resource corporations might appeal. I show that, under the circumstances of natural resource trade with distributive dictatorships, none of these types of consent can obtain. Hence, resource corporations cannot appeal to popular consent to defend their transactions with distributive dictatorships.
    July 14, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12135   open full text
  • The Question of the Holocaust's Uniqueness: Was it Something More Than or Different From Genocide?
    Nigel Pleasants.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 15, 2015
    Dating back to the very beginning of our knowledge of the events that constituted the Holocaust, some historians, social scientists, philosophers, theologians and public intellectuals argue that it was a unique historical, or even trans‐historical, event. The aim of this article is to clarify what the uniqueness question should be about and to ascertain whether there are good reasons for judging that the Holocaust is unique. It examines the core meanings of ‘unique’ that feature in the literature and identifies which of these is most apt for considering the possible uniqueness of the Holocaust. It then works out what it would take for the Holocaust to be unique in the appropriately rigorous sense, which is facilitated by inquiring into the nature of genocide. The key question turns on the relation of the Holocaust to genocide: was the Holocaust more than, or different from, genocide?
    June 15, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12113   open full text
  • Consent's Been Framed: When Framing Effects Invalidate Consent and How to Validate It Again.
    Eric Chwang.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 15, 2015
    In this article I will argue first that if ignorance poses a problem for valid consent in medical contexts then framing effects do too, and second that the problem posed by framing effects can be solved by eliminating those effects. My position is thus a mean between two mistaken extremes. At one mistaken extreme, framing effects are so trivial that they never impinge on the moral force of consent. This is as mistaken as thinking that ignorance is so trivial that it never impinges on the moral force of consent. At the other mistaken extreme, framing effects are so serious that their existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. This is as mistaken as the idea that ignorance is so serious that its existence shows that consent has no independent moral force. I will argue that, instead of endorsing either of these mistaken extreme views, we should instead endorse a moderate view according to which framing effects sometimes pose a serious challenge for the validity of consent, just as ignorance does, but one which we can solve by eliminating the effect, just as we can solve the problem of ignorance by eliminating it.
    June 15, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12112   open full text
  • A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory.
    Marcia Baron.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 10, 2015
    This article presents a Kantian alternative to the mainstream approach in ethics concerning the phenomena that are widely thought to require a category of the supererogatory. My view is that the phenomena do not require this category of (Kantian style) imperfect duties. Elsewhere I have written on Kant on this topic; here I shift my focus away from interpretive issues and consider the pros and cons of the Kantian approach. What background assumptions would lean one to favour the Kantian approach and what sorts would lean one to favour the mainstream approach? I also consider the possibility that in institutional contexts, there is a need for the category of the supererogatory. Here, it seems, we do need to know what we really have to do and what is beyond the call of duty; in this context, however, duty is not the Kantian moral notion, but rather is pegged to particular roles, or to the needs of the institution or group or club of which one is a member. But even here, I argue, the notion of the supererogatory is not crucial.
    June 10, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12139   open full text
  • Real‐World Love Drugs: Reply to Nyholm.
    Hichem Naar.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 10, 2015
    In a recent article, Sven Nyholm argues that the use of biomedical enhancements (BE) in our romantic relationships would fail to secure the final value we attribute to love. On Nyholm's view, one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others have for us. The satisfaction of this desire, he argues, is incompatible with the use of BE insofar as they are responsible for the attachment characteristic of love. In particular, the use of BE in order to create and sustain the sort of attachment characteristic of love would be less desirable than the creation and sustainment of it by more ordinary means. If one needs such enhancements in order for one's love to be created or sustained, then one's love is of lesser quality than the love we want. In this reply, I raise doubts about the argument.
    June 10, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12141   open full text
  • Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact that Some are Worse Off than Others?
    Robert Huseby.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 08, 2015
    According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new welfare level is justified in absolute terms, it is less clear that her now being worse off than others, is justified (a similar idea is explored by Susan Hurley). The reason is that while she has in one sense chosen her (new) welfare level, she has not chosen to be worse off than others. Her relative standing, something with which egalitarians ought to be concerned, is determined by her choices in conjunction with the choices of all others. But no individual controls the choices of all others. Hence, for any one individual it is the case that her relative standing is beyond her control. Some responses to this problem are available. It is doubtful, however, that these are entirely successful.
    May 08, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12122   open full text
  • Against Substitutive Harm.
    Daniel Schwartz.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 08, 2015
    Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility (PSP) specifies a class of exceptions to the general rule not to kill as a means. The principle allows us to harm as a means some of those who would have been otherwise harmed as side effects. ‘For example, suppose it is impermissible to paralyze A's legs as a means to a greater good. It would still be permissible to do this as the alternative to permissibly killing A as a mere indirect side effect.’ I argue that, despite of its great appeal, PSP is incorrect; it is simply not true that the victims of substitutive harm are not worse off than they would otherwise permissibly have been. In fact, there is no moral difference between the purportedly substitutive harm licensed by PSP (and its extension) and the standard sort of harming as means repudiated by nonconsequentialists.
    May 08, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12120   open full text
  • What Do Liberal Democratic States Owe the Victims of Disasters? A Rawlsian Account.
    Paul Voice.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 08, 2015
    Is there a principled way to understand what liberal democratic states owe, as a matter of justice, to the victims (survivors) of disasters? This article shows what is normatively special and distinctive about disasters and argues for the view that there are substantial duties of justice for liberal democratic states. The article rejects both a libertarian and a utilitarian approach to this question and, based on broadly Rawlsian principles, argues for a ‘political definition’ of disasters that is concerned with the restoration of citizens' dignity and their capacities for effective citizenship.
    May 08, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12119   open full text
  • Respecting Embedded Disability.
    Sahar Akhtar.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 08, 2015
    In certain ways, many disabilities seem to occupy a middle ground between illnesses like cancer and identity‐traits like race: like illnesses, they can present a wide variety of obstacles in a range of social and natural environments and, insofar as they do, they are something we should prevent potential people from having for their own sake; at the same time, those same types of disabilities can be, like race, a valuable part of the identity of the persons who already have them. I consider this seemingly dual nature of a significant class of disabilities to attempt to understand the proper relation of those disabilities to persons and how we should value or respect them. I argue for a distinction between embedded disabilities (e.g. John's blindness) and general disabilities (e.g. blindness‐in‐general); importantly not everyone with a disability will turn out to have an embedded disability. I then show that expressing negative value judgments about general disabilities does not typically express disrespect for people with disabilities — thereby addressing a long‐standing charge made by many in the disabilities community. Finally, I show that unlike with disabilities, expressing negative judgments about the general form of identity‐traits like race does typically express disrespect for people with those identity‐traits.
    May 08, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12121   open full text
  • Selling Citizenship: A Defence.
    Javier Hidalgo.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 19, 2015
    Many people think that citizenship should not be for sale. On their view, it is morally wrong for states to sell citizenship to foreigners. In this article, I challenge this view. I argue that it is in principle permissible for states to sell citizenship. I contend that, if states can permissibly deny foreigners access to citizenship in some cases, then states can permissibly give foreigners the option of buying citizenship in these cases. Furthermore, I defend the permissibility of selling citizenship against the objections that selling citizenship values citizenship in the wrong way, corrupts civic norms, and unfairly discriminates against poor foreigners. I conclude by noting that, although selling citizenship is not intrinsically wrong, it could still be wrong for states to sell citizenship in practice. If existent immigration restrictions are unjust, then it may be impermissible for states to sell citizenship in the real world.
    March 19, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12117   open full text
  • Liberty, Political Rights and Wealth Transfer Taxation.
    S. Stewart Braun.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 19, 2015
    Libertarians famously contend that the minimal state is the most just social arrangement because it secures individual freedoms and basic political rights. They also oppose wealth transfer taxation, i.e. taxation of inheritances, bequests, and inter vivos gifts, arguing that it violates people's right to use their wealth freely. However, as I argue, libertarian opposition to wealth transfer taxation causes practical problems for their commitment to a minimal state, as there is strong empirical evidence demonstrating that wealth transfer taxation is required to secure the political rights necessary for a free and stable society. In other words, I contend that without an effective wealth transfer tax, it will be difficult to ensure political rights and basic freedoms, thus leaving the libertarian minimal state in peril of collapse.
    March 19, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12118   open full text
  • Three Aristotelian Accounts of Disease and Disability.
    Shane N. Glackin.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 17, 2015
    The question of whether medical and psychiatric judgements involve a normative or evaluative component has been a source of wide and vehement disagreement. But among those who think such a component is involved, there is considerable further disagreement as to its nature. In this article, I consider several versions of Aristotelian normativism, as propounded by Christopher Megone, Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, and Martha Nussbaum. The first two, I claim, can be persuasively rebutted by different modes of liberal pluralist challenge — respectively, pluralism about structures of social organisation and pluralism about biological forms. Nussbaum's version, by contrast, is alert to the need for pluralism; I argue, however, that the Aristotelian aspects of her theory hamper her pursuit of those pluralistic aims.
    March 17, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12114   open full text
  • The Duty to Take Rescue Precautions.
    Tina Rulli, David Wendler.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 17, 2015
    There is much philosophical literature on the duty to rescue. Individuals who encounter and could save, at relatively little cost to themselves, a person at risk of losing life or limb are morally obligated to do so. Yet little has been said about the other side of the issue. There are cases in which the need for rescue could have been reasonably avoided by the rescuee. We argue for a duty to take rescue precautions, providing an account of the circumstances in which it arises. This novel duty has important implications for public policy. We apply it to the situation of some of the uninsured in the United States. Given the US clinician's duty to provide emergency care to all people regardless of ability to pay, some of the uninsured have a moral duty to purchase health insurance. We defend the duty against objections, including the possibility that a right to rescue can be waived, thus undermining a duty to take rescue precautions, that the duty of many professionals is voluntarily incurred, and that a distinction between actively assumed and passively assumed risks matters morally.
    March 17, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12115   open full text
  • Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
    Jessica Toit.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 06, 2015
    In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets — what I shall call the ‘restriction of freedom objection’, the ‘property objection’, and the ‘dependency objection’. The restriction of freedom objection is dismissed relatively easily. The property objection also fails to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection does lead to the conclusion that we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people's attitudes towards pets such that they (pets) are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I do not to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. However, I argue that this lack of clarity is of little concern at this time as our present moral obligations to pets are quite clear.
    March 06, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12106   open full text
  • Why Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility Cannot Save the Doctrine of Double Effect.
    Gerhard Øverland.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 06, 2015
    The DDE yields counterintuitive verdicts about certain cases: it may deem it permissible to kill a certain number of people when they are not used as means and their death is not intended, but deny that killing fewer of these people is permissible if that requires intending their death, or using them as means. To accommodate the judgement that we may kill the lesser number in such cases, supporters of the DDE may appeal to Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility (PSP). The principle says, roughly, that if it is permissible to kill n people when not intending their death, or using them as means, then it is permissible to kill n − m people in a way that does involve intending their deaths, or using them as means, as ‘secondarily permissible’ (where m > 0). In this article I argue that appealing to the PSP to solve the puzzling cases of the DDE is generally misleading and that it fails in particular cases. The crux of my argument is that the PSP allows killings that go against the grain of the DDE.
    March 06, 2015   doi: 10.1111/japp.12110   open full text
  • Why Should We Save Nature's Hidden Gems?
    Glenn Parsons.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 07, 2014
    Aesthetic preservation is the idea of sparing natural areas from development because of their aesthetic value. In this article I discuss a problem for aesthetic preservation that I call the ‘hidden gems problem’: in certain cases, the natural area under consideration is so remote and/or fragile that few people can actually experience it. In these cases, it becomes unclear how nature's aesthetic value can justify its preservation when development promises practical human benefits. After rejecting some potential responses to the hidden gems problem, I offer a different solution. I argue that we have an aesthetic reason to preserve nature's hidden gems because they are required to produce ‘true judges’ of aesthetic value, who are capable of improving the general quality of taste for landscape. I develop this argument using the example of recent preservationist efforts to save the isolated landscape of Sable Island, Nova Scotia.
    May 07, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12069   open full text
  • Taming the Conflict over Educational Equality.
    Bryan R. Warnick.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. April 22, 2014
    This article proposes an approach to educational distribution that attempts to minimise enduring tensions among conflicting values. At the foundation of this approach is a threshold of educational adequacy based on what is needed for citizens to participate in a democratic society. This threshold is justified because it minimises conflict with parental rights and because it better manages ‘the bottomless pit’ problem of educational distribution. This threshold is then modified to stipulate that, after the threshold has been reached, public resources should be distributed equally across students from all backgrounds. While this modification is essential to sending messages of equal citizenship, it also leaves a ‘moral residue’ because it allows wealthy parents to invest greater private resources in their children, thus preserving their children's competitive advantage. Minimising this harm requires policy mechanisms outside of schools that more aggressively break the link between educational outcomes, success in market competition, and social goods. Something ‘external’ to educational institutions is necessary, then, for the achievement of educational justice.
    April 22, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12066   open full text
  • Prenatal Equality of Opportunity.
    Eszter Kollar, Michele Loi.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. April 22, 2014
    In this article, we defend a normative theory of prenatal equality of opportunity, based on a critical revision of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). We argue that if natural endowments are defined as biological properties possessed at birth and the distribution of natural endowments is seen as beyond the scope of justice, Rawls's FEO allows for inequalities that undermine the social conditions of a property‐owning democracy. We show this by considering the foetal programming of disease and the possibility of germ‐line modifications. If children of lower socioeconomic background are more likely to develop in a poor foetal environment and germ‐line enhancements are available only to the rich, initial inequalities between the rich and the poor would grow, and yet FEO would be satisfied. In order to avoid the problem, we propose a revised FEO principle omitting any reference to the comparison of natural endowments. Our revised FEO requires that institutions mitigate social class effect from reproduction and gestation to the greatest extent compatible with parental freedoms and the value of the family.
    April 22, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12067   open full text
  • University Education Fees, Economic Rents and Distributive Justice.
    Julian Lamont.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 17, 2014
    In this article I defend the claim that subsidies for university education should be substantially reduced. The normative justification for this conclusion derives from a theory of distributive justice called the Compensation Theory of Income Justice, which is most easily understood as a normative version of the positive economic theory of compensating differentials. Relying on the distinction between incentives and economic rents, and after considering two ‘received opinions’ about why large income differentials exist in modern societies, I note that substantial portions of above‐average incomes are likely to be artificial monopoly rents, rather than incentives or natural monopoly rents. Under the Compensation Theory of Income Justice the earning of artificial monopoly rents is not justified. Since subsidisation of university education fees increases lifetime artificial rents, the theory would recommend such subsidies be substantially reduced. I defend this conclusion against objections, the most notable of which is the view that university subsidies help to improve equality of opportunity to university education. I explain how it is possible to maintain the laudable aim of providing equality of opportunity while reducing the subsidisation and, as a consequence, the lifetime artificial rents.
    March 17, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12061   open full text
  • What is the Point of Sufficiency?
    Shlomi Segall.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 10, 2014
    Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal value. Neither, secondly, is it committed to the person‐affecting view, the view that says that nothing can be better (worse) if there is no one for whom it is better (worse). This, in itself, is of interest because some sufficientarians reject egalitarianism precisely for its alleged incompatibility with the person‐affecting view. Sufficientarians' disavowal of the person‐affecting view implies that their view, similarly to egalitarianism (and, perhaps less famously, prioritarianism), must be anchored in some impersonal value. But crucially, and this is the third step of the argument, there is no apparent value that can fit that role. We must conclude, then, that telic sufficientarianism is groundless.
    March 10, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12062   open full text
  • Disadvantage, Autonomy, and the Continuity Test.
    Ben Colburn.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. March 03, 2014
    The Continuity Test is the principle that a proposed distribution of resources is wrong if it treats someone as disadvantaged when they don't see it that way themselves, for example by offering compensation for features that they do not themselves regard as handicaps. This principle — which is most prominently developed in Ronald Dworkin's defence of his theory of distributive justice — is an attractive one for a liberal to endorse as part of her theory of distributive justice and disadvantage. In this article, I play out some of its implications, and show that in its basic form the Continuity Test is inconsistent. It relies on a tacit commitment to the protection of autonomy, understood to consist in an agent deciding for herself what is valuable and living her life in accordance with that decision. A contradiction arises when we consider factors which are putatively disadvantaging by dint of threatening individual autonomy construed in this way. I argue that the problem can be resolved by embracing a more explicit commitment to the protection (and perhaps promotion) of individual autonomy. This implies a constrained version of the Continuity Test, thereby salvaging most of the intuitions which lead people to endorse the Test. It also gives us the wherewithal to sketch an interesting and novel theory of distributive justice, with individual autonomy at its core.
    March 03, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12060   open full text
  • The Tragedy of the Commons as an Essentially Aggregative Harm.
    Elizabeth Kahn.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 27, 2014
    This article identifies ‘the tragedy of the commons’ as an essentially aggregative harm and considers what agents in such a scenario owe to one another. It proposes that the duty to take reasonable precautions requires that agents make efforts to establish collective solutions to any essentially aggregative harm to which they would otherwise contribute. Baylor Johnson has argued that the general obligation to promote the common good requires that agents make efforts to establish a collective agreement to avert a potential tragedy of the commons. This article agrees with Johnson's analysis but argues that there are also negative duties, which give commons users additional moral reason to take collective action to prevent the destruction of the utility of the commons. These duties link commons users to resolving this particular problem and provide grounds to demand that they make greater efforts to prevent the destruction of the commons compared to bystanders. The article suggests that fulfilling negative duties can require establishing collective institutions with the power to regulate human action and interaction. This analysis could be applied to a range of social problems which result from the aggregation of actions and practices.
    February 27, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12057   open full text
  • Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’.
    Jennifer Saul.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 27, 2014
    This article explores two related widespread mistakes in thinking about sexual harassment. One is a mistake made by philosophers doing philosophical work on the topic of sexual harassment: an excessive focus on attempting to define the term ‘sexual harassment’. This is a perfectly legitimate topic for discussion and indeed a necessary one, but its dominance of the literature has tended to prevent philosophers from adequately exploring other topics that are of at least equal importance, particularly that of bystanders' responsibilities. The other mistake is one made not just by philosophers but by most people attempting to deal with real‐world behaviour that is either sexual harassment or closely related to sexual harassment: an excessive focus on whether or not formal charges of sexual harassment are possible or appropriate. (This is clearly related to the first mistake in that a part of deciding whether charges are appropriate is deciding whether the behaviour meets the definition of sexual harassment.) I argue that these are not merely unfortunate errors in attempting to conceptualise certain problematic behaviours; they have extremely damaging real world effects.
    February 27, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12058   open full text
  • The Ethics of Producing In Vitro Meat.
    G. Owen Schaefer, Julian Savulescu.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 27, 2014
    The prospect of consumable meat produced in a laboratory setting without the need to raise and slaughter animals is both realistic and exciting. Not only could such in vitro meat become popular due to potential cost savings, but it also avoids many of the ethical and environmental problems with traditional meat productions. However, as with any new technology, in vitro meat is likely to face some detractors. We examine in detail three potential objections: 1) in vitro meat is disrespectful, either to nature or to animals; 2) it will reduce the number of happy animals in the world; and 3) it will open the door to cannibalism. While each objection has some attraction, we ultimately find that all can be overcome. The upshot is that in vitro meat production is generally permissible and, especially for ethical vegetarians, worth promoting.
    February 27, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12056   open full text
  • The Scope of the Argument from Species Overlap.
    Oscar Horta.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 09, 2014
    The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This article intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (‘the argument from marginal cases’) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The article claims that the argument questions not only those defences of anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities believed to be typically human, but also those that appeal to special relations between humans. This means the scope of the argument is far wider than has been thought thus far. Finally, the article claims that, even if the argument cannot prove by itself that we should not disregard the interests of nonhuman animals, it provides us with strong reasons to do so, since the argument does prove that no defence of anthropocentrism appealing to non‐definitional and testable criteria succeeds.
    February 09, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12051   open full text
  • A New Use of ‘Race’: The Evidence and Ethics of Forensic DNA Ancestry Profiling.
    Matthew Kopec.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 09, 2014
    Recent advances in population genetics have made it possible to infer an individual's ancestral origin with a high degree of reliability, giving rise to the new technology called ‘DNA Ancestry Profiling’. Bioethicists have raised concerns over using this technology within a forensic context, many of which stem from issues concerning race. In this article, I offer some reasons why we ought to allow forensic scientists to use DNA Ancestry Profiling to infer the race or ethnicity of perpetrators — on a particular understanding of race or ethnicity — in at least some cases. First, there is reason to think the process will meet our evidential standards in many cases. Second, the technology has serious prospects for improving racial justice. Third, the ethical concerns that have been raised can be addressed. And last, using Forensic DNA Ancestry Profiling to infer race or ethnicity has many benefits over its successor technology known as Molecular Photofitting. I conclude the essay by sketching the empirical work that remains to be done.
    February 09, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12053   open full text
  • What Does Society Owe Me If I Am Responsible for Being Worse Off?
    Martin Marchman Andersen.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 09, 2014
    Luck egalitarians need to address the question of cost‐responsibility: If an individual is responsible for being worse off than others, then what benefits, if any, is that individual uniquely cost‐responsible for? By applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health I discuss different answers to this question inspired by two different interpretations of luck egalitarianism, namely ‘standard luck egalitarianism’ and ‘all luck egalitarianism’, respectively. Even though I argue that the latter is more plausible than the former, I ultimately suggest and defend a third interpretation of luck egalitarianism, which I label ‘universal luck egalitarianism’. Finally, I adjust my findings to a (all things considered) more plausible currency, namely welfare.
    February 09, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12054   open full text
  • Dependence on Wrongdoing in the Consumption of Meat: A Kantian Analysis.
    Carl Hammer.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 09, 2014
    Kant's ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant's principles. In this article, I argue that Kant's ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one's behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant's ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products.
    February 09, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12052   open full text
  • Moral Individualism, Moral Relationalism, and Obligations to Non‐human Animals.
    Todd May.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. February 09, 2014
    Moral individualists like Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer argue that our moral obligations to animals, both human and non‐human, are grounded in the morally salient capacities of those animals. By contrast, what might be called moral relationalists argue that our obligations to non‐human animals are grounded in our relationship to them. Moral relationalists are of various kinds, from relationalists regarding assistance to animals, such as Clare Palmer and Elizabeth Anderson, to relationalists grounded in a Wittgensteinian view of human practice, such as Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. This article argues that there are, in fact, two distinct types of moral reasons, those based on salient capacities and those based on relationships. Neither type of reason is reducible to the other, and there is no third type to which to reduce them both. Any attempt at reduction would run counter to deep intuitions about our moral relation to non‐human animals as well as to other humans. Among the implications of this is that certain kinds of arguments, such as the argument from marginal cases, seem to be incomplete precisely because they do not capture the complexity of our moral relations to non‐human animals.
    February 09, 2014   doi: 10.1111/japp.12055   open full text
  • Insults, Free Speech and Offensiveness.
    David Archard.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 22, 2013
    This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality. Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms.
    November 22, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12048   open full text
  • Economic Envy.
    Christopher Morgan‐Knapp.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 22, 2013
    Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do.
    November 22, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12045   open full text
  • Is Humility a Virtue in the Context of Sport?
    Michael W. Austin.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. November 22, 2013
    I define humility as a virtue that includes both proper self‐assessment and a self‐lowering other‐centeredness. I then argue that humility, so understood, is a virtue in the context of sport, for several reasons. Humility is a component of sportspersonship, deters egoism in sport, fuels athletic aspiration and risk‐taking, fosters athletic forms of self‐knowledge, decreases the likelihood of an athlete seeking to strongly humiliate her opponents or be weakly humiliated by them, and can motivate an athlete to achieve greater levels of excellence in her sport. In the context of team sports, humility can contribute to an athlete being a better teammate, foster unity amidst diversity within a team, and contribute to the overall moral and athletic excellence of a team. I also argue that an individual who is truly the world's greatest athlete can know and communicate this truth, while remaining humble.
    November 22, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12049   open full text
  • Respecting Autonomy Through the Use of Force: the Case of Civil Disobedience.
    Piero Moraro.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 13, 2013
    Acts of civil disobedience, which imply the open violation of a legal directive, often result in the forceful imposition of a choice upon others (e.g. blockades). This is sometimes justifiable, within a democracy, in cases of ‘democratic deficit’, namely, when fundamental rights of an oppressed minority are at stake. In this article, I claim that the use of physical force, in a democracy, may also be justified by the rights of (at least some of) the very people upon whom force is applied. Focusing on the nature of civil disobedience as a ‘form of address’, I argue: (1) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena does not entail infringing upon their status as autonomous agents; (2) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena may contribute to the fulfilment of a positive duty to promote the autonomy of (at least some of) those very people upon whom force is applied. This is not a defence of paternalism: I claim that using force against others, in the democratic arena, may be constitutive of a behaviour that treats others with the respect due to their status as autonomous agents.
    August 13, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12034   open full text
  • ‘Radical Interpretation’ and the Assessment of Decision‐Making Capacity.
    Natalie F. Banner, George Szmukler.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 13, 2013
    The assessment of patients' decision‐making capacity (DMC) has become an important area of clinical practice, and since it provides the gateway for a consideration of non‐consensual treatment, has major ethical implications. Tests of DMC such as under the Mental Capacity Act (2005) for England and Wales aim at supporting autonomy and reducing unwarranted paternalism by being ‘procedural’, focusing on how the person arrived at a treatment decision. In practice, it is difficult, especially in problematic or borderline cases, to avoid a consideration of beliefs and values; that is, of the substantive content of ideas rather than simple ‘cognitive’ or procedural abilities. However, little attention has been paid to how beliefs and values might be assessed in the clinical context and what kind of ‘objectivity’ is possible. We argue that key aspects of Donald Davidson's ideas of ‘Radical Interpretation’ and the ‘Principle of Charity’ provide useful guidance as to how clinicians might approach the question of whether an apparent disturbance in a person's thinking about beliefs or values undermines their DMC. A case example is provided, and a number of implications for clinical practice are discussed.
    August 13, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12035   open full text
  • Pogge on Poverty: Contribution or Exploitation?
    Gerhard Øverland.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 09, 2013
    Thomas Pogge argues that affluent people in the developing world have contribution‐based duties to help protect the poor. And it follows from Pogge's most general thesis that affluent people are contributing to most, if not all, instances of global poverty. In this article I explore two problems with Pogge's general thesis. First, I investigate a typical way in which affluent people would be contributing to global poverty according to Pogge: that affluent countries use their superior bargaining power to get poor countries to accept trading schemes that are unduly favourable to the affluent. I suggest that this type of relation is best understood as exploitation, and that Pogge's general thesis is better understood as a thesis about how affluent people exploit poor people rather than about how they contribute to poverty. Second, I argue that the exploitation does not have the normative content of doing harm. Although exploiting people is often morally wrong, it is not at all clear how demanding exploitation‐based duties are.
    August 09, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12036   open full text
  • Will the Real Tolerant Racist Please Stand Up?
    Magali Bessone.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 07, 2013
    One of the most perplexing paradoxes of toleration concerns the ‘tolerant racist’. According to most current definitions of toleration, a person is considered tolerant if, and only if, 1) he refrains from interfering with something 2) he deeply disapproves of, 3) in spite of having the power to interfere. Hence, a racist who refrains from discriminating against members of races he considers inferior despite having the power to do so, should be considered a tolerant person. Moreover, a person can apparently become more tolerant by increasing the range or degree of his racist disapproval, just as long as he continues not to act against the objectionable object. This paper examines this strongly counterintuitive implication of the standard concept of toleration, by considering in full the meaning and nature of racism(s) and focusing on the power component of toleration. It explores both an exclusive solution and an accommodating solution to the paradox. The first part of the paper shows that none of the standard agent‐oriented views of racism — doxastic, dispositional or volitional — adequately supports either solution. The second part of the paper turns to another, structural account of racism and toleration. It suggests that taking into account an institutional interpretation of toleration as non‐domination and adopting a more socio‐political perspective on racism provides an accommodating solution to the paradox.
    August 07, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12024   open full text
  • Does Religion Deserve Our Respect?
    Colin Bird.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 07, 2013
    This article enumerates several different possible construals of the idea that religion is owed respect. It asks: 1. how religion might be an object of respect; 2. what sorts of respect religion might command; and 3. whose respect might be at stake in complaints about and demands for religious recognition. By distinguishing various ways in which these questions can be interpreted, the discussion aims to introduce some clarity to a notoriously controversial and knotty area of public discussion. Although the article does not propose any particular answer to the question ‘Does religion deserve our respect?’, it does urge that theorists give greater attention to the neglected way in which religions have a ‘public presence’ that engenders distinctive sorts of social respect. I suggest that the popularity among academic political theorists and philosophers of a ‘liberal’ paradigm emphasising the importance of freedom of conscience and ‘respect for persons’ has led them to ignore the implications of ‘public presence’ for debates over the place of religion in modern secular societies.
    August 07, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12023   open full text
  • Against Respecting Each Others' Differences.
    Peter Balint.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 07, 2013
    In contrast to multicultural theory, which in discussions of respect for difference has primarily focussed on the state as the agent of respect, multicultural policy has instead tended to focus on citizens themselves as the potential agents of this sort of respect. This article examines the plausibility of this type of respect (which is advocated by some theorists too), and argues that is not a reasonable or necessary demand. While there are several different ways of understanding respect — most of which focus on respecting persons — none seem capable of doing the work required for it to enable either the adequate or reasonable accommodation of diversity in a liberal society. More specifically, I use Darwall's influential distinction between appraisal and recognition respect — the latter in a broad non‐moralised sense — to make my case. While appraisal respect for difference may be theoretically easy to dismiss, it is not uncommon in multicultural policy. On the other hand, recognition respect — which is more behavioural than attitudinal — may appear a more plausible candidate. Yet it too remains overly demanding for individual citizens, especially, and most importantly, in difficult cases. I conclude that tolerance of difference (coming out of respect for citizenship) is a more appropriate demand on the individual.
    August 07, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12016   open full text
  • A Matter of Respect: On Majority‐Minority Relations in a Liberal Democracy.
    Emanuela Ceva, Federico Zuolo.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 07, 2013
    In this article, we engage critically with the understanding of majority‐minority relations in a liberal democracy as relations of toleration. We make two main claims: first, that appeals to toleration are unable to capture the procedural problems concerning the unequal socio‐political participation of minorities, and, second, that they do not offer any critical tool to establish what judgements the majority is entitled to consider valid reasons for action with respect to some minority. We suggest supplementing the reference to toleration with a specific interpretation of respect for persons; all persons should be treated equally as self‐legislators and as if they were opaque to our judgement as regards their agential abilities, on which their capacity for self‐legislation supervenes. Minorities are disrespected in this sense whenever are treated merely as the addressees of the rules constraining the formulation and pursuit of their life‐plans, rather than as their co‐authors on an equal footing with the majority, and whenever their treatment in politics and society is considered as legitimately influenced by the majority's judgement of their agential abilities, either directly or by indirect inference from the evaluation of the content of their beliefs and practices.
    August 07, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12021   open full text
  • Killing Discarded Embryos and the Nothing‐is‐Lost Principle.
    Katrien Devolder.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. August 01, 2013
    A widely held view holds that it is permissible to conduct destructive research on embryos discarded following fertility treatment, but not on embryos especially created for research. One argument in support of this view appeals to the nothing‐is‐lost principle. It holds that because discarded embryos will die soon in any case, and something good is expected to come out of using them for research, it is presumptively permissible to do so. It is then claimed that no equivalent justification can be adduced in support of destructive research on embryos especially created for research. I argue that, on a standard formulation of the nothing‐is‐lost principle, this argument fails. I consider whether other plausible variants of the principle render the argument sound and argue that they do not.
    August 01, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12033   open full text
  • Corporations and Non‐Agential Moral Responsibility.
    James Dempsey.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. July 23, 2013
    One of the core challenges presented by ascriptions of moral responsibility to corporations is to identify who or what is being held responsible. A significant source of controversy in attempts to answer this challenge is whether or not responsibility can fall on a ‘corporate entity’ distinct from the individuals that make it up. In this article I argue that both sides of this debate have incorrectly assumed that the possession of moral agency is a necessary condition for holding moral responsibility. I go on to argue that it is sufficient for a corporate entity to be a ‘morally significant system’, that is a non‐agential system created by moral agents, and I develop an account of such systems. I conclude by setting out the implications of this analysis for our practices of holding corporations morally responsible.
    July 23, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12029   open full text
  • Ex‐offender Restrictions.
    Zachary Hoskins.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. June 25, 2013
    Individuals convicted of crimes are often subject to numerous restrictions — on housing, employment, the vote, public assistance, and other goods — well after they have completed their sentences, and in some cases permanently. The question of whether — and if so, when — ex‐offender restrictions are morally permissible has received surprisingly little philosophical scrutiny. This article first examines the significance of completing punishment, of paying one's debt to society, and contends that when offenders' debts are paid, they should be restored to full standing as citizens. Thus all ex‐offender restrictions are presumptively unjustified. Nonconsequentialist defences of these restrictions are ultimately unsuccessful in defeating the presumption against them. In a limited range of cases, consequentialist considerations — namely, of risk reduction — may be sufficient to override the presumptive case against these restrictions. The article concludes by suggesting a number of criteria for assessing whether particular restrictive measures are permissible on grounds of risk reduction.
    June 25, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12028   open full text
  • A Multirelational Account of Toleration.
    Maria Paola Ferretti, Sune Lægaard.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 22, 2013
    Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi‐dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect‐based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies.
    May 22, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12018   open full text
  • Sharing Responsibility and Holding Responsible.
    Garrath Williams.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 17, 2013
    Who, in particular, may hold us responsible for our moral failings? Most discussions of moral responsibility bracket this question, despite its obvious practical importance. In this article, I investigate the moral authority involved and how it arises in the context of personal relationships, such as friendship or family relations. My account is based on the idea that parties to a personal relationship not only share responsibility for their relationship, but also — to some degree that is negotiated between them — for one another's lives. In sharing these responsibilities, we grant people a particular authority to respond to us. By highlighting the responsibility that we assume when we hold someone responsible, I also suggest that this analysis contains important lessons for thinking about responsibility in other contexts.
    May 17, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12019   open full text
  • Are Toleration and Respect Compatible?
    Ian Carter.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. May 10, 2013
    Toleration and respect are often thought of as compatible, and indeed complementary, liberal democratic ideals. However, it has sometimes been said that toleration is disrespectful, because it necessarily involves a negative evaluation of the object of toleration. This article shows how toleration and respect are compatible as long as ‘respect’ is taken to mean (what some moral philosophers have called) recognition respect, as opposed to appraisal respect. But it also argues that recognition respect itself rules out certain kinds of evaluation of persons, and with these, certain bases for toleration: if recognition respect is really distinct from appraisal respect, and if the fundamental rights assigned to people on the basis of recognition respect are to be equal rights, then recognition respect must itself involve a refusal to evaluate certain basic agential capacities of persons when deliberating about how to treat them. Even where ‘respect’ means recognition respect, then, there is some truth both in the thesis that toleration and respect are compatible, and in the thesis that they are incompatible. The different truths in these two theses help to shed light on the nature of toleration considered specifically as a liberal democratic virtue. This point can be illustrated by showing how the foregoing analysis provides a plausible solution to the so‐called ‘paradox of the tolerant racist’.
    May 10, 2013   doi: 10.1111/japp.12017   open full text