Objective When do third‐party states engaged in military support of civil war governments resort to conflict management, such as negotiation or mediation, with rebels? Current research underemphasizes the role of third‐party state domestic conditions as precipitating the resort to conflict management. To do so, we formulate two explanations linking third‐party state domestic politics to conflict management with rebels: (1) gambling for resurrection, in which a weak third‐party state leader eschews conflict management in the pursuit of a victory that will rehabilitate his or her political survival; and (2) cutting losses, in which a weak third‐party leader resorts to conflict management to reduce the domestic political costs associated with continued fighting. Method We identify a sample of 32 civil conflicts during the 1960–2004 period in which a third‐party state deploys troops to defend a central government against a rebellion. We code the timing of negotiation and mediation offers between the third‐party and the rebels. We then rely on third‐party state economic conditions as a barometer of the political survival that shapes the third‐party's resort to conflict management. Results A logit analysis supports the cutting losses expectation that third‐party states seek conflict management when political survival at home is at risk. Conclusion The analysis underscores the necessity of incorporating the domestic politics of third‐party states in studies of interventions into civil wars and conflict management attempts therein.