["Social Science Quarterly, EarlyView. ", "\nAbstract\n\nObjective\nI argue that an autocracy’s oil export discourages democracies from employing foreign policies fostering democracy in the autocracy because three characteristics of oil trade—the importance of oil as a primary energy source, the international oil market’s exporter‐favored structure, and the price inelasticity of supply of and demand for petroleum—increase costs of such policies. Thus, an autocracy’s oil export hinders democratization by reducing both domestic and external democratizing pressures.\n\n\nMethods\nTo measure the effect of oil export on direct external democratizing pressures, I gather the dyad‐level oil trade ties using numerous oil trade datasets, and calculate each state’s oil export leverage using closeness centrality in weighted networks. Using this measure, I test the effect of oil export on the likelihood of democratization.\n\n\nResults\nEmpirical results support that as an autocracy’s oil export leverage increases, the autocracy’s\nlikelihood of democratization should decrease.\n\n"]