Objectives The objectives of the study were to establish whether district ideology was reflected in legislator ideal points in the 1996–1999 Duma. Methods I integrate for the first time individual‐level survey data on citizen attitudes to economic reform, the major dimension of political conflict in Russia in the 1990s, with individual legislator voting records from the 1996 to 1999 Duma. Using a Bayesian method, I estimate legislator ideal points as a function of individual and district characteristics and an individually specific random shock to assess the direct effect of district ideology and party membership. Results According to my results, legislators were responsive to district preferences on salient legislation such as final passage votes and key votes. Conclusions The findings have implications for the effects of a mixed electoral system, which was introduced in many young democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The broader conclusion of the study is that the electoral incentives in the single‐member district component of the election can encourage legislative responsiveness even in a “partial” democracy such as Russia.