Organizational scandals have become all too commonplace; from investment firms' financial impropriates to sexual abuse cover-ups, rulebreaking has become a "normal" feature in organizational life. Although there is considerable scholarly work on rulebreaking, efforts to explain it remain theoretically fragmented. Here we identify two fundamental dimensions of bureaucratic rulebreaking and develop a coherent theoretical conception of it as a structurally patterned and interactionally mediated sociological fact. First, rulebreaking may be permitted or contested by those charged with rule enforcement. Manifestations of rulebreaking take on a routine character only where it is unofficially allowed; where it is not, conflict ensues. Second, the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy is mirrored by an organizational hierarchy of rulebreaking. Rulebreaking can be undertaken by individuals acting alone; it can be coordinated by work groups; or it can be organized by top management as a matter of unofficial policy. Considering how these two dimensions of rulebreaking interact provides significant insight into how such action varies with respect to the full range of organizational cross-pressures. Finally, the framework we develop offers an important corrective to the over-reliance on the formal aspects of Weber's theorizing and has considerable utility for generating hypotheses across an array of institutional arenas.