This paper investigates the relationship between the number of managers who exit advertising agencies and advertisers and the dissolution of dyadic market ties. We investigate how the locus of managerial exit (advertiser vs. agency) and the hierarchical level from which exit occurs (executives vs. exchange managers) influence the likelihood that market ties dissolve. We theorize that the amount of managerial exit from organizational roles disrupts dyadic market ties through its effect on three mechanisms of social capital: investments in relationship-specific assets, formal control over market ties, and the intensity of interaction with exchange partners. We further consider how the fragility of market ties, poor financial performance of advertisers and short duration of market ties, conditions the effects of managerial exit on the likelihood of market tie dissolution. In short, we theorize about which managerial roles matter more to the dissolution of market ties, why they matter, and when they matter. We test our predictions using longitudinal data on 232 dyadic market ties between advertisers and New York City advertising agencies. Our results indicate that number of executives and exchange managers who exit on both sides of market ties affects tie dissolution, but that these effects are neither symmetrical between advertisers and advertising agencies nor uniform across the hierarchical levels from which exit occurs, and vary with the strength of market ties. We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of market ties.