The upper echelons of publicly traded family firms may consist of family members and non-family members. Due to ownership and control, family members may wield significant influence in the upper echelons. If non-family members lack sources of influence, they could exhibit lower participation. Limited participation by non-family members lowers access to and integration of knowledge from non-family members, thus, lowering the ability to devise strategic actions that increase performance. Drawing on the structural basis of power, greater equality in structural power (or, compensation, status, and representation) across family and non-family TMT members increases performance in family firms. This relationship is stronger under increasing environmental dynamism and higher governance performance but weaker under the presence of a founder CEO. Using a sample of 231 publicly traded family firms representing 1,934 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010 and controlling for endogeneity, we find support for the proposed relationships.