Firms are increasingly emphasizing lobbying, yet the theoretical rationale explaining the firm-level implications of lobbying remains limited and the empirical evidence contradictory. In particular, extant research largely focuses on aggregate expenditures, suggesting that more lobbying nets firm benefits (typically measured as firm performance). We argue that focusing solely on aggregate expenditures largely ignores how expenditures are targeted and the connections of firms doing the targeting and, as such, that exploring such factors both will add to our understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying lobbying and help clarify contradictory results. Specifically, we argue that a lobbying strategy consists of the amount of agencies and legislation targeted (lobbying breadth) and firms' connections in political circles (political connectedness). Empirical results support our contentions that lobbying breadth and political connectedness affect the benefits firms receive from lobbying, which we operationalize using both government contracts and Tobin's Q. Our results support our theoretical arguments that more is not always better in the case of lobbying breadth, as the benefits firms accrue via dispersing lobbying across more entities reaches a point of diminishing returns. Further, political connectedness has both a direct effect and interacts with lobbying breadth in determining firm benefits from lobbying.