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Managerial Ability Research: Mapping the Intellectual Structure and Journal Influence

Corporate Governance

Published online on

Abstract

["Corporate Governance: An International Review, EarlyView. ", "\nABSTRACT\n\nResearch Question/Issue\nThe study examines how the rapidly expanding literature on managerial ability is intellectually structured and how governance mechanisms shape the value‐creating versus discretionary effects of managerial ability. Despite extensive empirical work, managerial ability remains conceptually fragmented across efficiency, discretion, and agency‐based perspectives, limiting cumulative theory development in corporate governance research.\n\n\nResearch Findings/Insights\nUsing a comprehensive bibliometric analysis of Web of Science–indexed studies, we identify five dominant research clusters: foundations and measurement, corporate policies, risk and tail outcomes, governance and information environments, and strategic actions, innovation, and stakeholder orientation. The results show that governance‐related research occupies a central bridging position in the literature, connecting performance‐ and risk‐oriented streams. Collectively, the evidence reveals that managerial ability is associated with superior outcomes under strong monitoring and transparency, but with elevated discretion, risk, and opportunism under weak governance conditions.\n\n\nTheoretical/Academic Implications\nThis study advances corporate governance theory by reconceptualizing managerial ability as a contingent, governance‐sensitive resource rather than an unconditionally value‐enhancing attribute. By integrating fragmented streams, the findings reconcile conflicting empirical results and highlight governance and information environments as critical boundary conditions. The study also demonstrates how bibliometric methods can inform theory building by uncovering latent structures and tensions within complex governance literatures.\n\n\nPractitioner/Policy Implications\nFor boards, investors, and regulators, the findings suggest that hiring or retaining high‐ability managers is insufficient without complementary governance mechanisms. Effective monitoring, incentive alignment, and disclosure regimes are essential to channel managerial ability toward long‐term value creation and to mitigate downside risk. Policymakers should therefore consider governance quality and institutional context when evaluating the broader economic and social consequences of managerial talent.\n\n"]