["The Manchester School, EarlyView. ", "\nABSTRACT\nPlatform participants often join multiple competing platforms, a phenomenon known as multihoming. At the same time, many platforms invest in value‐added services (VAS) to enhance their value and strengthen their competitiveness. We propose a two‐sided (users and creators) platform competition model in which the user side has two segments (one values VAS and the other network effects), and we consider four different partial multihoming scenarios, endogenous platform VAS, and endogenous third‐party provisioned VAS (e.g., a third‐party payment, or delivery system for a marketplace). Our model setup complements the existing platform economics literature on multihoming and yields four main results. First, any increase in the proportion of users who value VAS can impact platform prices in either direction, depending on which side multihomes. Second, VAS asymmetries can strengthen feedback loops and strategic interdependence between the sides, as they act as bait to attract users who, in turn, attract other participants. Third, platforms have less incentive to invest in VAS on the multihoming side, as they prefer to weaken the aforementioned feedback loops. Fourth, third‐party‐provisioned VAS generates a new type of feedback loop that makes demands more elastic; that is a platform business‐model vulnerability that must be managed carefully. Overall, our study captures how network effects, VAS, user‐side heterogeneity, and third‐party services interact to shape platform pricing and investment strategies, as well as competition outcomes.\n"]