["Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 266-279, Summer 2026. ", "\nABSTRACT\nWe compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger. This result holds under symmetric and asymmetric costs. Considering a unilateral CO under Cournot competition, we show that the participating firms may prefer CO compared to a merger under asymmetric CO. We further show under Cournot competition that a symmetric CO may create higher consumer surplus and welfare compared to both merger and noncooperation in the presence of cost asymmetry and technology transfer between the firms engaging in CO or merger. If there is Bertrand competition, we show that the merger participants will not be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.\n"]