The number of salient female executive leaders has dramatically increased over the last two decades. In many countries, executive politics is no longer an exclusive male domain. Using data from the four waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems surveys and from several waves of the AmericasBarometer surveys, I investigate whether the presence of salient female executive candidates in high-profile national elections influences women’s political engagement in the electoral process. The analysis reveals that the presence of viable female candidates has no immediate impact on women’s political engagement at the mass level.
Normative reflection on the ethics of migration has tended to remain at the level of abstract principle with limited attention to the practice of immigration administration and enforcement. This paper explores the implications of this practice for an ethics of immigration with particular attention to the problem of bureaucratic domination. I contend that migration administration and enforcement cannot overcome bureaucratic domination because of the inherent vulnerability of migrant populations and the transnational enforcement of border controls by multiple public and private actors. The implication is that even if restrictive immigration policies are permissible in principle, the attempt to enforce them leads to injustices that make them ethically unacceptable in practice.
Immigration enforcement and policy making has increasingly devolved to the local level in the United States. American sheriffs present a unique opportunity to evaluate decisions made about immigration policies in the local context. In dealing with immigration concerns in their counties, sheriffs act both within the confines of federal and state mandates and as local policymakers. However, little research comprehensively assesses the role sheriffs play in immigration policy making. Using data from an original, national survey of more than five hundred elected sheriffs in the United States, we provide a broad account of sheriffs’ roles in immigration enforcement and policy making. Our research demonstrates that sheriffs’ ideology and personal characteristics shape their personal attitudes about immigrants. In turn, these attitudes play a key role in influencing local enforcement decisions. Sheriffs’ immigration attitudes relate strongest to checks of the immigration status of witnesses and victims and those stopped for traffic violations or arrested for non-violent crimes. Our results demonstrate the important role of the sheriff in understanding local variation in immigration policy and the connection between the personal preferences of representatives and policy making that can emerge across policy environments and levels of government.
Is sisterhood global? This study investigates if women in Congress are representing women worldwide by extending their surrogate representation of American women to women in foreign countries. Congressional research shows that race affects surrogate representation across borders via transnationalism. I test whether this also applies to gender when no shared "mother country" unites women, there are divisions over how to represent women, and American foreign policy is considered a stereotypically masculine policy domain. With an original dataset of three Congresses (2005–2010), I test if female House Representatives are more likely to introduce foreign policy legislation that targets foreign women and girls by applying regression analysis. Controlling for likely individual, electoral, and institutional incentives, I find that gender matters and that women in Congress are more likely to introduce legislation on behalf of women worldwide, acting as global surrogates. These findings offer new insights into the boundaries of surrogate representation, congressional foreign policy decision making, the influence of gender on international relations, and the impact of women in Congress.
Research on the gender gap in American politics has focused on average differences between male and female voters. This has led to an underdeveloped understanding of sources of heterogeneity among women and, in particular, a poor understanding of the political preferences of Republican women. We argue that although theories of ideological sorting suggest gender gaps should exist primarily between political parties, gender socialization theories contend that critical differences lie at the intersection of gender and party such that gender differences likely persist within political parties. Using survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study, we evaluate how party and gender intersect to shape policy attitudes. We find that gender differences in policy attitudes are more pronounced in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party, with Republican women reporting significantly more moderate views than their male counterparts. Mediation analysis reveals that the gender gaps within the Republican Party are largely attributable to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and attitudes toward gender-based inequality. These results afford new insight into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and raise important questions about the quality of representation Republican women receive from their own party.
This paper explores the role of threats from below in the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Mass uprisings for democratic regime change undermine closed authoritarian regimes by making it difficult for autocrats to maintain their regimes through repression and co-optation. Anti-regime uprisings also promote the establishment of electoral authoritarianism by toppling the existing closed regime or by compelling autocrats to offer political reform as a survival strategy. Looking at closed authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 2006, my analysis reveals that anti-regime mass uprisings are significantly associated with transitions to electoral authoritarianism. I also find that nonviolent uprisings are more likely than violent uprisings to result in the establishment of electoral authoritarianism and that the effect of anti-regime uprisings on transitions to electoral authoritarianism is greater when a country is surrounded by more democracies or is ethnically or religiously homogeneous.
Much of the literature on partisan agenda setting in Congress focuses on the majority’s ability to exercise negative agenda control. As a result, the empirical emphasis has been on "rolls," or how often the majority of the majority party opposes legislation that nonetheless passes. Although interesting, rolls are only one source of majority party failure. The other source, largely unexplored in the literature, is when the majority of the majority party supports legislation that is subsequently defeated. These cases represent "disappointments," and are a means to determine how effective the majority party is at exercising positive agenda control. Making some basic modifications to a standard spatial model of agenda setting, we articulate why and where we might expect the majority party to fail to exercise positive agenda control effectively. We then derive hypotheses regarding (1) which members should vote "no" on roll calls that result in a disappointment and (2) why disappointments vary on a Congress-by-Congress basis across time, and test them using a dataset of final-passage votes on House bills in the post-Reconstruction era.
The Madisonian formulation suggests that (religious) pluralism is linked to moderate representation when filtered through republican selection. We leverage the quasi-experiment afforded by the ratification of the 17th Amendment to explore whether religious diversity shapes how senators vote. The shift from indirect to direct elections, coupled with roll-call and religious Census data, allows us to test hypotheses derived from differing conceptions of pluralism and the literature on constituency effects in Congress. We find that religious diversity is linked to ideological moderation, but that link weakens considerably in the immediate aftermath of the amendment’s passage.
Racial stereotyping has been found to handicap African American and Latino candidates in negative ways. It is less clear how racial stereotypes may change the fortunes of Asian candidates. This paper explores the candidacies of Asian Americans with an experiment run through Amazon Mechanical Turk as well as real-world evaluations of Asian American candidates using the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study. In my experiments, I find that Asian candidates do significantly better than white candidates across different biographical scenarios (conservative, liberal, and foreign). I find that, contrary to expectations, Asian candidates are not significantly disadvantaged from being immigrant and foreign born. My experimental results mirror my observational results, which show that Asian Democrats are significantly advantaged even when compared with whites. These results indicate that Asian candidates in America face a set of racial-political stereotypes that are unique to their racial subgroup.
States have increasingly taken the process of redistricting out of the hands of elected legislators and placed it with the public. The shift is in part driven by a concern that legislators are motivated to partition districts to advantage their own and their political party’s electoral prospects, whereas citizens are not. We know little, however, about the preferences of the public when it comes to redistricting. One party-based argument is that individuals should prefer to share a district with as many like-minded partisans as possible to maximize their legislative representation, whereas other arguments suggest that nonpartisan factors, such as sharing a district with their community, may be more important. Using a novel experimental design, we find that for most participants, the draw to share a district with copartisans is stronger than a preference for preserving a community (county) within the district even when participants are specifically instructed to attend to local jurisdictional boundaries.
The spread of Internet and mobile phone access around the world has implications for both the processes of contentious politics and subsequent reporting of protest, terrorism, and war. In this paper, we explore whether political violent events that occur close to modern communication networks are systematically better reported than others. Our analysis approximates information availability by the level of detail provided about the date of each political violent event in Africa from 2008 to 2010 and finds that although access to communication technology improves reporting, the size of the effect is very small. Additional investigation finds that the effect can be attributed to the ability of journalists to access more diverse primary sources in remote areas due to increased local access to modern communication technology.
Drawing on the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, we develop and explore a new theory of international conflict. We outline a simple mechanism whereby industrialization fosters peace, suggesting that industrialized states are more peaceful because they can gain more by investing at home than by pursuing foreign military conquest. We borrow from Schumpeter to argue that our mechanism is distinct from traditional measures of liberalism. Empirically, we propose a measure of industrial development, based on a state’s economic structure. Using World Bank sector-specific economic data, our exploratory analysis shows that a more industrialized economy significantly reduces the likelihood that a state will be involved in a fatal military conflict. We show that this result is robust across a number of model specifications and independent of both democracy and capitalism. We propose this as an interesting first step toward a broader research program on modernization and conflict.
While democratic theory suggests that representatives should be willing to adjust their issue positions to adapt to new circumstances, politicians face serious political risks from "flip flopping." How do members of Congress balance these risks? Using an original data set of district economic conditions and opinion from 2007 to 2010 and sets of repeated roll call votes, I leverage the exogenous shock of the Great Recession to explain position change on three major economic policies. I find that position change occurs in response to the constituency on final passage votes, but that partisan pressures exert greater influence, especially on procedural votes. This novel test of responsiveness has implications for the nature of policy representation and the mechanisms behind aggregate responsiveness.
Gender differences in who gets recruited by political party elites contribute to women’s underrepresentation on the ballot, but recent evidence suggests that even when women are recruited to the same extent as men, they are still less likely to be interested in seeking office. Why do men and women respond differently to invitations to seek office? We hypothesize that women view party recruitment as a weaker signal of informal support than men do. We use a survey experiment on a sample of 3,640 elected municipal officeholders—themselves prospective recruits for higher office—to test this. We find that female respondents generally believe party leaders will provide female recruits less strategic and financial support than male recruits. In other words, even when elites recruit women, women are skeptical that party leaders will use their political and social capital on their behalf. This difference may account for many women’s lukewarm responses to recruitment.
The presence of women justices in the highest constitutional courts varies significantly across countries, yet there is little existing research that engages this substantial cross-national variation. Using an original data set of women’s representation in the constitutional courts in fifty democracies combined with qualitative case studies, we assess the effect of the selection mechanism on this variation and find that the existence of a "sheltered" versus "exposed" selection mechanism is a critical determinant of women’s presence. That is, when the selectors are sheltered from electoral accountability, they are less likely to select women as judges because they do not benefit from credit claiming. When the selectors are exposed and can claim credit, however, the unique traits and visibility of the highest court generate an incentive to appoint women.
Local governments prioritize spending on various types and levels of public services. Although scholars have shown that citizen preferences and institutional factors, such as economic, political, and legal arrangements, play a role in resource allocation, scholars have not systematically examined the impact of local elected officials’ own ideological preferences on service prioritization. A better understanding of the impact of personal ideology on local government resource allocation is needed as this provision of funds has implications for democratic governance and responsiveness. We develop and use a novel measure of local elected official ideology using a 2011 survey of California local elected officials to test the hypothesis that local decision-maker ideology affects attitudes on funding-specific service categories. We find evidence that local elected officials’ attitudes toward service reductions are associated with both their own individual ideology, measured on the conservative–liberal spectrum, and the ideology of their constituents.
This paper aims to deliver experimental evidence on the dispute between two behavioral models of electoral turnout. Both models share the idea that the subjects’ voting propensities are updated from their past propensities, aspirations, and realized payoffs. However, they differ in the exact specification of the feedback mechanism. The first model has a strong feedback mechanism toward 50 percent, while the other has only moderate feedback. This difference leads to two distinct distributions of voter types: the first model generates more casual voters who vote and abstain from time to time. The latter generates more habitual voting behavior. Thus far, the latter model seemed to be better supported empirically because survey data reveal more habitual voters and abstainers than casual voters. Given that the two models differ in their propensity updating mechanism in dynamic processes, a more direct test of their assumptions as well as implications with survey data is still pending. We designed a laboratory experiment in which subjects repeatedly make turnout and voting decisions. The result from experimental data is mixed, but more supportive of the second model with habitual voters and abstainers.
This study offers a contextual explanation for discrepancies in women’s rates of election between European national legislatures and the European Parliament (EP). Many European Union (EU) member states elect more women to the EP than to their national lower legislative houses. However, the margin of difference between women’s presence in the EP and these national legislatures varies widely across member states. Using data for the EU-27, the study corroborates previous research in showing that institutional accounts offer limited leverage in explaining these varying gaps. Instead, it argues that the discrepancy between women’s descriptive representation at national and European levels in each case is the result of contextual factors: voters, parties, and upwardly mobile politicians’ valuation of the EP and EP service moderates the translation of the national pool of potential female candidates into EP officeholders.
Scholars have long sought to resolve whether and to what degree political actor diversity influences the outputs of political institutions like legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts. When it comes to the judiciary, diverse judges may greatly affect outcomes. Despite this potential, no consensus exists for whether judicial diversity affects behavior in trial courts—that is, the stage where the vast majority of litigants interact with the judicial branch. After addressing the research design limitations in previous trial court-diversity studies, the results here indicate that a trial judge’s sex and race have very large effects on his or her decision making. These results have important implications for how we view diversity throughout the judiciary and are particularly timely given the Obama Administration’s over 200 female and minority appointments to the federal trial courts.
Under what conditions do citizens of developing countries view judges as neutral and fair or biased and arbitrary? This study addresses this topic through an original, nationally representative survey from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Conducted in Morocco, the survey is the first of its kind to gauge attitudes about how a citizen’s informal influence facilities getting favorable rulings from judges. It finds that 82 percent of respondents believe that citizens with "connections"—known as wasta in Arabic—get favorable rulings. Yet some citizens more strongly value informal influence, especially rural individuals, women, and ethnic minorities. The survey shows that believing in informal influence considerably lowers citizen trust in the authoritarian regime’s courts and institutions, which some scholars consider an asset for democratization. However, because the citizens most likely to value informal influence are marginalized or embedded in regime clientelism, their low trust may not easily translate into strong advocacy for democracy. Meanwhile, the citizens most able to advocate for democratization—the Francophone petite bourgeoisie—disproportionately deny the importance of informal influence in regime institutions.
This article examines the impact of cognitive ability on ideological voting. We find, using a U.S. sample and a Danish sample, that the effect of cognitive ability rivals the effect of the traditionally strongest predictor of ideological voting, political sophistication. Furthermore, the results are consistent with the effect of cognitive ability being partly mediated by political sophistication. Much of the effect of cognitive ability remains, however, and is not explained by differences in education or openness to experience either. The implications of these results for democratic theory are discussed.
Invalid votes are often considered as simple failure to cast a valid vote. In fact, they might be a rational expression of discontent with party policy offerings. By employing individual and party system-level data on eighteen European party systems, this article focuses on voter discontent and voter apathy as two major determinants of casting an invalid vote and seeks to answer why some voters intentionally waste their votes despite paying the costs of voting. I find that higher distinct policy offerings decrease the probability of casting an invalid vote. However, voting behaviors of politically sophisticated and unsophisticated voters vary conditionally on the diversity of policy offerings and the cost of information. On one hand, when a party system offers a larger set of policy offerings, politically sophisticated voters become less likely to cast an invalid vote and more likely to support niche parties. On the other hand, sophisticated voters cannot deal with increasing cost of information, and are more likely to cast an invalid vote, especially in party systems with compulsory voting where the cost of nonvoting is higher.
Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman’s party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a "least likely" context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.
Conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship is the "unmoved mover" in the minds of American voters. Revisionist theories hold that party updating is conditional on individual/contextual factors. By delimiting the scope conditions of the Michigan model, revisionist models do not fundamentally challenge the classic view. This paper proffers an unconditional model of party revision. We theorize that beliefs about government activism—operational ideology—are widely available and heuristically efficacious, and easily map onto party labels. Hence, operational ideology should drive party updating. Using data from seven panel studies covering 1990–2012, we demonstrate that (1) party shapes operational ideology, (2) operational ideology shapes party, (3) the ideology-to-party effects are as large as the party-to-ideology effects, and (4) neither sophistication nor education or elite polarization condition these relationships. These results push the revisionist model of party farther than it has gone before and suggest that operational ideology is a core predisposition in mass belief systems.
Drawing on empirical evidence from online citizen feedback on the 2012 Egyptian Constitution, we demonstrate that despite normative skepticism about implications of participatory constitution making, citizen participation matters. Using data of more than 650,000 online votes and comments on the constitution, we find that draft provisions with higher public approval are less likely to change and those with lower approval are more likely to change. We also find that Articles related to rights and freedoms are more likely to change based on online public input. Finally, following the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by non-Islamists, changes in draft Articles based on public feedback drop sharply. These findings highlight the conditions under which participatory constitution making becomes more effective. First, consensus among citizens over the most salient issues increases the probability that those issues would be successfully incorporated in the constitution. Second, without ex ante elite agreement over the design of the constitution, it becomes difficult to account for citizen proposals amid political clash between elites.
Presidents often see a Supreme Court nomination as an opportunity to leave a lasting mark on policy. Recent studies speculate that focusing on Supreme Court nominees affects presidential success beyond the confirmation process, but this has not been established systematically. We develop and test a hypothesis stating that presidents who get into a battle to promote a controversial Supreme Court nominee will see delays and failures in their efforts to promote their legislative agenda in the Senate and fill lower level judicial vacancies. We test our theory using data on presidential policy agenda items from 1967 to 2010 and lower level judicial nominations from 1977 to 2010. We find that increased efforts in promoting confirmation reduce the likelihood of timely Senate approval of important policy proposals and nominees to federal district courts.
Do foreign private investments (originated through public-private partnerships) improve the Water and Sanitation Sector in developing countries? I synthesize market sympathetic and skeptical arguments by noting that their relative salience depends on the level of corruption in a country. Specifically, I argue that private investments can effectively provide water and sanitation through public-private partnerships if they are adequately governed by the state. When corruption is high, however, private actors will pursue profit maximization over public needs, which leads them to provide water but not adequate sanitation. I test these arguments using a cross-sectional time series of fifty-six non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1991 through 2012.
Along with inequality in wealth, politics is increasingly divided between a very small percentage who can afford access and the vast majority who are effectively marginalized. In 2014, billionaire Tom Perkins essentially proposed eliminating that last trace of fairness by arguing that one ought to be able to purchase as many votes as he or she could afford. Ostensibly, one million dollars would buy one million votes. Given the current state of inequality, we concur that "one person, one vote" is no longer sensible. However, following from the political philosophy of Pierre Proudhon, we take the position that "property is theft." Accordingly, the possession of wealth, far from being a source of increased rights, is exactly what disqualifies an individual from supernumerary votes. Instead, drawing upon Proudhon’s views, and those of other nineteenth-century anarchists, we argue that the poorest in society, those who have the least property and have therefore committed the least theft, ought to have a surplus of votes. Using anarchism as a framework for critique within the parameters of existing politics, we will argue that as wealth declines, individuals ought to be bestowed with additional votes as compensation.
Drawing from the literature on deliberative conditions, we analyze thirty years of verbatim transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The transcripts provide a rare opportunity for the systematic empirical analysis of deliberative conditions. The importance of the FOMC, and its recent policy failures, makes the case particularly interesting. Deliberative scholars argue that deliberation should occur in a setting where participants are free and equal. Using a unique set of deliberative measures, our model shows that FOMC members do enjoy deliberative freedom. In contrast, we find inequalities in rates of participation. Some deviation from equality may be reasonable. However, we demonstrate a sustained pattern of gender inequality in participation that could in turn influence the FOMC’s policy choices and which is difficult to justify on any grounds.
Scholars who examine judicial independence offer various theories regarding its development. Some argue that it serves as a type of insurance for regimes who believe their majority status is in jeopardy. Other scholars argue that insurance theory does not offer an adequate explanation until states democratize. We argue that part of the explanation for these mixed results involves the inadequacy of insurance theory as a complete explanation. Our paper develops a multidimensional theory that focuses on the interplay of constraints on ruling elites derived from levels of political competition within the government, the potential for social competition within the state, and regime type. We test our argument using a dataset of approximately 145 countries over forty years, and our results support the argument that development of judicial independence is related to the political landscape encountered by the executive. Ethnic fractionalization in the state, political competition, and regime type each has a conditional effect on the observation of judicial independence.
Many developing countries have recently increased the number of their sub-national administrative units. Existing literature explains this phenomenon by suggesting that because new units serve as patronage to an area, they can help a leader meet local demand for state resources or divide opposition elites. These explanations, however, overlook the costs of new administrative units to a leader facing competitive reelection, in part, because they rely largely on evidence from non-competitive electoral systems. I posit that leaders facing competitive reelection create new units selectively, limiting the supply to electorally valuable areas where residents of the split unit can best be swayed to vote for the leader in the upcoming election. I find evidence of these claims using a unique dataset of administrative district creation alongside archival evidence from Kenya during the country’s first decade after the return to multi-party elections. This article illuminates the political factors driving decentralization across developing countries that have transitioned to holding multi-party elections.
This article examines how Western foreign policy opinion reacts to the perceived Islamic character of foreign actors. Studies show that the target actor’s dominant religion is a key ingredient in foreign policy opinion: Western audiences react more hostilely to "Muslim" than "Christian" targets. Yet, actors differ not only in which world religion they belong to but also how that religion is politicized by themselves and by others. We argue that Islam can be politicized in three major ways—via Islamic rhetoric, policies, and labels—that shape foreign policy attitudes. To examine our claims, we field a survey experiment in which we attach common Islamic rhetoric ("Allahu Akbar"), policies ("Shari’a law"), and/or labels ("Islamist") to a foreign actor in the context of the Syrian civil conflict. We find that these cues strongly harm attitudes toward the actor, and the results vary widely by type. Indeed, the Shari’a policy cue does the most damage to attitudes, emotions, and preferences toward the actor. Moreover, the Islamic cues reinforce each other in fueling these fearful reactions and are particularly potent on conservative citizens. These results paint a richer picture of how out-group religious cues influence foreign policy attitudes.
This article examines when partisan media effects occur during presidential campaigns. I argue that partisan media are most likely to influence candidate impressions early in the election cycle, when voters have less crystallized impressions of the candidates and are less motivated to defend their party’s nominee. Using multiple methods and two large-scale surveys spanning 2008, I show that Fox News affected favorability toward Barack Obama during the first five months of the election year, but those effects largely disappeared over the last five months. The results varied by political knowledge, however, as Fox News affected low-knowledge viewers throughout the entire year, but only affected high-knowledge viewers early in the election cycle. These results provide important new evidence on how partisan media affect viewers and when those effects occur during a presidential election.
This essay critically engages ontological, rhetorical, ethical, and political themes pertinent to the concept of "sympathy" as it appears in the poetry and prose of Walt Whitman and Jane Bennett’s writing on him. I suggest that antagonism is immanent in the "ecology of sympathies" that Bennett theorizes, and that this partly explains why one frequently finds antagonistic articulations deeply intertwined with Whitman’s most sympathetic expressions. I propose that we use the paradoxical—even oxymoronic sounding—trope antagonistic sympathy to evoke this immanent relationship between affiliative and antagonistic flows, energies, and conditions for ethical and political cultivation. The concept of antagonistic sympathy helps us better understand Whitman, the ethical and political qualities, pulls, and implications of sympathy, and it enables us to theorize entanglements of sympathy and antagonism in ways that avoid the worst tendencies of each when isolated from the other. Antagonistic sympathy, I argue, is indispensable for radical democratic and ecological transformation in a time of rapidly intensifying planetary ecological catastrophe.
Political science struggles, sometimes more than it knows, to study religion’s relationship with politics, democratic and otherwise. The difficulty is in part theoretical. This paper synthesizes diverse strains in recent scholarship on religion to propose a theoretically attuned definition well suited for empirical political science. Religions are defined as systems of shared activity organized around transcendental signifiers. Transcendental signifiers are readily identifiable in public discourse and are "god terms" that organize (or rest at the center of organized) systems of shared activity. This parsimonious definition admits both belief-oriented and practice-oriented phenomena and allows political scientists to study religion as it shapes political acts, interventions, and possibilities. For illustrative purposes, the paper examines a key speech delivered by Sukarno at Indonesia’s founding moment, in which naturalistically observable transcendental signifiers mark the mobilization of religion. Revising older histories that discover a contest between "secular" and "religious" actors, or that are keen to determine the sincerity of Sukarno’s own belief, we contend that Indonesia’s founding is best understood in terms of competing religious discourses that merge in the development of a new civil religion.
What do citizens want from their members of Congress? Do they expect them to be constituent servants? Do they expect them to work on local problems? Or do they expect them to represent them on the national issues of the day? While citizens expect members of Congress to perform all of these roles, we argue that, in the contemporary political environment, citizens especially value members who represent them on the salient national issues of the day. We also argue that such behavior will be especially pronounced among those who are the most educated and partisan. We show, using several recent nationally representative surveys, that citizens prioritize this sort of issue representation, and that such evaluations shape member approval and vote choice. We conclude by discussing the implications of this pattern for related trends such as elite polarization and the nationalization of elections.
Scholars overlook that Locke has two distinct concepts of equality entrenched in his political theory. By recovering the centrality of natural law in Locke, these two concepts of equality can be easily identified. The first I call "natural equality," which includes every human being regardless of rational capacity, each possessing rights to life, liberty, and property. The second is "law-abiding equality," which includes the subset of people who adequately recognize the dictates of natural law. This distinction is significant because it helps overcome the conflict in liberalism between universal dignity and the necessarily exclusionary character of citizenship.
Although we have a broad understanding of the factors that predict traditional forms of political participation, we know comparatively less about the determinants of online political participation. Among the limited research that explores the predictors of online political participation, news seeking is often found to be an important factor; however, many studies fail to consider selective exposure and the distinct influence of differing types of information. In this study, I ask, "What factors predict online participation, and what role does selective exposure play in this relationship?" Using a nationally representative sample (N = 2,250) and a selection model to correct for biased estimates of online political participation, I find that online political participation is not well predicted by the same resource-related determinants that influence traditional participation; specifically, income and age are unrelated to online political participation among Internet users. Second, I find that exposure to political information that reinforces one’s point of view predicts higher levels of online political participation when compared with differing information or information with no point of view. Finally, I conduct a subset analysis of partisan identifiers to examine differences in these relationships among Republicans and Democrats.
In the vast majority of American states, governors have unrestricted authority to fill Senate vacancies, and in an average decade, one-third of all Americans have been represented by an appointed senator. Despite the importance of Senate appointments both theoretically and substantively, no published study has investigated the dynamics of gubernatorial selection. In this paper, we compile an original data set of Senate appointees as well as the list of the candidates the governor considered but did not select. We model the governor’s selection and discover that despite having no formal constraints on their appointment power, governors behave as constrained actors. In particular, we find that governors eschew the potential appointees who are closest to their policy views and instead appoint the candidate who is closest to the ideological position of the voters in their state. This effect is particularly pronounced when the governor is eligible for reelection within two years. These findings have both theoretical and normative implications for understanding Senate appointments, gubernatorial decision making, and the implicit power of the electorate.
Although public support for political authorities, institutions, and even regimes is affected by the delivery of positive economic outcomes, we know that judgments on authorities are also made on the basis of several other aspects that fall into the general theme of "procedural fairness." So far, most of the literature examining satisfaction with democracy has, from this point of view, focused on the direct effects of both economic and procedural fairness indicators or evaluations. This study takes as its starting point a large number of studies in social psychology showing that procedural fairness moderates the effects of outcome favorability in the explanation of citizens’ reactions to authorities. It expands those findings to the macro-political level, using representative samples of European populations in twenty-nine countries. It reveals that the general depiction of satisfaction with the way democracies work in practice as a fundamentally "performance-driven attitude" needs to qualified: economic evaluations matter, but they do not matter in the same way in all contexts and for all people, with procedural fairness playing a relevant moderating role in this respect.
What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer this question by examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership internally encounter during a peace process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that willingness to end fighting does not always translate into the ability to make concessions. Although battlefield-related indicators may increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I introduce original data on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005. Findings using two-stage censored probit models demonstrate that war-weariness increases willingness for negotiations whereas internal consensus creates opportunity for settlement.
In recent years, the electorate has sorted along ideological lines. Republican identifiers have grown more likely to self-identify as conservatives. Democrats, however, have been slow to embrace the liberal label. And while many Americans are operationally liberal and express support for liberal policy positions, in symbolic terms, the American electorate is much more conservative in nature and appears reluctant to hew to the liberal label. The uneven nature of partisan sorting and the observed symbolic/operational divide have both been linked to Republican efforts at making "liberal" a dirty word, but researchers have yet to offer a direct test of the effects of exposure to anti-liberal rhetoric. In this study, I rectify this shortcoming using the 2004 University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW)/Brigham Young University (BYU) panel study coupled with data on the content of candidates’ campaign advertising from the Wisconsin Advertising Project. I find that exposure to anti-liberal campaign messages had a direct effect on evaluations of Democratic candidates, vote intention, and vote choice, but only in senate races. At the same time, self-identified ideology was unmoved by elite efforts at disparaging the liberal label—thereby calling into question simple versions of a common explanation for the existence of conservative Democrats and "conflicted" conservatives.
Welfare spending has grown considerably and is currently a core component of government expenditure in most advanced countries. Although a good deal of scholarship assumes that benefiting from welfare spending increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent parties, the impact of general welfare spending on incumbent parties’ electoral success has received scant attention. Moreover, we do not have much evidence regarding the conditions under which citizens reward incumbent parties for their generous welfare spending. This article expects that an increase in welfare spending has a positive effect on incumbent vote, but this effect is conditional on the ideology of government and levels of taxation. By examining 197 lower chamber elections in thirty-one OECD countries from approximately 1980 to 2013, this article finds that incumbent parties gain benefits for expansionary welfare spending. However, as the ideology of government moves closer to the right and as levels of taxation increase, the effects of welfare spending on incumbent parties’ vote share become weaker. The conditional effects of government ideology and levels of taxation on welfare voting suggest that right-wing governments can be relatively free from their welfare performance and that high levels of taxation reduce the electoral benefits of generous welfare spending.
Americans expect the president to lead Congress, but Congress’s partisan divide typically widens on presidential priorities. More often, presidents are reduced to leading their copartisans rather than Congress as a whole, but why? In this paper, I argue that competition for White House control creates incentives for parties to disagree on presidents’ policy agendas, regardless of the contents of those agendas. I use an original data set of members’ roll-call vote decisions on presidents’ agendas between 1971 and 2010 to show that partisan polarization is larger on presidents’ priorities and largest on their top priorities, above and beyond what we would expect from members’ ideologies and standard party effects. These findings persist over time and under a wide range of alternative model specifications, bringing us closer to understanding the partisan conflict so prevalent in today’s politics.
This paper analyzes the effects of biases in economic information on partisans’ economic perceptions. In survey experiments, I manipulate the presence of partisan cues and the direction of proattitudinal information in news stories about the American economy. Results demonstrate that although proattitudinal tone in factual economic news stories most strongly affects partisans’ economic perceptions, inclusion of partisan cues alongside proattitudinal information results in weaker shifts in economic sentiment relative to stories lacking partisan content. These findings suggest that the relatively subtle process of agenda setting in economic news may be the most effective tool used by partisan news outlets to drive polarization in citizens’ factual economic perceptions.
In many parts of the world, people live in "dual polities": they are governed by the state and organize collective decision making within their ethnic community according to traditional rules. We examine the substantial body of works on the traditional–state dualism, focusing on the internal organization of traditional polities, their interaction with the state, and the political consequences of the dualism. We find the descriptions of the internal organization of traditional polities scattered and lacking comparative perspective. The literature on the interaction provides a good starting point for theorizing the strategic role of traditional leaders as intermediaries, but large potentials for inference remain underexploited. Studies on the consequences of "dual polities" for democracy, conflict, and development are promising in their explanatory endeavor, but they do not yet allow for robust conclusions. We therefore propose an institutionalist research agenda addressing the need for theory and for systematic data collection and explanatory approaches.
Although the majority of studies on political knowledge document lingering gender-based differences in advanced industrial democracies, most contributors have drawn such conclusions from a single or a handful of countries, using limited batteries of political information items. Exploiting a pooled data set of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems encompassing 106 post-election surveys in forty-seven countries between 1996 and 2011, this article demonstrates that survey instrument–related factors, such as question format and content, as well as the overall difficulty of questions, are more consequential in shaping the size of gender gaps in political knowledge than institutional factors, such as electoral rules or opportunity structures. The research design of this article draws from almost three hundred different items measuring factual political knowledge using the broadest country coverage and most comprehensive approach to measurement to date.
A substantial literature has used field experiments to assess the mobilization effects of non-partisan mailers. However, little work has examined whether partisan mailers affect voters as intended. We report findings from two field experiments conducted in cooperation with partisan campaign strategists that allow us to assess the effects of negative and positive mailers. We find that mailers can affect voters—particularly their recognition of candidate names and their intent to turn out to vote. Notably, we find evidence that both negative and positive mailers stimulate intent to turn out.
Theories of presidential success find that political disunity reduces the President’s effectiveness by restricting his authority to generate new policies. We maintain that focusing solely on policy change neglects the influence exerted by the President when he defends his policy agenda by preventing unfavorable changes to the status quo. We develop a new theory of presidential success that predicts that certain political environments raise the resource costs to the President of policy change. During these times, the President shifts political resources to defending the status quo. We empirically test our predictions in both legislative and regulatory lawmaking, and find strong support for our theory.
In this article, we take advantage of a new source of data providing updates from the Majority Leader’s Office that signal the leadership’s positions on floor votes. We offer a more nuanced explanation of voting in the U.S. House as our findings suggest that not all procedural votes are created equal. While the most liberal members of the party vote with the leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.
This article uses the case New York City to examine why certain immigrant groups participated in the 2006 protest wave more than others and why the city mobilized less compared with other major immigrant metropolises. The findings indicate that certain immigrant groups participated more than others because of how the issue of "illegal immigration" was racialized and framed by the media, and because of the disproportionate impact the proposed legislation would have had on them. The data presented illustrate how the city’s heterogeneous population served to diminish its capacity to produce the magnitude of mobilization found in other large immigrant cities.
Institutional and behavioral theories of democracy abound but rarely intersect. Do executive lawmaking power and prowess condition democratic regime support in presidential democracies? We develop theoretical expectations linking the lawmaking powers of the president and mass regime support and test them by analyzing survey data from eighteen Latin American countries over ten years. As hypothesized, results indicate that preference for, and satisfaction with, democracy is highest where presidents have moderate legislative powers and success and lowest where presidents either dominate policymaking or face gridlock. Hence, a "happy medium" of presidential power promotes the attitudinal foundations of democracy.
Much of the protest literature has examined the policy consequences of social protests. Few studies focus on the effect of social protests on public opinion. We examine the impact of the 2006 immigration protests on the saliency of immigration among Latinos. The 2006 Latino National Survey was in the field before and after the protests began, creating a natural experiment. Using these data, we discover protests increased Latinos’ perception of undocumented immigration as the most important problem facing Latinos. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the effect of protest was not uniform across the population but rather contingent on individuals’ characteristics.
This study argues that the proximity to a general election would affect the frequency of the opposition parties’ referrals to the constitutional court. This effect is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition parties’ prediction of the upcoming election results. To test this theory, I constructed an original data set including all acts promulgated by Turkish Parliament and all cases that were brought to the constitutional court by the opposition parties during 1984–2011. The results show that once the opposition party believes that it will lose the election, it increases its referrals to the court as election approaches.
The 113th Congress has a record number of racial and ethnic minorities serving on Capitol Hill. Using the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we examine what this increased descriptive representation of racial minorities means for legislative responsiveness and citizen–representative communication in the U.S. House. We argue that descriptive representation will improve the constituent–legislator relationship across racial groups, but that shared race should matter more for blacks and Latinos as racial minorities unaccustomed to legislative responsiveness. Our findings follow these expectations and suggest that the presence or lack of descriptive representation is an integral part of how citizens experience representation in the U.S. House.
Traditional vote-choice models include variables such as party identification, assessments of the economy, as well as other demographic characteristics. We argue that variables that tap shared racial/ethnic identity or some such similar dimension can enhance Latino vote-choice models beyond the traditional model. We evaluate Barack Obama and Mitt Romney’s cross-racial mobilization of Latino voters during the 2012 Presidential election. Using a survey of several thousand Latino voters, we find that these candidates’ policy stances vis-à-vis immigration and their ability to convey care and concern to the Latino community are important variables that guide Latino vote choice. Implications are discussed.
Scholars of democratization have developed a variety of theories to explain national and cross-national differences in democratic support. These theories, however, pay little attention to the cognitive origin of democratic support. This study seeks to examine how informed understanding about democracy affects such support. To this end, it applies theories of institutional legitimacy and social learning and predicts that the relationship between citizen understanding of and support for democracy is not only positively concaved but also dependent on the historical experience of democracy. An analysis of the World Values Survey 2005–2008 reveals strong evidence to support the theoretical predications.
The responsiveness of individual legislators to their constituents creates an indirect electoral connection between the aggregate preferences of citizens and the behavior of legislative parties. In this research, I argue that legislators from moderate districts are the least likely to support their parties and most likely to vote moderately during roll call votes. I also argue that states with low ideological variance among citizens are the most likely to have moderate districts. Thus, states with ideologically heterogeneous populations are more likely to have homogeneous, extreme legislative parties. Using ideal point estimates and measures of party cohesion from state legislative parties, empirical evidence largely supports my expectations.
Racial attitudes toward African American candidates are partially explained by symbolic racism, which has replaced overt racism in responses to these candidates. However, as typically operationalized, symbolic racism as applied to candidate assessments fails to account for the emotions generated by a political campaign. Symbolic racism’s effects are moderated when emotional responses to Barack Obama are included in a candidate evaluation model, while emotions remain an important predictor. While symbolic racism and negative emotions lower evaluations, the presence of the positive emotions generated by the 2012 campaign counteracted both. Inclusion of both symbolic racism and emotion is necessary to understand perceptions of Obama as a black presidential candidate.
We examine the impact of direct presidential elections on legislative party systems. We argue that presidential power (PRESPOW) shapes the effective number of presidential candidates in a way that has a reductive effect on the legislative party system within an intermediary range of PRESPOW. We also argue that this proposition should be tested solely on the population of countries with direct presidential elections. We find that the effect of presidential coattails is less important than has typically been suggested and that we need to think carefully about how to capture variation in PRESPOW when trying to estimate its effect.
There are good reasons to test more refined measures of protest to better understand protesters’ disaffection with and disconnection from politics. This article assesses whether disaffection and disconnection predict each of: protest participation (aggregated), participation in demonstrations, and differential participation in demonstrations. Failure to vote does not predict participation in demonstrations but positively predicts participation in "protest" (aggregated). Those who demonstrate more frequently are more likely to participate in electoral politics than less frequent demonstrators. Most protesters are at least moderately engaged with formal politics, despite lacking trust in political institutions. Protest is not, therefore, a straightforward expression of anti-politics.
Legislative speeches are an important instrument for parties and members of parliament (MPs) to signal their positions and priorities. This raises the question of who speaks when. We evaluate whether a MP’s presence on the floor depends on his or her gender. We hypothesize that female MPs give in general less speeches in parliament and that this pattern results from debates dealing with "harder" policy issues. Our expectations are supported when analyzing a new data set containing information on the number and content of speeches given in the Swedish Riksdag between 2002 and 2010.
Information transparency is frequently heralded as a positive regime feature. However, does information transparency produce negative side effects such as increased terrorist activity? We theorize that freer transmission of information creates opportunities for radical dissidents to employ political violence to draw attention to their agendas. We build a theoretical argument connecting external (international) transparency to increases in transnational terrorism, and internal (domestic) transparency to increases in domestic terrorism. We find empirical support for our theory by analyzing the effects of measures of transparency on counts of terrorist attacks in as many as 144 countries for time periods as long as 1970 to 2006.
The most well-known elements of Montesquieu’s political thought are his liberal constitutionalism and his emphasis on the need for a fit between a regime and a populace. But scholars have rarely sought to understand the theoretical relationship between these elements, and some have denied that they are meaningfully related at all. I argue that Montesquieu’s liberal constitutionalism and his political particularism are theoretically harmonious and mutually reinforcing elements of a unified project. Montesquieu’s liberal political philosophy possesses in-built sources of resistance to the rationalistic and universalistic political projects often associated with modern liberalism.
There is a debate about the extent of the Senate majority party’s influence and the conditions under which it is used. This article demonstrates that the majority party influences legislative outcomes to meet electoral goals and protect its reputation by manipulating the consideration of the dozen annual appropriations bills. The majority party limits amendments and eases passage of the budget when it abandons the "regular order" and creates an omnibus appropriations bill. It is more likely to abandon the regular order when it is ideologically divided, has a small margin of control, or is distant from the minority.
Voters often make the effort to go to the polls but effectively throw their vote away by leaving their ballot blank or intentionally spoiled. Typically construed as anomalous or errant, we argue that blank and spoiled ballots are empirically differentiable and politically informative. We consider self-reported vote choice from a nationally representative survey following the 2011 Bolivian elections, in which 60 percent of votes cast were blank or spoiled. We estimate a multinomial logit model, finding that both blank and null voting were driven by political concerns, though null voting was more common among politically sophisticated individuals.
In mid-2011, the Florida legislature reduced the state’s early voting period from fourteen days to eight and eliminated the final Sunday of early voting. We compare observed voting patterns in 2012 with those in the 2008 General Election and find that racial/ethnic minorities, registered Democrats, and those without party affiliation had significant early voting participation drops and that voters who cast ballots on the final Sunday in 2008 were disproportionately unlikely to cast a valid ballot in 2012. Florida’s decision to truncate early voting may have diminished participation rates of those already least likely to vote.
Does partisan and racial context have an effect on the likelihood that states will adopt stringent requirements for voting? Our duration analysis shows that Republican governments increase the likelihood that a new law requiring citizens to have a photo ID to vote will be passed. This effect is weakened by minority group size. We then examine whether the adoption of voter ID regulations affects turnout across racial groups. Our analysis, using state-level data and the Current Population Survey (CPS) November Supplement File (NSF) for 1980 to 2010, offers little evidence for the belief that minority turnout is uniquely affected by voter ID regulations.
Do judicial dissents affect mass politics? The conventional wisdom is that unanimous rulings boost support for Supreme Court decisions, while division fuels popular opposition. However, empirical analysis of public reaction to unanimity and dissent is sparse, incomplete, and inconsistent. Through a series of survey experiments, I expand upon existing research on public opinion of judicial unity. I find that reaction to judicial consensus is dependent on the ideological salience of the issue involved and that, contrary to conventional wisdom and recent findings, dissent can foster acceptance of rulings among the Court’s opponents by suggesting evidence of procedural justice.
Can natural disasters undermine democratic legitimacy? This article maps a causal pathway from natural disaster damage to shifts in opinion and behavioral tendencies in less established democracies. It theorizes citizens who suffer damage in such contexts will tend toward lower evaluations of democratic institutions, lower support for democratic values and practices, and stronger dispositions toward action. These expectations are tested with national survey data collected following Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami by analyzing intracountry differences in damage with matching techniques and regression analyses. Results are consistent with expectations, with important implications for Chile and other less established democracies.
An archival study of U.K. General Election results from 2001, 2005, and 2010 revealed that Conservative black and minority ethnic (BME) candidates were less successful than their white counterparts. However, mediation analyses demonstrate that this lack of success can be explained by the lower winnability of BME candidates’ seats, such that the opposition candidate held a seat with a significantly larger majority compared with white candidates’ opponents. Results and implications are discussed in the framework of the "glass cliff," previously demonstrated for women, in the sense that the seats minority groups contested were harder to win compared with majority groups.
Using data from the 2008 presidential nomination contest, we offer systematic tests of the relationships between traditional campaign factors, the Internet and campaign performance. We find that claims of the Internet’s relevance to modern campaigns are warranted, as it is a unique facet of campaigns and significantly improves candidates’ financial and electoral support. The Internet is especially helpful to candidates in generating small-donor contributions and in maximizing contributions after early primary victories. Overall, these findings suggest that the Internet offers a viable mechanism for long-shot candidates to overcome the resource demands of the current presidential nomination system.
Research on local turnout has focused on institutions, with little attention devoted to examining the impact of campaigns. Using an original data set containing information from 144 large U.S. cities and 340 separate mayoral elections over time, our contributions to the scholarship in this field are manifold: we focus the literature more squarely on the impact of campaigns by examining the role of campaign effort (measured with campaign expenditures), candidates, and competition in voter mobilization; demonstrate the relative importance of challenger versus incumbent campaign effort in incumbent contests; and show that changes in campaign activities influence changes in turnout over time.
Differences in political culture have been observed at the cross-national and subnational levels, and political culture corresponds with a wide array of important social and political phenomena. However, possible psychological correlates of political culture are less clear. Building on research in personality psychology and cross-cultural psychology, this study contemplates whether aggregate personality measures compiled in the American states correspond with patterns in political culture. Using measures of personality traits provided by more than 600,000 survey respondents, parallels with state-level measures of citizen ideology, political culture, and civic culture are examined. Possible mechanisms linking personality and political culture are discussed.
Using American National Election Studies (NES) data from 1952 to 2008—a longer timespan than any analysis to date—we evaluate the leading claims about growing polarization along authoritarian/nonauthoritarian lines and the reasons for that growth. We find authoritarianism’s impact has grown for partisanship and voting but has been consistent for policy attitudes—usually present for "social" and defense issues, but less so for social welfare and foreign policy. This suggests that authoritarianism’s importance is related to strategic politicians advancing issues that touch on the authoritarian/nonauthoritarian divide, and varies across election years.
Scholars have found that, even when a crisis creates demand for reform, a focal point is often necessary to overcome obstacles to change. I argue that, with surprising frequency, U.S. blue-ribbon commissions use their bipartisan political credibility to provide this focal point and thereby catalyze postcrisis government reform. Since commission-inspired reform is often designed to integrate or centralize policy making, I further explain that commissions can be useful presidential tools for asserting power over agencies. I test my argument on an original data set that includes new measures of commission influence.
As female candidates may face greater challenges in establishing their "qualifications" for office, coverage of their personal traits may be pernicious, because it tends to de-emphasize substantive qualifications. This study focuses on relative amounts of trait and issue coverage of contests with and without women candidates. We find that races with female candidates yield more coverage of traits than male versus male contests and races with female candidates are less likely to generate issue coverage than trait coverage. Candidate gender and office interact; female gubernatorial candidates are most likely to garner trait coverage and least likely to engender issue coverage.
Unpacking corruption has advantages over using aggregate measures of corruption when theory generates different predictions about the effects of political institutions on different kinds of corruption. We take advantage of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys conducted in 1999, 2002, and 2005 to investigate the effect of veto players on state capture and bureaucratic corruption in the postcommunist countries. According to our results, a greater number of veto players is associated with less state capture. By contrast, the number of veto players does not have a significant impact on bureaucratic corruption.
Presidents should prefer to be positively remembered in history for improving their country’s conditions, rather than to be hated for generations. Few, however, succeed. Why? The inquiry goes beyond historic accounts or mere intellectual curiosity; it is a key part of understanding presidential decision making. We answer this question using data from an expert survey on the Mexican Presidency, the first of its kind for Mexico. Problem-solving capacities and presidents’ ability to change the existing institutions are the main determinants of success. Corruption is barely punished by experts. Negative remembrance in history is associated to authoritarianism and economic crises.
This essay examines how two Jefferson biographies represented the Thomas Jefferson–Sally Hemings relationship in the post–civil rights movement era: Fawn Brodie’s Thomas Jefferson (1974), a controversial publication that claimed that Hemings and Jefferson loved each other, and Joseph Ellis’s American Sphinx (1996), one of the last mainstream biographies to deny that they had any children together. The story in both cases serves as an allegory of founding authority and national membership. The author finds that Ellis and Brodie characterize Jefferson as a fallible founder to affirm that founding ideals can accommodate and overcome racial differences and injustices.
An agent-based computer simulation demonstrates that results from Downs, Duverger, Riker, and Sundquist can be seen as emergent consequences of five simple rules about iteratively forming coalitions and adjusting policy platforms. The model creates distributions of agents who form coalitions within a political body. By modifying and omitting the basic rules, I compare results from plurality and majority-seeking actors and from policy-seeking, office-seeking, and mixed-strategy coalitions. A set of simple rules implemented by agents with extremely bounded knowledge are sufficient to drive the classic median voter, two-party system, minimum winning coalitions, and party realignment results in a single framework.
Elections involving women candidates in the United States can offer unsettling examples of voter gender stereotypes, but research on women candidates provides little in the way of available data that allow us to link stereotypes to voter decision-making. This project reports results from a 2010 survey designed to examine gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations, and voting behavior in U.S. House elections with women candidates running against men. In general, stereotypes are not a central part of candidate evaluations or voting decisions, but the political party of the woman candidate can shape their role in candidate evaluations and vote choice.
We examine the extent to which governments consider the role of bicameral conflict resolution procedures in legislative agenda-setting. We argue that governments may use these institutions to promote policy change in the event of bicameral conflict, especially when facing uncertainty over bicameral policy preferences. We test our arguments using comprehensive original data on forty years of German legislation and find that bicameral conflict resolution committees play a more sophisticated role in governmental policy making than previously suspected.
This research conceptualizes political engagement in Facebook and examines the political activity of Facebook users during the 2008 presidential primary (T1) and general election (T2). Using a resource model, we test whether factors helpful in understanding offline political participation also explain political participation in Facebook. We consider resources (socioeconomic status [SES]) and political interest and also test whether network size works to increase political activity. We find that individual political activity in Facebook is not as extensive as popular accounts suggest. Moreover, the predictors associated with the resource model and Putnam’s theory of social capital do not hold true in Facebook.
Although there is widespread concern about bias in American democracy, convincing tests of differential responsiveness are rare. We use a unique data set that surveys the views of a large cross-section of urban residents to provide greater insight into this question. We demonstrate clear differences in perceived responsiveness across demographic and political groups with racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and liberals expressing less satisfaction with local outcomes. Our analysis suggests that these differences are unlikely to be due to underlying differences in individual attitudes but instead appear to stem from real differences in local conditions and perceived governmental responsiveness.
Influential economic models predict that as inequality increases, the public will demand greater redistribution. However, there is limited research into the determinants of support for redistributive tax increases because such proposals have been so rare in America in recent decades. We use Washington State’s Proposition 1098 to examine how economic self-interest, concerns about inequality, and partisanship influence support for redistributive taxation. The results show that all of these factors influenced support, with strong support among the lower income, indicating that when the distributional implications of policies are clear, citizens can translate their self-interest and broad attitudes into congruent redistributive preferences.
The notion of a Chinese popularity function may seem surprising, given its authoritarian nature. However, exploring the possibility of indirect popularity functions in nondemocratic systems, we articulate a model of national government support in China. The model argues that sociodemographics, political attitudes, and performance issues mold central government satisfaction. Drawing on a countrywide 2008 public opinion survey, we conclude that regional differences, national trust, and local policy success are of special importance in shaping national government support. The findings, which exhibit theoretical and statistical appeal, lay the groundwork for further investigation of popularity functions in China.
This article explores the connection between political theory and political commentary in the editorial stance of Dissent magazine’s staff, especially Irving Howe, Lewis Coser, and Michael Walzer. It argues that central to the political thought of the Dissent circle was a rejection of ideological Puritanism on the American left. Dissent’s theoretical contribution was to develop a space for a policy-oriented social democratic platform that draws on both liberalism and communism while transforming them. Thus, Howe sought a socialism that drew on valuable liberal insights, while Walzer looked for a permanent uneasy coexistence between social democracy, liberalism, and communitarianism.
How are legislative outcomes shaped by multidimensional negotiations? Examining the legislative politics of U.S. immigration reforms, I show how alternating coalitions in multidimensional negotiations produce centrist legislative outcomes. In doing so, this article sheds light on a puzzling aspect of immigration policy—namely, the gap that exists between public opinion and legislative outcomes. My investigation of major immigration bills in 1986, 1996, and 2006 shows that the multidimensional nature of immigration debates contributed to the lack of dramatic reforms, by allowing legislative minorities to form alternating coalitions to block any dramatic changes.
Scholars have seemingly established that constituents hold "out of step" legislators electorally accountable. Empirically, however, such claims have not been based on measures placing districts and perceptions of legislators’ preferences in the same space. We remedy this using the 2006 and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, and Aldrich and McKelvey’s scaling procedure, finding that electoral success is roughly consistent with Downsian logic but not with the blanket statement that out-of-step incumbents are penalized. Voters punish out-of-step incumbents conditional on having a sufficiently more "in step" challenger. Effects are substantial, but so are incumbent advantages.
Riker famously theorized that political actors faced with suboptimal outcomes might be able to garner a more desirable one by adding issues to the agenda. To date, limited support for Riker’s theory of heresthetics exists, primarily consisting of case studies and anecdotal evidence. We offer a systematic analysis of heresthetical maneuvers in the context of Supreme Court decision making. We argue justices who oppose a potential case outcome may add alternative issues to the record in an effort to restructure the terms of debate. Data from justices’ behavior during oral argument support Riker’s theory.
Scholarly interest in hybridity has focused largely on the present and recent past. Yet, one of the great theorists of hybridity is an ancient one: Herodotus. By describing a globe in motion—the motion of people across borders and through time—Herodotus draws a picture of a world that brings the hybrid to the fore. He thinks seriously about how we should regard diversity in light of global hybridity. Reading Herodotus as a theorist of the hybrid not only adds an interesting perspective to contemporary conversations but also reminds us of hybridity’s enduring importance as a subject of political inquiry.
It is widely assumed that candidate issue convergence or "dialogue" is beneficial for voters in campaigns. Using a lagged weekly measure of issue convergence in political advertising about specific campaign issues from the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns, I show that dialogue, as it is currently defined by campaigns and elections scholars, is as likely to harm voters as it is to help them. These findings require scholars to think more deeply about what role, if any, issue convergence plays in deliberative campaigns.
Publicity is central to terrorism, but demonstrating a link between press freedom and the targeting of attacks is challenging. There are several reasons for this: (1) studies do not distinguish between press freedom and press attention; (2) perpetrators use press freedom to weed out unacceptable targets rather than to determine which targets to attack; (3) only foreign, not domestic, perpetrators depend on press attention; and (4) foreign terrorists satisfy their desire for press attention by attacking powerful states. Our models confirm this argument about press freedom and national power even after controlling for executive constraints, polity, and foreign policy activity.
We examine whether votes on minority rights make the public less sympathetic to the targeted group. Panel data are used to test whether votes on marriage changed public attitudes about gays and lesbians. We propose the marriage debate had a stigmatizing effect on attitudes about gays and lesbians in states where marriage was on the ballot. Results reveal a conditional relationship. Religious people in states where marriage was voted on had lower affect for gays and lesbians after the campaign. Independent of policy outcomes, subjecting a minority group to public judgment about rights may promote animus toward the group.
Judicial autonomy from societal actors is argued herein to be a critical aspect of the rule of law and to have been overlooked by the dominance within comparative judicial politics of the role of interbranch judicial independence. These distinct concepts are parsed and then interrelated to form a typology of four "judicial regime types": liberal regimes, partisan control regimes, clandestine control regimes, and government control regimes. These regime types are then traced in five Central American countries.
The impressionable years thesis asserts that early adulthood is accompanied by increased attitudinal vulnerability. Although there is tentative empirical evidence to support this idea, it remains unclear whether this sensitivity is due to exposure to change-inducing circumstances, typically encountered in early adulthood, or due to the weight attached by young people to new information. I address this question, focusing on a political event—the Watergate—that offers a test of youth’s heightened susceptibility, holding exposure constant. The results confirm the impressionable years thesis and shed light on how it is most likely to be manifested empirically.
What explains the behavior of legislators on bills that restrict the rights of marginalized minorities? Studies of representation typically focus on factors like party or public opinion but seldom account for theories of minority representation like electoral capture or subconstituency politics. One reason for this is that data allowing for the comparison of these theories are seldom available for U.S. House districts. We overcome this hurdle by implementing multilevel regression with post-stratification to estimate opinion on gay marriage during the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act vote. We show that subconstituency politics explains legislators’ behavior better than electoral capture, party, or public opinion.
Leo Strauss ends his Socrates and Aristophanes with a pregnant assertion: the best account of the Socratic turn is offered by al-Razi in his The Philosophical Way of Life. Al-Razi’s account thus provides two invaluable opportunities: to gain some insight into Strauss’s unique understanding of Socrates, and the chance to examine the problem of Socrates from a nontraditional vantage point. Taking advantage of these opportunities reveals an oft-overlooked moment in the history of political philosophy: Socrates’s discovery of the regime. This essay examines al-Razi’s account while also casting a new light on Strauss’s own scholarship.
This study explores what effect different campaign information frames have on voters’ evaluations of Sarah Palin using data from an online experiment. We show that descriptions highlighting more stereotypically feminine attributes cause individuals to perceive Palin as holding more feminine traits, while those highlighting more masculine attributes lead to higher assessments of her masculine traits. Those that mix feminine and masculine attributes lead to higher assessments of Palin’s masculine traits and null effects on her feminine traits. We show that Palin benefits the most in overall evaluations by being perceived as high on both masculine and feminine traits.
Public opinion polls demonstrate that Arab citizens support both democracy and shari’a. I argue that individual values related to the secular-Islamist cleavage are instrumental in explaining this joint support. The analysis of the Arab Barometer Survey shows that individuals holding Islamic values are more favorable of shari’a, whereas those with secularist values tend to support democracy. However, the bivariate probit estimations also confirm that Arab opinion about these governing principles is more complementary and less divergent. The results imply that constitutional models combining Islam and democracy, rather than strictly secular institutions, may be more acceptable to Arab citizens.
The exploration of the religious underpinnings of intolerance has long focused on the effects of religious behaviors and beliefs, but has ignored a variety of important facets of the religious experience that should bear on tolerance judgments: elite communication, religious values about how the world should be ordered, and social networks in churches. We focus on the communication of religious values and argue specifically that values should affect threat judgments and thus affect tolerance judgments indirectly. We test these assertions using data gathered in a survey experiment and find that priming exclusive religious values augments threat and thus reduces tolerance.
Case salience affects nearly every aspect of Supreme Court justices’ behavior, yet a valid actor-based measure of salience has remained elusive. Researchers have instead relied on external proxy indicators, such as amicus curiae participation and media coverage, to explain justices’ behavior. We propose a novel measurement of salience in which we use justices’ differential levels of engagement to generate actor-based measures of case and justice-level salience. Focusing on justices’ behavior during oral argument, we contend that the more engaged the justices are in a case—defined by the number of words they speak—the more salient the case.
We examine how the growth in vote-by-mail and changes in voting technologies led to changes in the residual vote rate in California from 1990 to 2010. In California’s presidential elections, counties that abandoned punch cards in favor of optical scanning enjoyed a significant improvement in the residual vote rate. We also conduct the first analysis of the effects of the rise of vote-by-mail on residual votes. Regardless of the election, increased use of the mail to cast ballots is robustly associated with a significant rise in the residual vote rate.
Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.
This article investigates the attitudinal drivers of partisanship in Western Europe, focusing in particular on the role exerted by voters’ evaluation of party leaders. The cross-sectional analysis is performed on pooled national election study data from three established parliamentary democracies (Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands). Results highlight the growing statistical association between leader evaluations and voters’ feelings of partisan attachment throughout the last three decades. Further analyses of selected panel data provide evidence for a causal interpretation in which voters’ evaluation of party leaders plays a crucial role in shaping their feelings of attachment to parties.
In this article, we examine both the content and effects of opinion shows during the 2008 presidential election. First, a content analysis shows that opinion shows devote most of their attention to attacking the opposition candidate, rather than praising the like-minded candidate. Second, analyses of panel data show that exposure to opinion shows made viewers less (more) favorable toward the opposition (like-minded) candidate. Finally, we use overtime analyses to show that coverage of the opposition candidate affects attitudes toward both candidates, whereas coverage of the like-minded candidate has negligible effects on attitudes toward either candidate.
Scholars of gender and race politics have long drawn links between the media’s less than favorable treatment of women and minorities, and these candidates’ struggles to curry favor with voters. However, few have examined minority women’s coverage. This multimethodological study examines the nature and implications of the media’s treatment of Anglo, Latina, and African American congresswomen. The results indicate significant differences in the content of these women’s media coverage and its influence on voters’ attitudes. The implications of these findings for Anglo and minority women campaigning for and holding elective office are discussed.
To what extent do members of Congress respond unequally to people in different economic situations? How does partisan control of the agenda change the way in which Senators respond to the poor? Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, and multiple roll call votes, I examine Senate responsiveness for the 107th through 111th Congresses. The results show consistent responsiveness toward upper income constituents. Moreover, Republicans are more responsive than Democrats to middle-income constituents in the 109th Congress, and a case study of the 107th Senate reveals that responsiveness toward the wealthy increases once Democrats take control of the chamber.
The prevailing scholarly wisdom is that weak states, or resource-poor states, are the most prone to civil war. Yet many weak states never experience civil war. Why then are some weak states prone to civil war while others are not? The author offers a theory that explains how dissidents and states interact to jointly produce civil war. In sum, states that repress their citizens are the most likely to kill citizens and to generate dissident violence. This insight resolves an academic puzzle and when tested provides a model with better predictive ability than previous models.
Condorcet’s theory of voting rests on the crucial proposition that voting errors are random and not systematic. Using Lau and Redlawsk’s voting correctly measure, I test whether voting error is systematic or random in presidential elections from 1972 to 2004. I show that errors are systematically skewed toward Republican candidates. I also show that the level of skew of incorrect voting has led to the incorrect candidate being elected in three out the last nine elections. In addition, I find that greater skew in Republican campaign spending increases skew of incorrect votes toward Republican candidates.
This essay interprets Baldwin as continuing the Socratic practice of self-examination and social criticism while also shifting his Socratic undertaking by charting the limits of examination created by the harsh effects of race and slavery in the United States. The author argues that Baldwin’s Socratic practice inflects not only his essays—the center of previous analyses—but also his fictions. By transposing Socrates to issues of race in twentieth-century America and confronting the incoherent effects of a racialized society, James Baldwin thus carries forward and transforms a pivotal figure in the history of political thought.
Why are the leaders in some U.S.-style legislatures more influential than others? This study uses individual-level data on lawmakers’ perceptions of their leaders’ influence to test three general theories of legislative power delegation: legislative leaders have no real power, simple collective action theory, and Conditional Party Government theory. These perceptions of speakers’ legislative influence are modeled with varying intercept, multilevel, ordered probit models. The analyses strongly support the simple collective action problem explanation of legislative leadership influence, in particular suggesting that collective problems caused by the internal dynamics of the legislative process drive the delegation of influence to leaders.
Group populations take many different types of actions in order to influence government, but how those actions are received depends on the traits of group populations. This article uses data on national-level voluntary associations in the United States from 1974 to 1999 to investigate group survival and discuss how it affects representation. The results demonstrate the existence of density dependence, significant positive effects for group-level resources, group-level characteristics, and government attention on group survival. These findings also include counterintuitive significant negative effects for public attention suggesting that increases in public attention lead to group replacement rather than group survival.
Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on "selectorate" models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting civil liberties. Because this strategy requires military capacity, autocracies but not democracies should spend aid on the military. We support this hypothesis empirically, providing further evidence that autocracies misuse foreign aid.
Growth in the U.S. Latino population has prompted speculation that the "racialization" of welfare with respect to African Americans would eventually extend to Latinos. The authors assess this prediction, analyzing public attitudes toward welfare spending and national health insurance and their linkages to attitudes about Latinos and undocumented immigrants. The authors find significant relationships between affect for "illegal immigrants" and social welfare attitudes, conditional on party identification. The findings indicate that Americans view undocumented immigrants as the beneficiaries of social welfare policies, not the wider Latino population. Furthermore, the framing of social service utilization by undocumented immigrants could threaten the Democratic coalition.
Judicial behavior is contingent on case salience. Unfortunately, existing measures of case salience have met with some skepticism. After discussing the characteristics of an ideal measure of salience, the authors construct a new measure of case salience. This new measure expands on prior studies by examining coverage in four diverse newspapers and includes coverage anywhere in the paper, instead of concentrating on front-page coverage only. By developing this new measure, the authors uncover patterns about national media coverage of the Court and provide a potentially more useful measure of case salience.
Judicial behavior is contingent on case salience. Unfortunately, existing measures of case salience have met with some skepticism. After discussing the characteristics of an ideal measure of salience, the authors construct a new measure of case salience. This new measure expands on prior studies by examining coverage in four diverse newspapers and includes coverage anywhere in the paper, instead of concentrating on front-page coverage only. By developing this new measure, the authors uncover patterns of national media coverage of the Court and provide a potentially more useful measure of case salience.
Existing theories of turnout model individuals' decisions to vote as a function of the utility they would gain from their favored party's election, the costs of voting, and the intrinsic benefits associated with democratic participation. This project shows that such utility calculations are conditional on electoral rules. In electoral systems with low incentives for strategic behavior, the traditional model of voter turnout is accurate. However, in plurality systems, in which there are stronger incentives for individuals to abandon their true preferences, less importance is placed on the utility associated with the possible success of favored parties.