Voters are often uninformed about the political candidates they choose between. Governments, media outlets, and civic organizations devote substantial resources to correcting these knowledge deficits by creating tools to provide candidate information to voters. Despite the widespread production of these aids, it remains unclear who they reach. We collect validated measures of online voter guide use for more than 40,000 newspaper readers during a state primary election. We show this newspaper-produced voter guide was primarily used by individuals with high levels of political interest and knowledge, a finding in contrast to earlier hypotheses that providing guides directly to voters online would reduce disparities in use based on political interest. A field experiment promoting the voter guide failed to diminish these consumption gaps. These results show that the same content preferences that contribute to an unequal distribution of political knowledge also impede the effectiveness of subsequent efforts to close knowledge gaps.
We report findings from an experiment where participants read a story about a speech that sharply criticized U.S. foreign policy. The story varied how elites framed the speech, the speaker’s apparent ethnicity, and the content of the speech. We assess how each of these factors affected not only tolerance judgments but also inferences about the speaker’s motives and the likely consequences of the speech—considerations that play a central role in free speech jurisprudence. Troublingly, we find that the effects of elite framing and the speaker’s apparent ethnicity are often comparable with the effect of the speech explicitly calling for violence. Our design also allows us to assess the extent to which the effectiveness of elite framing is constrained by "facts on the ground." However, we find little evidence that the framing effects we identify depend on the content of the speech or the speaker’s ethnicity.
The choice of proportional representation (PR) is rarely included in work on American local politics. Yet we have long known that 24 cities adopted the single transferable vote form of PR from 1915 to 1948. Breaking with a machine–reform dichotomy that dominates the PR historiography, I investigate two partisan hypotheses about PR’s origins. One concerns the emergence of third parties. A second involves splits in ruling parties. In at least 15 cases, PR choice involved an alliance of convenience between ruling-party defectors and local minority parties. Evidence includes narratives on the partisanship of elite PR backers, comparison of case history and precinct-level referendum outcomes for three similar cities, and aggregate data on big-city charter change referenda from 1900 to 1950. New in this article is comparison of PR adopters with non-adopters. Party splits in places with sizable out-parties emerge as a distinctly American path to proportional electoral rules.1
In recent decades, observers of Congress have devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby members of Congress and staffers go on to careers in lobbying. This practice raises a number of normative concerns that are perhaps most heightened when it comes to the lobbying activities of members of Congress themselves. In this article, I examine the factors determining which former members go through the revolving door, and find that members with central network positions and highly effective legislators are more likely to become lobbyists. I then examine the extent to which members-turned-lobbyists have an impact on bills in Congress. I find evidence that lobbying by former members increases a bill’s probability of progressing and some evidence that highly effective legislators also go on to become more effective lobbyists. Taken together, these findings support conventional wisdom that former members become some of the most influential lobbyists.
The literature on the U.S. Supreme Court has paid substantial attention to the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. However, much less attention has been paid to the perceived legitimacy of the reasons the Court provides for its opinions. We design two experiments to understand how the public perceives opinion content. Unlike prior studies, we take it as a given that the Court uses legal reasons in its decisions. This offers us a baseline by which to compare departures from these legal reasons. We find that extralegal reasons, when paired with legal reasons, do nothing to harm the legitimacy of the Court. Furthermore, we find that even with a lack of legal reasons, the use of extralegal reasons does not harm the legitimacy of the Court, even among those who find that these reasons are inappropriate for the Court to use.
Online voter registration (OVR) is an election reform that has recently taken hold in more than half of the American states. Election administration observers have marveled at both the rapid diffusion and bipartisan support associated with legislative passage of OVR. We examine the likelihood a lawmaker voted in favor or against OVR in legislatures approving the reform. Despite the leading narrative of both parties overwhelmingly embracing OVR, we find that lawmaker support is clearly rooted in political calculations. Most prominent is a partisan divide, with Republicans in polarized legislatures with a Democratic majority decidedly less supportive of OVR. In addition, a host of contextual factors tied to the variation in partisan and electoral power affect the probability a state legislator votes in favor of this reform. We argue that the near-consensus position of Democrats (more than 90% voted "yea" on OVR) and the impressive supermajority of Republicans backing OVR (greater than 70%) have diverted attention from the reasons why there is opposition to this seemingly noncontroversial reform.
Policy termination has received less scholarly attention than policy diffusion, and empirical state-level studies that examine the rise and fall of the same policy are mostly absent from the literature. This study assesses the factors that led more than 45 states to enact and some to later repeal Motion Picture Incentive programs, a collection of tax incentives aimed at facilitating job creation and economic diversification. We find program enactments were driven by rising unemployment and national but not bordering state imitation. Falling unemployment and national trends drove subsequent terminations, but in many states, their impact was overwhelmed by the influence of incentive spending, which greatly reduced termination likelihood. These results not only shed light on policy enactments and terminations in general, but also inform scholarship on state tax incentives and the role of competitive factors in their creation and repeal—or lack thereof.
Political knowledge is central to the success of representative democracy. However, public policy has been shown to follow public opinion even despite low levels of political information in the electorate. Does this mean that political knowledge is irrelevant to policy representation? We consider whether knowledgeable electorates are better able to achieve representative policy outcomes. Using the heterogeneity in the responsiveness of government across the states, we consider how state political knowledge moderates the connection between citizen ideology and the policy outcomes of state government. Using national surveys and multilevel logit with post-stratification, we develop measures of collective political knowledge in the states. We test whether knowledgeable electorates are more likely to secure representative political outcomes than less politically informed constituencies. We find that as state political knowledge increases, so does the correspondence between the preferences of the public and the ideological tenor of state policy outcomes.
The current research assessed whether political satire viewing could indirectly promote interpersonal talk about politics by eliciting emotions. The theoretical model was tested utilizing both experimental and survey designs. The findings indicated good agreement, demonstrating that negative emotions significantly mediate and reinforce the effect of political satire viewing on interpersonal talk. Conversely, the process wherein traditional news sources motivate interpersonal talk is mostly direct, with little development of affective responses. The results suggest that political satire can help to paint a sanguine picture of a healthy deliberative democracy mainly through an affective rather than cognitive route.
Can ostensibly nonpolitical television programming affect policy opinions? In this article, I use a laboratory experiment to test whether the gender norms portrayed on two primetime sitcoms can alter political attitudes on gender issues, specifically access to abortion, and contraception. Though the shows in the experiment did not explicitly discuss any policy, I find that sitcoms can influence policy opinions, particularly when the show conveys a "boys will be boys" mentality toward sexual behavior. This finding has important implications for public opinion scholars because it suggests that there may not be such a thing as apolitical programming, and pop culture may have a profound, overlooked effect on public opinion.
This study examines whether broadcast news reduces negativity toward political leaders by exposing partisans to opposing viewpoints. For analysis, both exposure to broadcast news and variation in media content are used to predict changes in feelings toward the candidates during the 2008 presidential election. The results suggest that increased exposure to broadcast news increased partisans’ favorability toward the out-party candidate. In addition, increased coverage of the candidates was followed by increased favorability among members of the opposing party. These results demonstrate the benefits of exposure to two-sided communications flows for the reduction of animosity between the political parties. Moreover, these results suggest that public negativity toward political leaders might be even worse if not for the large amount of overlap between the audiences for partisan and mainstream news outlets.
While a large body of research examines cross-state variation in social policy, few studies systematically examine the policy influence of organizations that advocate on behalf of people living in poverty. This article examines relationships between state advocacy communities and policy choices following the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), or welfare reform. Using an original data set of states’ advocacy communities, political and economic characteristics, and welfare policy choices, the article analyzes whether a state’s advocacy community is associated with its decisions to reduce the government’s commitment to low-income families on one hand and enact policies providing additional supports to families on the other. The analysis reveals that significant relationships exist for both types of policies, suggesting that organizational advocates may play a role in shaping state-level social policy decisions.
This research examines the partisan inclinations of American Indians, a minority population with a complicated history with the U.S. government and American society. The empirical analyses identify Native Americans as preferring the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. The impact of being Native American on identification with the Democratic Party is sizable, equivalent to the effect for being Hispanic, Asian, or female. In addition, American Indians demonstrate a pronounced tendency to not affiliate with a major American political party. The higher incidence of non-identification among Native Americans likely results from the importance of their claims for sovereignty and, relatedly, living separate from much of American society. Unlike other broad-based social groups in American politics, Native Americans disseminate cues that reduce the tendency of their members to affiliate with a major political party.
When programs are grants to states, federal funds will be used to meet both the national objectives and the local priorities of the state or local government recipients. This article examines the decision to design new federal programs as either a grant to states or as administered by federal agencies. We predict that Congress will choose either the states or the federal bureaucracy based on which agent is more likely to manage the program consistent with the preferences of the Congressional majority. We examine the political and economic conditions present in the year before Congress created a program. We find that Congress’s perception of a government agency’s partisan orientation matters: A perceived divergence in partisan orientation between the Congress and federal agency increases the likelihood of a grant design. In addition, we see evidence that a grant design is preferred when the president is not a co-partisan of Congress.
Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) posits that individuals, when feeling anxious, abandon dispositions and activate their surveillance system to attend to available political information about the focus of their anxiety. However, it is not clear whether, and to what degree, people exercise discernment about the reliability of the information they seek and find—especially when partisan cues and related information are not available in the information environment. We use this article to extend understanding of anxiety’s effect on assessing information reliability about an issue outside the standard partisan framework. Our assessment is based on a lab experiment where 330 non-student subjects were randomly assigned exposure to television ads referencing an impending nuclear terror threat to the United States. The ads included varying degrees of production vividness and either a positively or negatively framed message about the government’s ability to respond to the threat. Results show that the negative and vivid threat ads—when mediated by a subject’s relative level of anxiety—substantially raise the probability of surveying information related to the nuclear threat. However, the anxiety mediator has no effect on subjects checking the reliability of the surveyed information. These findings broaden our understanding of media ad effects by providing greater nuance on the motive for information use and anxiety’s mediating role.
This article investigates whether constituents are able to accurately infer their senators’ votes when the senator frequently votes against the party line. We find that when senators repeatedly vote against the party line, constituents’ ability to correctly identify their senators’ votes drops precipitously while levels of misinformation rise. We then show that citizens represented by senators who tend to vote against the party line are also less able to connect their policy positions with their evaluations of those senators. These findings indicate that there is substantial variation across senators in the ability of their constituents to hold them accountable for their votes while in office. Constituents simply know less about the positions taken by moderate senators and have a harder time aligning their levels of policy agreement with a senator with their evaluation of that senator if she frequently votes against her party.
Scholars interested in bargaining over political appointments typically analyze the duration between the candidate’s nomination and eventual disposition, ignoring the prior period between vacancy and nomination. Using a dataset of vacancies reported to the Government Accountability Office, we instead examine the nomination stage. We uncover both commonalities and differences between the dynamics of nomination and those of confirmation. Ideological divergence between the President and the Senate filibuster pivot tends to delay nominations but only under divided government. Presidents not only move more quickly on more important positions, but are also influenced by the ideological leanings of the agencies.
Social voting norms persistently impel citizens to the polls. To date, most research in this field has focused on norms coming from the community at large rather than voters’ particular social groups. But pressure to conform to in-group norms may have an even stronger effect; inquiry across disciplines repeatedly demonstrates that group identity can be an important moderator in the relationship between norms and behavior. We apply this lesson to political behavior, testing the effect of partisan social pressure on turnout. We report the results of a randomized field experiment conducted during the 2012 Iowa primary election, comparing the mobilization effects of partisan and nonpartisan direct mail messages. We test the interaction between social pressure and the partisan nature of the message and find that partisan direct mail messages alone do not effectively mobilize voters. When partisan and social pressure elements are combined, turnout increases, but no more so than when communitarian and social pressure elements are combined. We conclude that simply referencing a voter’s party does not seem to render mobilization messages more effective.
Across democracies, elected officials are expected to represent their constituents, but how do legislators react to changes in their constituency? This core question of legislative responsiveness is examined in the context of the bicameral U.S. Congress where more than 100 legislators have served in both chambers since 1960. These chamber-changers provide a unique vantage point for examining constituency representation, including competing expectations based on the electoral connection and the ideological stability of legislative voting. Based on analyses of original data, I find overwhelming evidence of legislative responsiveness to both constituency change and constituency stability. Moreover, when legislators’ constituencies change, they respond by changing their behavior in ways that reflect both the direction and magnitude of constituency change.
The first debate in 2008 was a turning point in the presidential election campaign: a race that was close before the debate turned decisively in Obama’s favor following it. This article explores how the media reached their verdict that "Obama won." We examine two aspects of this problem: how, in practice, the media reached this verdict and whether they made the right decision from a normative standpoint. Based on content analysis of debate transcripts, we argue that the media interpreted the debate by synthesizing three pre-debate narratives in roughly equal proportions. Crucially, two of these narratives favored Obama. We also find that the "Obama won" verdict was consistent with what we might expect had the debate been judged by a public-spirited umpire.
This article analyzes the relationship between U.S. senators and their constituencies over the entire period of time that senators have been selected by direct election. Focusing on preference change within states, we identify three mechanisms that might produce responsiveness in senators’ ideological locations. We find that it is not merely the case that responsiveness is produced by party representation. Replacement of one senator with another of the same party facilitates responsiveness, too. And, even without electoral replacement, individual senators appear to adjust their ideological locations in response to changes in their electorates’ preferences. We also investigate how the mechanisms of responsiveness changed with the erosion of Democratic dominance in the South and as the parties grew stronger over time.
Scholars are increasingly interested in how partisan conflict in Congress affects public evaluations of institutional performance. Yet, existing research overlooks how the public responds to one of the most widely discussed consequences of partisan conflict: legislative gridlock. We develop expectations about how partisan conflict resulting in partisan wins, losses, and gridlock will affect evaluations of Congress, and how these relationships will differ across consensus and non-consensus issues. Results from two survey experiments indicate that partisan conflict resulting in a victory for one’s own party boosts approval relative to compromise, but conflict resulting in gridlock substantially damages approval. However, the degree to which gridlock decreases approval hinges on the type of policy under consideration. On consensus issues, citizens reward legislative action by either party—their party or the opposing party—over gridlock.
Religion plays a prominent role in American politics, and candidates often attempt to display their religiousness in a variety of ways. For example, in spite of the association between conservatism and religion, research shows that candidates of both parties routinely use religious language and seek to demonstrate personal religiousness. Existing research portrays religious rhetoric primarily as an ideological cue, failing to explain why Democrats would make religious appeals. Drawing on psychological theories of prejudice toward atheists, we argue that candidates emphasize their religiousness in order to enhance perceptions of their trustworthiness and morality. Using survey data, we show that voters are quite unlikely to support an atheist candidate, an effect that is strongly driven by the perception of atheists’ morality. Next, we show evidence that voters perceiving Hillary Clinton as religious also viewed her as more trustworthy, and were more likely to view her favorably. Finally, we show experimentally that religious candidates are perceived as more trustworthy, at least among a wide swath of the electorate. We conclude that displays of religiousness likely serve not only an ideological purpose but also the broader goal of increasing perceived candidate trustworthiness.
This article reports findings for a decomposition of the roll-call voting record of the U.S. Congress to determine the effect of the level of aggregation on the observed dimensionality of the policy space. In doing so, we identify some but certainly not all of the ways in which the aggregation of the voting record affects the observed dimensionality of the policy space. For the 1955 to 2008 period (84th-110th Congresses), we apply optimal classification (OC) to votes aggregated to the level of the individual bill and policy area to measure dimensionality. We examine the marginal proportional reduction in error (MPRE) across dimensions. Our results demonstrate that complexity in voting patterns of individual bill episodes is the norm, that aggregating to higher levels reduces the observed dimensionality, and that the liberal–conservative dimension appears more dominant in more highly aggregated analyses. These results call into question many of the conclusions from the theoretical and empirical literature on the U.S. Congress that uses a unidimensional model.
The dominant political science explanations of the causes of individual-level political participation converge on three sets of antecedents—resources/skills, recruitment, and political engagement. However, the overwhelming majority of the empirical tests of these antecedents rely on cross-sectional data, obscuring the fact that micro-level participation in the United States is more accurately characterized by instability rather than by stability. Using the American National Election Study and Jennings time-series data, we for the first time demonstrate the inability of traditionally examined antecedents to explain individual-level variation in political behavior over time. Finding extant theory inadequate in this regard, we propose a modification of participation theories that puts the concept of motivation in the foreground. We argue that a model that includes motivation may both pave the way for a better understanding of the variation in participation over time and suggest possible prescriptions to help alleviate representational biases at the individual level.
Citizens process economic information in ways that confirm their prior political beliefs. We therefore see stronger effects of presidential approval on economic perceptions than vice versa. Yet as economic conditions worsen, voters become heavily exposed to negative economic information and more likely to experience conflicting political and economic considerations. As conditions improve, identities and evaluations fall back into sync and political attitudes become more useful as an identity-confirming shortcut. I expect that the effect of economic perceptions on presidential approval grows stronger as economic conditions worsen and the effect of presidential approval on economic perceptions grows stronger as conditions improve. Using panel data from four American National Election Studies, I apply simultaneous equation extensions of the Anderson–Hsiao estimator to test the relationship between economic and political attitudes. Results show that the effect of economic perceptions on presidential approval was substantially stronger during the Great Recession than during the previous three panel studies.
This article investigates whether exposure to extreme television media informs citizens about politics. Using lab experiments with both student and non-student samples, I find that extreme media produce higher levels of political knowledge and that they also produce higher levels of negative affect among viewers compared with control groups. I also show that extreme media are at least as informative as traditional news. This research adds to the growing literature on media effects in a polarized media environment, showing that extreme television media can have a beneficial impact on at least one important area of U.S. politics: citizen competence. To account for external validity and popular conceptions on extreme media’s non-informative nature, I use cross-sectional data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey finding that extreme television viewership correlates with greater political knowledge, while controlling for other known predictors.
A whole array of studies has shown that the physical appearance of candidates running for elective office matters. However, it is unclear whether attractiveness or perceived competence is the source of such electoral advantage. In addition, the gender of candidates might interact with perceptions of physical appearance. With the help of Canadian student coders and through the use of a web-based survey, we measure the threefold link between physical attractiveness, perceived competence, and gender for all races in the 2008 U.S. House of Representatives elections. We find that both the attractiveness and perceived competence of candidates matter for candidates’ electoral successes; the former having an important effect in intra-gender races and the latter in inter-gender races.
Using original survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), we examine variation in racial and ethnic group and partisan attitudes toward legislators and representation. Respondents were asked about their views on descriptive representation, its importance for their own elected official, and whether it was important to have more descriptive representatives in general. Using respondents’ personal characteristics such as education, partisanship, race, ethnicity, income, and race and ethnicity of their House of Representatives member, we analyze the impact of these variables on attitudes toward representation. We find that Latino and Black respondents place a high level of importance on having descriptive representatives in their own districts in addition to articulating a high degree of importance to having more representatives from their respective group. However, Latino Republicans place less importance on descriptive representation overall than Latino non-Republican respondents. Non-Latino Republicans also place importance on more legislators of their same race or ethnicity. The findings have implications for democratic governance as the demographics of the United States rapidly changes.
How effective is unilateral presidential power? Recent developments have shifted presidential scholarship in the direction of a more institutional approach, and one of the most important tenets of this work holds that the president has the ability to make policy on his own. However, there is significant anecdotal evidence suggesting that agency responsiveness to executive orders is not at all guaranteed. This study leverages a unique data set tracing the implementation of executive orders across 10 government agencies, and the results indicate that despite conventional wisdom, presidential directives are not universally implemented, and a host of factors come to bear on an agency’s decision as to whether they will respond. This project represents among the first quantitative empirical assessments of the utility of unilateral power and suggests that the field may benefit most from shifting toward a bargaining-based model similar to those used in legislative scholarship.
The U.S. Supreme Court is traditionally thought to hold little influence over social or political change; however, recent evidence suggests the Court may wield significant power, especially with regard to criminal justice. Most studies evaluate judicial power by examining the effects of individual rulings on the implementation of specific policies, but this approach may overlook the broader impact of courts on society. Instead, I adopt an aggregate approach to test U.S. Supreme Court power. I find that aggregate conservative decision making by the Court is positively associated with long-term shifts in new admissions to U.S. federal prisons. These results suggest the Court possesses significant power to influence important social outcomes, at least in the context of the criminal justice system.
Does the act of attending religious services "cause" individuals to participate in politics? There is no known literature that examines this question using longitudinal, individual-level data. Therefore, using the Youth Parent Socialization Panel Study, this analysis examines three theoretical possibilities: the indirect, direct, and null relationships. The results show that changes in religious attendance are primarily indirectly linked to political participation through civic activity, a factor highly correlated with political participation. There is also some limited evidence for a direct effect. As individuals increase their political participation over time, they are slightly more likely to participate in political activities and vote. But, the findings also imply that the previous literature has likely overstated the role of religious attendance in generating political participation. Once individuals start participating politically, they continue to do so regardless of changes in their attendance at places of worship.
This study investigates trends in social capital in the United States since the 1970s. The literature suggests that variations in social capital are associated with both individual attributes and macro-level economic conditions. Yet, others argue that after controlling for these features, large-scale changes in social capital are evident across birth cohorts and over time. While previous studies have identified a number of individual and societal factors that influence social capital, I note that the common modeling approach used is inappropriate for examining the interaction between national and individual-level data as well as the simultaneous influence of period- and cohort-based effects. I therefore utilize a multilevel model to reassess the different theories of the origins and determinants of social capital. The evidence presented casts doubt on past studies that see a general erosion in social capital as well as those that view the decline as stemming from generational replacement.
When the U.S. Supreme Court sits with an even number of justices participating, there is a risk that the Court will be deadlocked in a tied vote. While this outcome awards the individual respondent with a victory, it also preserves circuit splits and other ambiguities in the law. In this article, we examine the conditions under which an even-membered Supreme Court actually results in a tie vote. We argue that the Court recognizes the potentially damaging consequences of 4-4 rulings and seeks to avoid them when those consequences would be most severe. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that ties are less likely when a decision is necessary to resolve a dispute in the lower courts and when cases are important to the executive branch.
Approximately half of immigrants to the United States are now settling directly in cities and towns with little prior history of immigration. Because this dispersed settlement pattern is so recent, we know little about the political behavior of naturalized citizens in these new immigrant destinations. This article begins to fill this gap by exploring the determinants of foreign-born voting in municipal elections using a new dataset that combines official voting information from the state of Utah with demographic information about Utah residents from the Utah Population Database (UPDB). We hypothesize that in addition to individual-level predictors of prior experience with democratic politics and community attachment, the size of cities and their form of government will also affect the likelihood that foreign-born citizens will turn out to vote in local elections. We use multilevel modeling techniques to test these hypotheses and find that prior experience with democratic politics, whether in the United States or in their home country, along with the city-level characteristics of city size and form of government, are powerful predictors of foreign-born voting in local elections. Moreover, we find that while large cities experience lower levels of turnout for all citizens, the negative effect on participation is strongest for foreign-born citizens.
Recent research finds that doubts about the integrity of the secret ballot as an institution persist among the American public. We build on this finding by providing novel field experimental evidence about how information about ballot secrecy protections can increase turnout among registered voters who had not previously voted. First, we show that a private group’s mailing designed to address secrecy concerns modestly increased turnout in the highly contested 2012 Wisconsin gubernatorial recall election. Second, we exploit this and an earlier field experiment conducted in Connecticut during the 2010 congressional midterm election season to identify the persistent effects of such messages from both governmental and non-governmental sources. Together, these results provide new evidence about how message source and campaign context affect efforts to mobilize previous non-voters by addressing secrecy concerns, as well as show that attempting to address these beliefs increases long-term participation.
Is state opinion stable or dynamic? Do states exhibit similar or divergent trends? I answer these questions by creating dynamic measures of state opinion using multilevel regression, imputation, and post-stratification (MRP) techniques across eight issues: two global indicators, partisanship and ideology; and six specific issues, including spending on education and welfare, abortion, the death penalty, presidential approval and consumer sentiment. I find that patterns of dynamism and heterogeneity vary. State opinion on some issues, such as consumer sentiment, is highly dynamic but follow closely with national trends. On other issues, such as education spending, states exhibit more stability with heterogeneous trends. And still other issues, such as abortion, exhibit both stability and homogeneity. The results have implications for longstanding debates concerning the nature and origins of mass opinion, the way that state opinions are translated into policies, and how to measure state opinion. Finally, the extensive data set of longitudinal state opinion is publicly available.
We identify the economic interests in the United States that have a partisan alignment. We disaggregate corporate and trade association political action committees by economic sector, using the most fine-grained classifications available. We then analyze the campaign contributions to House incumbents from each sector, controlling for the majority party, economic geography, committee membership, and electoral competition. We find wide variation in how economic sectors relate to the parties. More than one third have a clear party tilt, with far more leaning toward Republicans than to Democrats. The remainder have no discernible partisan preference, either giving without reference to party or opportunistically to the majority. Republican-leaning sectors concentrate in particular enterprises, especially natural resources extraction, while most professional service sectors are nonpartisan. Business is not a monolith, to be contrasted with "labor" or "ideological interest groups," but embedded in economic sectors that are more or less politicized in partisan terms.
I present the results of an original survey experiment designed to understand the complex relationship between policy information, attitudes, and evaluation. Parents of children attending schools identified for improvement under the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) are exposed to basic, context-specific, policy information on a randomized basis and then asked to complete an attitudinal survey. Treatment parents are significantly more likely than control group peers to report familiarity with NCLB and correctly identify the policy status of their child’s school. An increased depth of policy understanding enables these parents to bring evaluations of their child’s educational experience, policy, and government into alignment. Findings demonstrate the potential for careful policy framing and delivery to encourage enlightened opinion formation and political participation.
Although the policy diffusion literature comprises a large number of methodologically sophisticated papers, very little is known about basic issues such as how often states actually look at others’ policies, whose policies they look at, and when they look. We study policy research briefs prepared for legislators to focus on policy knowledge diffusion. We find that policy researchers frequently reported on others’ policies. We also find that factors such as innovativeness and proximity affect how often a state’s policies are studied. More generally, we find evidence of fairly sophisticated learning as policy makers looked at others’ policies in nuanced and varied ways. Our findings suggests that information about policies diffuses through systematic and targeted research during the policy-making process. This policy research disproportionately focuses on neighbors and states likely to have good policies, but it also uncovers ideas from less obvious states.
Having had more or less sleep changes mood and behavior; for example, more sleep associates with greater productivity and a perception that more time is available. This changes the time cost of voting in ways particularly important for the United States, where the general elections are sometimes but not always held 2 days after a 25-hr day, when people typically have had more time to catch up on sleep. Election returns and surveys confirm that circumstances where the election occurs 2 days after a long day produce higher turnout, suggesting a role for factors that affect sleep in political behavior.
Many U.S. states require redistricting authorities to follow traditional districting principles (TDPs) like the creation of compact districts and respecting the integrity of county and town boundaries. Reformers, academics, and other redistricting experts have long suggested that following such districting principles may enhance representation. Yet, very few academic studies have empirically examined these expectations. Using two measures of geographical compactness and a new measure of respect for political subdivisions (referred to as coterminosity) created with a geographic information system (GIS), the connection between district boundaries and representation is tested. The results show strong evidence that the use of geographic districting principles can enhance dyadic representation, as more compact and more coterminous districts are associated with more positive evaluations of legislative responsiveness and greater citizen-representative communication. Violating TDPs to advance other goals in redistricting like strict population equality between districts thus comes with a clear representational cost.
Scholars have recently begun to recognize the importance of policy durability to the overall shape of public policy. Existing work on policy durability focuses on the political environment rather than elements of policy design, such as the delivery of benefits as a tax break instead of a direct outlay. I argue that the unique characteristics of tax breaks, including the relatively narrow reach of these policies, make them vulnerable to elimination. Using a newly expanded data set, I test this claim by examining the longevity of all federal tax and non-tax programs created between 1974 and 2003, and find that tax expenditures are more vulnerable to elimination than non-tax programs. Further analysis provides more support for my arguments, as narrowly targeted tax expenditures prove more vulnerable than those benefiting the public. This project makes an original contribution to the literatures on policy durability, indirect governance, tax policy, and policy feedback.
This article examines the factors that influence two important areas of state tax policy—the adoption of an income tax as well as whether a state permits deducting federal income taxes against state individual income taxes. We focus on a factor that has largely been unexplored, the flow of income going to the Top 1% of earners. Using data from two different time periods (1916-1937 and 1960-2003), we find that the share of income received by the richest 1% of taxpayers corresponds with both the likelihood states will adopt an income tax as well as whether states allow deductions of federal income tax against state individual income taxes.
Despite a slogan advocating a change from practices of the past, Barack Obama’s presidential campaign of 2008 had an intriguing similarity to that of Richard Nixon in 1968. Like Nixon, Obama benefited from and secured victory partly due to his opposition to a contentious "war of choice." The wars in Vietnam and Iraq provided the political and cultural circumstances that made Nixon and Obama credible candidates in 1968 and 2008, respectively. The wars weakened support for the incumbent party and caused divisions within the country and in their own parties that both men exploited to neutralize political rivals in the primary season and defeat their opponent in the general election. This article examines the manner in which Obama, like Nixon, benefited directly from conflict by promoting his opposition and apparent solutions to gain public confidence, neutralize political opponents, and secure the presidency.
Recent studies have questioned the familiar characterization of Congress as unidimensional. We argue that agenda control, orchestrated through the House Rules Committee and other techniques, can make multidimensional congresses appear more unidimensional. We evaluate this argument by examining the relationship between measures of unidimensionality and various measures of party control for the House of Representatives from 1875 to 1997, at both the roll-call level and congress level. Our findings contribute to an expanding literature explaining why a single dimension could explain most of the variance in voting data, even if latent ideology is multidimensional.
Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their "advice and consent" privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors—such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election—are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees.
An analysis of U.S. budgetary changes shows that, among subaccounts that are cut, Democrats make more large cuts when they control more lawmaking institutions. This surprising finding is consistent with legislators who are subject to motivated reasoning. In an information-rich world, they disproportionately respond to information in line with their bias unless they must make a large accuracy correction. This article tests, for the first time, motivated information processing among legislators. It finds evidence that Democrats engage in motivated information processing and that the effects of it are felt more on social spending and in off-election years.
This research examines the impact of gender on gubernatorial and senate candidates’ issue prioritization. I argue that women running for statewide office prefer to play against gender stereotypes in their issue priorities at the outset of their campaigns, so they do not appear as a strictly "female" candidate. Instead, women will only run a "gendered campaign" in response to male candidates doing so first. I put forth a dynamic theory of gendered interaction that asserts that male candidates facing female opponents will attempt to force women to campaign on stereotypical "feminine issues." The campaign interaction between male and female candidates for office puts women in a precarious situation in which they must decide whether to respond to their male opponent or continue their "masculine" campaign strategy. I demonstrate that the gender of candidates directly influences the types of issues and strategies that each candidate pursues on the campaign trail.
We examine the impact of the Citizens United decision on firm value. While the value of U.S. firms do not respond significantly to the Citizens United decision on average, we find evidence that firms in industries subject to more extensive regulation react significantly and positively to the announcement. We also find evidence consistent with Justice John Paul Stevens’ argument that the Court decision will affect state laws. Specifically, our results indicate that firms that are headquartered in states with more stringent limits on political spending by corporations respond positively to the announcement.
Congressional elections have occurred every 2 years since the nation’s founding, yet we know surprisingly little about these electoral contests outside of the modern era. This is unfortunate as our understanding of how Congress performs and has evolved over time is directly linked to how its elected representatives reach and maintain office. In an effort to better understand early U.S. House elections, we revisit the era of the "partisan press" where newspapers were the main source of news for American voters and were typically operated by one of the two major parties. Using a data set linking the geographic location of partisan newspapers with electoral data during the early 19th century, we examine district-specific factors impacting the competitiveness of House races. We uncover previously unidentified evidence of candidate-specific effects during this historical era along with confirmation of media influence in the context of early American elections.
This article documents and assesses subregional variation among white southerners in presidential voting behavior and a variety of issue attitudes. I demonstrate that whites in the South remain consistently distinct from those in the rest of the nation, but heterogeneously so: whites in the Deep South are generally far more conservative than their Peripheral South neighbors. I also assess how the region’s disproportionate concentration of born-again Christians can confound assessments of regional and state coefficients when properly accounted for in regression models. By demonstrating the continuing distinctiveness of the white South, the significant variation present within the region, and the interrelationship of region and religion, these results have theoretical and methodological implications for the study of American politics.
Building on evidence that Latino voters participate at higher rates when co-ethnic candidates appear on the ballot, we report the results from a field experiment examining whether co-ethnic policy leadership can produce similar mobilization in direct democracy elections. The study features a direct-mail campaign conducted during California’s 2010 statewide primary election aimed at mobilizing Latino voters. The experiment included variation in the language of the message sent to voters and the extent to it emphasized the pivotal role played by a prominent Latino official in placing the policy on the ballot. We find that mobilization messages are most effective when they target voters using their preferred language, at least for English-dominant Latinos. By contrast, our experiment yielded no evidence that co-ethnic policy leadership increased voter turnout, although we do show that female voters participate at higher rates when the mobilization campaign prominently features a high-profile female official. These divergent effects provide lessons for the study of ethnic political participation and for the design of effective mobilization campaigns aimed at boosting Latino turnout.
A significant body of previous research demonstrates that the public holds stereotyped views about the abilities and personal traits of women and men who run for office. However, because much of this work is based on experimental designs or hypothetical candidates, we have relatively little information about whether and how gender stereotypes matter in real election situations. In an effort to determine whether people draw on stereotypes in evaluating women in political life, we use data from a survey of people who experienced races for the U.S. House in 2010 in which women candidates ran against men. We analyze two sets of dependent variables—(a) abstract attitudes about women and men as candidates and officeholders and (b) vote choice in the actual House elections. In line with previous experimental work, we find that gender stereotypes are important to people’s abstract evaluations of candidates and election situations. However, we find little evidence that gender stereotypes matter to the same degree in shaping vote choice decisions involving actual candidates.
This research revisits when and how voters use race as a cue for politicians’ ideological and partisan orientations. Using an embedded survey experiment that manipulates the race and policy positions of a (fictitious) Member of Congress, I provide a more comprehensive view of the role of ideological and partisan stereotypes in impression formation. Voters perceive non-White politicians as more liberal and more likely to be Democrats than otherwise-identical White politicians. This stereotyping persists even when the politician takes counter-stereotypical positions (e.g., a Black or Hispanic politician with a conservative record), and shapes non-White legislators’ approval ratings in significant ways.
This research examines how severing the electoral connection influences legislative behavior. Unlike previous studies of legislative shirking, we argue for a more nuanced conceptualization that takes account of members’ electoral circumstances (beyond a dichotomous measure of term limited/nonterm limited) as well as the nature of the votes under consideration. This enables us to incorporate expectations of party influence into our model of legislative shirking. Our research demonstrates shirking among legislators leaving public office as they are no longer susceptible to party pressure, while those who face term limits and are seeking another public office may remain adherent to the party on votes most crucial to the party (i.e., procedural votes). Moreover, we find evidence that legislators who are no longer constrained by elections also exhibit a greater level of roll call abstention, although only those leaving public office demonstrate significant increases in abstentions on procedural votes. Thus, we may find very different shirking patterns among term-limited members depending on their future political ambition (or lack thereof) and also depending on the nature of the votes that we are examining.
Understanding how people engage in politics, and what motivates them to do so, has been an ongoing concern in the social science literature. Over the past decade, scholarly interest in boycotts and buycotts, which collectively comprise political consumerism—the deliberate purchase or avoidance of products for political or ethical reasons—has increased. However, these activities not been well conceptualized, and it is not clear what motivates people to engage in political consumerism. In this paper, I theorize that postmaterialist values increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in the United States. To test this expectation, I use original, nationally representative U.S. survey data, and I find that postmaterialist values significantly increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism, while materialist values not, with controls in place for partisanship, ideology, and other democratic norms.
This article argues that the threat of review and reversal by supervising courts affects circuit court judges differently in disputes focusing on law compared to disputes focusing on facts. Because fact-bound cases are less likely to be reviewed than law-bound cases, lower court judges are freer to indulge their policy preferences in fact-bound cases. I test this argument using computer-assisted content analysis to measure the extent to which legal disputes are based on interpretations of facts and interpretations of relevant legal standards, respectively. The results of this content analysis are then used as independent variables in a model predicting the outcomes of legal challenges to the actions of administrative agencies. The results indicate that highly fact-bound decisions amplify the effects of judicial ideology while highly law-bound decisions constrain the effects of ideology.
This paper examines how interpersonal social networks relate to the voting behavior of men and women. We argue that underlying the gender gap in voting is related to social processes that depend on the partisan and sex composition of networks. Analysis of the 2000 American National Election Study identified two ways that sex differences are relevant to network explanations of voting behavior. First, men have more sex homophily in their networks than women. As men are more likely to be Republican than women, this leads to different discussion environments for men and women. Second, men—and not women—are more likely to share the political opinion of women discussants, but only when they are pro-Bush and the remainder of the network is also supportive. The results support a social model of voting behavior that highlights the importance of social factors (in this case sex) other than just partisan differences.
Recently, a burgeoning literature has developed around the idea that personality traits influence political attitudes and orientations. There has also been increasing recognition that orientations like the sense of civic duty exert a powerful influence on voting behavior. Despite the theoretical and empirical importance of civic duty, little research has investigated its antecedents. This article turns to individual personality traits as a potential explanation for why some people feel a stronger sense of civic duty than others. The analysis shows that a number of the Big Five traits shape an individual’s sense of civic duty, with Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Openness having statistically significant (p < .05) effects. The effects of personality traits rival and, in some cases, exceed the influence of variables that have typically been used to explain the sense of duty, including income. In the end, this study provides new evidence that personality traits influence broad orientations toward political life.
Regulation of the environment is often characterized as a polarizing issue that pits public health against economic growth. Although researchers have examined the decisions of federal district court judges in environmental civil penalty cases and examined the decision making of administrative law judges (ALJ), there has been no research which has examined factors that influence ALJ decision making in environmental civil penalty cases at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I theorize that ALJ decisions, like federal district court judge decisions, are a function of personal policy preferences, hierarchical controls by higher courts, separation of powers influences, and case and defendant characteristics. Results demonstrate that the size of civil penalties issued by ALJs at the EPA is influenced by personal policy preferences, political constraints via Congress, hierarchical control by the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) and the Supreme Court, litigant characteristics, and case characteristics. Overall, EPA ALJs seem to put more emphasis on their role as judge than their role as bureaucrat. The influence of attitudes raises normative concerns regarding the level of independence that is provided to ALJs as the weighing of public health versus economic growth seems to be based in personal policy preferences rather than technical expertise.
Examining the systematic and private records of a former D.C. Circuit Court Judge, we examine the process by which federal circuit court judges craft legal opinions. We discover that private and contextual factors influence legal outcomes. More specifically, we find that workload considerations strongly influence circuit opinions, that some visiting and senior judges effect the process differently than do active circuit court judges, and that panel effects play but a minimal role in the creation of opinions. In short, we move the literature on circuit court decision making forward by employing private archival material that illuminates how private and contextual features influence opinion writing and legal policy.
The diversification of the federal courts has led to a number of studies focusing on the voting behavior of African American and, to a lesser extent, Latino judges. Despite expectations that minority judges will vote differently from their White colleagues, extant research demonstrates mixed results. Perhaps one reason for this outcome is that they fail to account for the conditional role that coracial and coethnic claimants might have on behavior. This study examines the voting behavior of minority judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Focusing on employment discrimination claims between 2001 and 2009, this analysis demonstrates that minority judges are not monolithic in their voting behavior. While African American judges are more likely to vote in favor of Black claimants, Latino judges are less likely to vote in favor of the claimant more generally. In all, the findings have important implications for substantive policy outcomes.
Recent work on social influence has highlighted the importance of socially supplied political expertise, crediting it with strengthening attitudes, resolving ambivalence, and encouraging political participation. However, in focusing on the consequences of socially supplied political expertise, scholars have made the implicit assumption that citizens have equal access to this resource and have largely ignored its distribution. Given that individuals are constrained by their social contexts, we are particularly troubled by this oversight, and thus use two nationally representative data sources to explore the distribution of expertise among and throughout the social networks of citizens. We find consistent evidence that existing resource inequalities reinforce the unequal distribution of expertise in social networks—a gender-moderated pattern that involvement in civil society may help remedy.
More than 50 years after Brown v. Board, African American students continue to trail their White peers on a variety of important educational indicators. In this article, we investigate the political foundations of the racial "achievement gap" in American education. Using variation in high school graduation rates across the states, we first assess whether state policymakers are attentive to the educational needs of struggling African American students. We find evidence that state policymaking attention to teacher quality—an issue education research shows is essential to improving schooling outcomes for racial minority students—is highly responsive to low graduation rates among White students, but bears no relationship to low graduation rates among African American students. We then probe a possible mechanism behind this unequal responsiveness by examining the factors that motivate White public opinion about education reform and find racial influences there as well. Taken together, we uncover evidence that the persisting achievement gap between White and African American students has distinctively political foundations.
Do people specifically seek to live among political co-partisans when they relocate? Does the partisan composition of the neighborhood affect their level of residential satisfaction? Drawing on survey data and a survey-embedded experiment, I find that people have a clear preference for co-partisans. Both Republican and Democrat identifiers prefer more co-partisans in their neighborhood. Although the preference is not the primary factor in deciding where to settle, the partisan composition of a neighborhood does affect an individual’s sense of neighborhood satisfaction. Results from a survey-embedded experiment show that respondents’ subjective satisfaction is sensitive to objective facts about their neighborhood. Respondents’ satisfaction slightly decreases when told their neighborhood has a higher presence of members of the opposite party than perceived.
How do campaigns decide what issues to emphasize for voters? According to most studies, campaigns rely on factors outside of their control—issue salience, party issue ownership, and district ideology. In this article, I argue that campaign messages are designed primarily based on the candidate. I examine the issue content of campaign advertisements from U.S. House and Senate campaigns from 2000 to 2004 and develop a measure that determines if candidates have developed a reputation on a particular issue. When candidates have developed such a reputation, their campaign is more likely to highlight that issue to voters than campaigns whose candidate has not developed such a reputation. This relationship is consistent across most issues and across two different measures of a campaign’s issue agenda.
Prior public opinion research has identified a wide range of circumstances in which polling results may be tainted by social desirability bias. In races pitting a Black candidate against White opponents, this has often been referred to as the "Bradley effect" (aka "Wilder effect" or "Dinkins effect"), by which survey respondents overstate their preference for Black candidates running against White opponents. This study examines the accuracy of polling on same-sex marriage ballot measures relative to polling on other statewide ballot issues in all states voting on the issue from 1998 to 2012, controlling for a range of theoretically relevant contextual factors. There has been a great deal of speculation, though little empirical evidence, that polling systematically understates opposition to same-sex marriage. Consistent with social desirability bias, this study finds that opposition to same-sex marriage is about 5% to 7% greater on election day than in preelection polls.
Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of disclosure requirements, some donors have been able to remain anonymous through a combination of regulatory gaps, complicated financing schemes, and lags in when information is made public. As a first examination of the potential consequences of increased anonymity in political advertising we designed an experiment that varied the amount and format of information about the interests behind an attack ad sponsored by an "unknown" group. We find that participants were more supportive of the attacked candidate after viewing information disclosing donors, suggesting that voters may discount a group-sponsored ad when they have more information about the financial interests behind the message. We also find some evidence that the effect of disclosure depends on how campaign finance information is presented. Our study has implications for how (to this point, failed) congressional efforts to require greater disclosure of campaign finance donors may affect electoral politics.
Since most Americans are politically unsophisticated, but political attitudes are reasonably predictable, what is it that guides political behavior? This study suggests it is moral judgment. The article first lays down the mechanisms explaining the role of morality in attitude strength, extremity of attitude, tendency to issue voting, and participation, and then examines the extent these are accounted for by moral convictions. Sentimental and reasoned moral convictions are strong political cues, available to both ideological sides, and independent of political sophistication. Since political attitudes may be based on moral judgments that occur very quickly, via emotional and intuitive responses, coherent public opinion does not require unusual levels of political competence and motivation.
Does rhetoric highlighting social norms or mentioning science in a communication affect individuals’ beliefs about global warming and/or willingness to take action? We draw from framing theory and collective-interest models of action to motivate hypotheses that are tested in two large web-based survey-experiments using convenience samples. Our results show that attitudes about global warming, support for policies that would reduce carbon emissions, and behavioral intentions to take voluntary action are strongly affected by norm- and science-based interventions. This has implications for information campaigns targeting voluntary efforts to promote lifestyle changes that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The methods used to select public officials affect the preferences they bring to office, the incentives they face while in office, and, ultimately, the policy goals they pursue. We argue that the preferences and actions of local election officials (LEOs) differ depending on whether they are elected or appointed. We test these expectations with a data set that includes the survey responses of 1,200 Wisconsin LEOs, structured interviews, census data, and returns from the 2008 presidential election. Drawing upon a natural experiment in how officials are selected, we find that, compared to appointed officials, elected officials express greater support for voter access and expressless concern about ballot security and administrative costs. For appointed officials, we find that voter turnout in a municipality is lower when the LEO’s self-reported partisanship differs from the partisanship of the electorate but only in cases where the official is a Republican.
We examine public attitudes about one of the most visible procedural features of Congress, the Senate’s filibuster and cloture practice. We measure the stability of those attitudes during an important legislative episode, relate them to more abstract attitudes about majority rule and minority rights, and draw inferences about the importance of those attitudes for evaluations of the parties and vote intention for the 2010 elections. We find that filibuster attitudes change in ways predicted by respondents’ partisan and policy preferences. Moreover, controlling for party identification, ideology, policy views, and attitudes about majority rule and minority rights in the abstract, filibuster attitudes have modest, asymmetric effects on party evaluations but no effect on vote intention.
Research indicates that, when engaging their opponents, strategic candidates will draw (and redraw) lines of conflict, pulling attention to their advantaged topics. But do these expectations hold up in debates, where candidates are at the mercy of those asking the questions? And do strategic debate behaviors matter? This study draws on past literature to hypothesize the specific types of agenda-control behaviors we should see in debates. These hypotheses are tested in the 2008 presidential debates, using quantitative content analysis to examine candidate agenda setting, issue framing, and tone. The results show that both Obama and McCain used all three means of agenda control to continually displace the line of conflict in their favor. These findings offer empirical support for theories of strategic agenda control and heighten our understanding of agenda setting, framing, and tone as agenda-control mechanisms. Additionally, media and public opinion data suggest these debate agenda-control behaviors had real effects during the 2008 election.
A great deal of research focuses on contributions by political action committees (PACs) to candidates, but PACs are also institutional mechanisms for mobilizing contributions by individuals. Restrictions on the ability of PACs sponsored by businesses, trade associations, and labor unions to solicit contributions and the private benefits of contributing imply that these PACs are likely to mobilize donors who do not otherwise contribute to political campaigns. Analysis of itemized contributions to PACs during the 2004 election cycle confirms this. Moreover, the numbers of donors and dollars contributed to sponsored PACs aggregated by congressional district during 1996-2006 are relatively unaffected by electoral competition, presidential cycles, or changes in campaign finance regulations, and the effects of urbanization are less uniform than for nonconnected PACs. PACs sponsored by economic institutions therefore expand the pool of donors beyond the usual suspects.
Theories of political culture have traditionally been based on how the mass public views the role of government, yet scholars have rarely studied this issue. Using American National Election Studies(ANES) data from 1952 to 2008, I track cultural changes in external efficacy, a measure of the public’s beliefs about government responsiveness. The aggregate- and individual-level results indicate that external efficacy varied across political cultures until around 1980, when the differences dissipated. These findings should cause scholars to question some of the underlying theoretical basis of political culture, as well as the measurement of external efficacy.
What determines state success when petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for review? We suggest that states can improve the likelihood of securing Supreme Court review by coordinating litigation efforts. This coordination occurs in two ways. First, some states coordinate their appellate litigation efforts internally through the creation of state solicitors general offices. Second, external coordination occurs when states join amicus briefs at the agenda setting stage urging the Supreme Court to grant review in state-filed cases. Using new data on all state-filed certiorari petitions from the 2001-2009 terms, we find that internal and external coordination is associated with an increased likelihood of the Supreme Court granting review in state-filed cases.
Recent research has taken note of the steadfast growth of the Latino population in the United States by examining Latino attitudes toward those commonly identified as nonimmigrants, Whites and Blacks. Extant literature on Latino racial attitudes explores the determinants of Latinos’ perceptions of commonality with Whites and Blacks, yet it has greatly overlooked the impact that skin tone, a key differentiating factor of Latinos, has in explaining these attitudes. Using the 2006 Latino National Survey, we develop models that examine the extent that skin tone explains Latinos’ commonality with Whites and Blacks. We find that self-reported skin tone considerably explains Latinos’ attitudes toward Whites and Blacks with light-skinned Latinos sensing greater commonality with Whites and less commonality with Blacks than dark-skinned Latinos. We also find that skin tone moderates the relationship between linked fate with Latinos and closeness with Whites and the relationship between social contact and closeness with Blacks and Whites.